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DEDICATED TO:
A yoimg imdetgmduate,
Who dreamed after truth, 
Attd understanding.
Well, the trutli is partial,
And the understanding less, 
But the dream was not clear. 
For something is established.
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ABSTRACT
The thesis argues, iti the main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein’s rule- 
following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Pemarks on the foundations of 
Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by 
Kripke, that is destructive o f a realist account o f rules and contends that the correct 
application o f a rule is not fully determined in an understanding o f the rule. In  addition to 
these consequences, tliis negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dum m ett’s charge o f radical 
conventionalism (a charge that also, but differendy, applies to certain mid-period views and 
this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by 
Kripke’s sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a 
sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative 
considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding o f a rule 
of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able 
to follow a rule correctiy. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined 
understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect o f this appearance, involves what 
Wittgenstein calls following a rule “blindly” in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, o f 
following a rule blindly, involves developing an account o f an alternative rational response to 
rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but aU the 
same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule 
application.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis, in very broad terms, aims to provide an uncovering o f tire arguments and 
structure of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on rule-following (although in the first chapter, which 
treats o f Wittgenstein’s middle period, the concern is largely not the rule-following 
considerations, which is a development o f the later period, but with dominant and preceding 
views o f the middle period). It is an over-arching objective to show that there is systematic 
thinldng, structure and argument, to Wittgenstein’s remarks despite an outward showing to 
the contrary. The considerations raised in the rule-following remarks are central to 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, to his views on meaning, understanding and rationality, and 
the main contribution of this thesis, I believe, lies in its raising firom the relief the structure 
and connections of Wittgenstein’s thoughts. The later Wittgenstein is not an openly 
systematic plihosopher in the presentation of his thoughts, but this is not to say that there is 
not method, rigour and arrangement to his thoughts. Wittgenstein may seem like he is just 
making observations, from one remark to the next, but he is also, in the course, to a large 
extent defending these observations.
However, this agenda meets an immediate concern. The later Wittgenstein is careful 
to say that philosophy should not be about advancing theses, and building theories (c.f., PI 
128,126).^ It should be practised as a form o f therapy for exactly this predilection to 
system-build. I do not reject this as a concern. But it is a concern that, to say up front, I whl 
largely leave to the side. I do tliink that arguments are employed, dieses advanced, 
throughout die Philosophical Investigations (and in other works), and that it is a disservice to
 ^ In this thesis, I will use the established abbreviations for texts and citation methods when referring to 
passages from the works o f  Wittgenstein (e.g., referring by remark number rather tlian page number; 
an exception, although still remaining witli convention, is tliat references to tire Philosophical Investigations (PI) will 
refer simply to the remark number if  from the first part (and this witliout explicit mention that tliey are from 
the first part) but, if  from the second part, wül refer to the second part explicitly widi a page number). These 
abbreviations are provided in tlie Bibliography alongside the bibliographic details o f  tire respective works.
Also, references to Wittgenstein’s works will be made in tire body o f  tire text wlrile other references wül be 
made in footnotes.
Wittgenstein’s philosophy to deny him the strength o f argument for his views. I admit that I 
may take things a bit far when setting down theses, and presenting arguments with stated 
premises and conclusions^, but this is done with the stated intent of trying to achieve a 
greater clarity o f the structure and character o f Wittgenstein’s thoughts. Theses are certainly 
presented throughout (I take this as obvious, in spite o f protestations that philosophy is not 
about advancing theories). And they are not expressed without reasons. I endeavour to 
make these reasons clear to view, and principally as regards the rule-following 
considerations. There is a view o f reading Wittgenstein that says that it is disingenuous to 
present him as an argumentative philosopher. However, I concur with the sentiment, 
expressed by Eilce von Savigny^, that if  we refrain from reading Wittgenstein as propounding 
debatable theses, we remove him from contemporary philosophical debate. In which case 
the disservice is not only to him, but to ourselves.
A binding theme o f this thesis is the issue (indeed, the accusation) o f radical 
conventionalism. Radical conventionalism — first charged to Wittgenstein by Dummett — is 
the view that at any given step, the correct way to follow a rule is a matter o f decision. Even 
for rules that we take as necessary that they be followed in a certain way, this necessity is a 
matter o f decision (we decide to treat a rule as unassailable). A conclusion follows firom a set 
o f premises, in this view, as a matter o f decision (and hence the accusation that, under such a 
view, proofs do not prove; they do not compel). This charge o f radical conventionalism can 
be distinguished as drawing on two different sets o f views o f Wittgenstein’s: his rule- 
following considerations o f the later period and the concept modification thesis and strong 
verificationism of the middle period. And so, this charge finds itself being thrown at
2 And I refer the reader to a handy reference sheet o f  these attached at the end, after the Bibliography, wliich 
may be removed for convenience in reading.
 ^During a presentation at the 24* Annual Wittgenstein Symposium in Kkchberg am Wechsel, in Austria, 2001.
Wittgenstein in both liis middle and later periods, and to different (and, as I  will show) 
exclusive sets of views. The first chapter picks up the task o f clearing Wittgenstein o f this 
charge in his middle period. The charge of radical conventionalism, directed at rule- 
foUowing considerations, is attended to from the second chapter on. It is no t the main 
theme o f the discussion o f rule-foUowing in these chapters, but it is always close to the 
surface. For instance, it is observed that a sceptical reading of the rule-following remarks — 
the preoccupation o f the second and third chapters and, in virtue o f its response, the fourth 
chapter — provides a basis for the charge o f radical conventionalism.
Another theme binding this thesis — from the first chapter to the last — has to do 
with issues of determinacy (although the issues raised concerning determinacy are somewhat 
different in the middle period than in the later period). In his middle period, at least for 
mathematical propositions, Wittgenstein upheld that sense must be determinate. Indeed, 
this view carried to the extent that any modification to this sense constituted a different 
proposition. For instance, he upheld that a matliematical proof modifies the sense of a 
mathematical proposition, and in virtue of this modification, a proof, in effect, introduces a 
new proposition, a new rule (and hence does not prove the original proposition). In the 
later period, the point is made that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in 
our grasp of the rule. This thought is described by Wittgenstein, among other ways, by 
saying that our mind does not “fly ahead” to the whole use o f a word or rule, to all 
unconsidered steps, in our grasp. This lack o f determination in our understanding o f a rule 
is quite an important point for the later Wittgenstein, I contend, but one that is difficult to 
get a handle on. I will offer a firm grip by approaching the point through an account o f how 
our understanding of any rule is underdetermined by underdetermining instructions and 
training in the rule. This will involve tlie Une o f argument that our understanding of a rule
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does not transcend an understanding o f instructions and training (itself a central rule- 
following consideration to be developed and explained), and thus, since these 
underdetermine the correct way to follow a rule, our understanding o f any rule is thereby 
underdetennined.
Following a rule correctly from an underdetermined understanding would seem to 
involve an epistemic leap for we are able to grasp a unique way of proceeding from a set o f 
instructions that can be consistently interpreted along indefinitely many lines. Following a 
rule in spite o f this apparent gap in our understanding will involve what Wittgenstein calls 
following a rule ‘hlindly” (indeed, the very locution o f “following a rule blindly” is a 
concession to the point that, from a point of view, when we follow a rule in this way we 
proceed unjustified or arbitrarily). That is, it will be asserted that despite the fact that the 
understanding of any rule is underdetermined, this need not imply that we come to see a rule 
as indeterminate in what it proscribes. I t is an interesting point that this issue — the 
underdetermination in our understanding o f a rule — and the response it requires — in terms 
of blind rule-foUowing — does not arise as a problematic in the middle period (and again, this 
has to do with a different view o f the requirements o f determinacy in our understanding of a 
word or concept in that period).
Turning now to a brief overview o f the chapters, there are two basic reasons for the 
existence o f Chapter 1 which deals with Wittgenstein’s middle period while the rest focus on 
his later period. First, as noted, the charge o f radical conventionalism bifurcates into two: 
one directed at middle period views, and the other at later period views. Attending to the 
charge o f radical conventionalism, thus, requires attending to its manifestation as a charge 
against Wittgenstein’s middle period views. Second, it allows us to gain some understanding 
of Wittgenstein’s later views on rules by looking to his immediately preceding views o f the
middle period on similar points. I would not say tliat what we find here are proto-rule 
following considerations. Indeed, much o f what is said conflicts with the later thought. But 
tliis still offers elucidation: if  we do not gain a view to the later period through a 
foreshadowing in the middle period, then we have available a view informed by contrast, i.e., 
an understanding of the later thought informed by an understanding of what was abandoned 
from the middle period.
In Chapter 2 ,1 present and explain basic rule-following considerations and raise two 
sceptical arguments that are built on these considerations. These arguments share 
paradoxical conclusions — that there is no rule-following — and to some extent even 
premises, but are different in the tactics employed. We see one proceed inductively, arguing 
tliat an underdetermined understanding is open to interpretation along indefinitely many 
lines, and so if grasping the correct way to follow a rule requires interpreting, then we are left 
unable to follow a rule for reason of having no (non-arbitrary) basis for settling on a course 
o f action. The other argues, along conceptual lines, that if instructions underdetermine our 
understanding o f the most basic of rules, such that we can find these rules open to 
interpretation, then no course o f action is determined by a rule or Its instructions, and where 
there is no deterrnination, it is argued, there is no rule or iustrucdon in a rule. These are 
presented as separate arguments but there is a strong interdependence for part o f one 
argument is in the service o f supporting a premise o f the otlier (and so, in this respect, we 
may see these as a single, more intricate argument, but I present these as two separate 
arguments to keep clear the different methods o f arguing}. These arguments are claimed to 
be Wittgenstein’s own for reason tliat they are drawn closely fi:om the text.
Furthermore, these arguments offer a case against a realist view o f rules; I will 
present this case and describe and explain that it involves a version o f the private language
argument (which whl also be shown to follow on from rule-foUowing considerations). In  the 
Appendix to the chapter I offer a more general view o f this argument against private 
language and make the point that tliis can be defended in a non-verificationist way. Also, in 
tliis chapter, I present Kripke’s sceptical argument and compare this to Wittgenstein’s 
argument(s). These are no t the same — a perhaps obvious point — altliough certain building 
blocks are shared and these are discussed. And although Kripke’s argument does not 
provide a faithful view o f Wittgenstein’s argument in the detail, I do sympathise, and this 
should be stressed, with Kripke’s general view o f Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks as 
embodying both a negative and positive agenda. This will be made apparent as we move 
from the second chapter, where I am occupied with the negative agenda, to the fourth, 
where I attend to the positive.
Chapter 3, to start, concerns itself with commentators on Wittgenstein who find 
disagreement witli Kripke’s argument. These commentators object to Kripke (or at least, 
this is the main objection that I focus on) arguing that the sceptical argument is correctly to 
be read as a reductio. I agree with this. However, I add that this does not absolve us firom 
having to give an explanation o f how it is that the culpable premise, which takes us to a 
sceptical conclusion, is rejected (while accepting that there is a premise to be rejected is a 
result o f the argument being read as a reductio). Among objectors, I focus on McDowell 
and argue that the devices offered to account for the rejection o f a premise — namely, an 
appeal to custom — does not serve this end. I also discuss McDowell’s overall view of the 
general structure o f arguments in the rule-following remarks and find this to be a false view. 
Accounting for this structure is a main objective o f this thesis and so treating McDowell’s 
view on this point, a subde and, in some respects, a compelling view, allows me to further 
this objective tlirough indirect means. And further, I add that although the argument is to
be treated as a reductio, it is not the case diat diis denies negative consequence to tlie rule- 
following remarks. That is, while it is admitted that there must be a way to grasp a rule that 
is not an interpretation in order to avoid the sceptical paradox, this does no t deny that the 
understanding of any rule is underdetermined by training and instructions in the rule. A t the 
end, this is left in need of account; how is it that we are able to follow a rule correctly 
despite an underdetermined understanding and this without coming to interpret the rule?
Chapter 4 picks up this problem and approaches it by first broadening the terms of 
the debate. That is, the question of underdetermination is Hnked to the question o f how it is 
that we are able to follow a rule without reasons, or at least, reasons that run short of 
justifying or vindicating a unique (let alone the correct) course of action. An answer is 
fasliioned on the basis that there is an alternative rational mode under which we can come to 
grasp instructions in a rule; that is, we need not interpret because we can come to grasp a 
rule under what I call the ‘reactive’ mode o f rationality. This alternative rational mode or 
standard is that in virtue o f which we are able to follow a rule “blindly”. It is through a 
description and explanation o f this rational mode that Wittgenstein’s positive programme is 
developed and die sceptical or negative agenda answered. This positive programme, 
however, is less open to view in the lule-foUowing remarks than the negative. Tliere is just a 
greater scarcity o f positive-minded pronouncements. And so, fashioning this account draws 
together apparendy different lines o f thought and argument. In the end, the view of the 
positive programme obtained is bit o f a patchwork, Neverdieless, the framework for an 
account — as involving a distinction in our rational response to rules and instructions — is 
established and important steps in filling this out are taken.
CHAPTER 1
Radical Conventionalism and the Middle Period
I. Introduction
Dummett accuses Wittgenstein o f being a radical conventionalist. He describes this as 
follows:
^ttgenstein goes in for a full-blooded conventionaHsm; for liiin die logical necessity o f  any statement is 
always die direct expression o f  a linguistic convention. That a given statement is necessary consists 
always in our having expressly decided to treat tiiat very statement as unassailable; it cannot rest on oiu  
having adopted certain other conventions which are found to involve our treating it so. This account is 
applied alike to deep theorems and to elementary computations.^
Under this characterization, all necessity is decided. It is not the case that we accept certain 
statements and that others follow as necessary consequences. Rather, one statement follows 
another with necessity only if we decide so. WTietlier we accept that the last sentence in a 
mathematical proof, or that any sentence in a proof, follows from another is strictly a matter 
o f decision. Let ‘RC’ stand for this position.
RC: The logical necessity of any statement is decided.
Under this view, tliere is no logical compulsion and so no logical necessity as we normally 
conceive o f it. It is clear that this is a “radical” position. Note that Dum m ett indicates, not 
just that Wittgenstein’s views (perhaps unwittingly) commit him to RC, but more dainning, 
that Wittgenstein explicitly endorses RC.
The charge o f radical conventionalism can be seen to follow from both what Crispin 
Wright calls Wittgenstein’s ‘Concept Modification Thesis’ and from rule-following 
considerations.^ This means that Wittgenstein in both his middle period, in which the
 ^Dummett [1966], pp. 425-426.
2 Tills division in sources o f  the charge o f  radical conventionalism is not clear in Dummett’s initial expression, 
but becomes so with Wright’s account o f  the issue and liis elaboration o f tlie relevant views o f  "Wtittgenstein. 
See especially Wright [1980], Ch. 3.
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concept modification thesis is expressed and rule-foEowing considerations begin to form, 
and his later period, when the rule-following considerations reach maturity, is allegedly a 
radical conventionalist.
In  this chapter, I will focus on the charge o f radical conventionalism as drawn from 
the concept modification thesis. I wiU defend tliat this thesis — read in a way to imply RC — 
is a product o f related views o f Wittgenstein’s on the status of conjectures in mathematics 
and verificationism regarding mathematical propositions. It is my contention that once the 
concept modification thesis is read in terms o f tliese other views, RC ceases to be a 
consequence and further, even if it were, these other views are works in progress o f the 
middle period texts that are abandoned or sufficientiy evolved by the later period so as to 
quell the charge o f radical conventionalism as ultimately drawn from these views. As a 
result, the charge of radical conventionalism as drawn from the concept modification thesis 
is a non-starter in the later period. The charge is, at best, only appropriate if  leveled against a 
work in progress and not then either as I will argue. Tliis case is largely exegetical. As far as 
denying the charge o f radical conventionalism as drawn from the rule-following 
considerations, this case cannot be similarly exegetical because these considerations do not 
express unsure thoughts to be later repudiated or dramatically reformed. Malting this more 
difficult case will be an occupation o f the coming chapters and will provide an entryway to 
the further discussions o f rule-foUowing in tliese later chapters.
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II. The Concept Modification Thesis.
Let ‘CM’ stand for die concept modification thesis.
CM: A proof serves to modify the sense of a mathematical proposition.
According to the concept modification thesis, proofs are a source o f new concepts; they 
create new concepts for us rather than enable the investigation and further development of 
existing concepts.^ This thesis is drawn from remarks o f Wittgenstein’s (in his middle 
period) such as the following:
Well, I could say: a mathematician is always inventing new forms o f  description. Some, stimulated by 
practical needs, others, from aesthetic needs, - and yet odiers in a variety o f ways. And here imagine a 
landscape gardener designing paths for the layout o f  a garden; it may well be that he draws diem on a 
drawing board merely as ornamental strips witiiout die slightest drought o f someone’s sometime walking 
on them. (EPM 1167)
The madiematician is an inventor, not a discoverer. (E P M I168)
a madiematical proof incorporates die mathematical proposition into a new calculus, and alters its 
position in madiematics. The proposition widi its proof doesn’t belong to the same category as die 
proposition without die proof. (PG 371)
When I said that a proof introduces a new concept, I meant sonietiiihg like: die proof puts a new 
paradigm among die paradigms o f  the language; Eke when someone mixes a special reddish-blue, 
somehow setties die special mixture o f  die colours and gives it a name. But even if  we are inclined to 
regard a proof as such a new paradigm — what is die exact similarity o f the proof to such a concept- 
model? One would like to say: die proof changes the grammar o f our language, changes our concepts. 
It makes new connections and it creates the concepts o f  tiiese connections. (It does not estabhsh diat 
tiiey are tiiere; diey do not exist until it makes diem.) (RFM  III 31)
Tlie idea that proof creates a new concept might also be roughly put as follows. A proof is not its 
foundations plus the rules o f  inference, but a m v  budding — although it is an example o f  such-and-such 
a style. A  proof is a m v  paradigm. The concept wliich die proof creates may, for example, be a new
' Wright [1980], pp. 41-42.
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concept o f  inference, a new concept o f  inferring,.. Tire proof creates a new concept by creating or 
being a new sign. Or — by giving die proposition wliich is its result a new place. (EFMII. 41)'*
Remarks such as these underlie the thought, expressed above, that proofs modify our 
understanding o f concepts in virtue o f introducing new concepts.^ Based on the concept 
modification thesis, Wright observes that a proof does not prove what it sets out to prove. 
H e states:
if  the sense o f the conclusion is changed, dien nodiing in the way in wliich we understood it before can 
have required us to accept die proof; and similarly for our ctiteria for the correctness o f  die steps. To 
accept the proof is a new step in no way imposed on us by out prior understanding o f  die notion o f  
correct proof or o f  die concepts in die conclusion. Hence die appropriateness o f  the picture o f  decision.^
However, as it is stated, the concept modification thesis does not imply radical 
conventionalism. It is possible that a proof can modify the sense o f a proposition without 
the basis for the acceptance o f the proposition thereby being a decision. This is because it 
remains possible to trace the change in sense from the original conjecture to the modified 
proposition such tliat we can recognize that it is the same proposition and thereupon 
maintain that the p roof is a proof of the original conjecture, Wright realizes this but does 
not think that this possibility applies here. He contends that this would require that we be 
able to give an account o f how tlie proof affected the sense of the original conjecture. He 
states, “It ought to be possible to give an account of how certain concepts have been 
modified.”  ^ Wright interprets Wittgenstein’s concept modification thesis as not allowing for 
such an account. Let this be called ‘CM*’
“* These remarks, and others, are presented by Wright as evidence for attributing to Wittgenstein a 
conventionalist view o f  mathematics, and more specifically, die view diat proofs modify concepts. See Wright 
[1980], pp. 39-40.
 ^This distinction between modifying concepts and introducing new concepts is important and one to wliich I 
win shordy return.
Wright [1980], pp. 41-42.
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CM* A proof selves to modify the sense of a mathematical proposition and it is not 
possible to give an account of how this sense has been modified.
Since a proof changes the sense o f a mathematical conjecture and we cannot trace this 
change, the basis for accepting the original conjecture would presumably be a decision.
Thus, radical conventionalism is obtained from CM* because the proof does not prove the 
original conjecture (i.e., if we cannot account for the change in sense then we cannot assert 
that the original proposition is the same as that supported by the prooQ. Wright elaborates, 
“The idea o f conceptual change is intelligible par excellence in the sort o f case where we can 
trace the development o f a concept through alterations in the conditions under which its 
application is considered to be justified, where, that is, we can compare the old and the new 
conditions.”® The view here is that we cannot trace our understanding o f a concept through 
its change. Consequently, we cannot compare our old and new understandings. Surely, we 
could accept that a proof may affect our understanding of the sense o f a conjecture; we can 
admit tliat it draws new connections (and that “seeing” these connections is part of 
recognizing that the proof works). But this (which is so far to admit to only CM) is not what 
Wittgenstein is here taken to say, or at least not the all o f it. According to CM*, there is no 
connection between our understanding of the proposition pre- and post-proof that would 
allow us to track the change, let alone recognize that it is the same proposition. Wright, 
understandably, finds tliis diought unconvincing:
N ow  if  with Wittgenstein, we attempt to maintain that accepting a proof o f a statement changes its 
meaning, tlien it ought to be possible, after we have accepted tlie proof, satisfactorily to convey what 
our understanding o f  tlie statement used to be. It ought to be possible to give an account o f  how  
certain concepts have been modified. Part o f one’s natural resistance to Wittgenstein’s suggestion is, o f  
course, diat tiiis does not seem to be possible. It seems to us diat nothing changes as a result o f die 
proof; indeed, that if  we could discern an alteration in our concept of, for example, the pattern o f
7 Wright [1980], p. 42.
8 Wright [1980], p. 42.
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appEcation o f a particular rule o f  inference, brought about by tlie appEcation o f  it made in the proof, 
then the proof would faE short o f  complete cogency precisely at tlie point where the rule is appEed.**
Wright adds the point that if  a proof serves to change our understanding o f inference rules, 
then proof acceptance should require new training or explanation (to go with the new way of 
understanding the concepts or expressions as they are now used). Since this is not part o f 
our practice o f proof acceptance, Wright again finds for the unacceptabihty o f
The unacceptabdity o f CM* (as opposed to CM) is due to the point that proofs 
modify sense without our being able to trace (and thereby even recognize) the change in 
sense. But the reason why we cannot trace our understanding o f a mathematical proposition 
from pre- to post-proof is that, according to Wittgenstein, there is no understanding of a 
mathematical proposition to be had pre-proof; that is, there are no mathematical 
conjectures. There is nothing to trace back to. This is what I will call Wittgenstein’s ‘no­
conjecture thesis’. CM*, read a certain way (the right way I will claim), is a consequence of 
this thesis. Furthermore, the no-conjecture thesis, and so with it CM*, are consequences of 
Wittgenstein’s strong verificationist views regarding matliematical propositions in his middle 
period (which wiU be die topic o f the next section but one).
III. The No-Conjecture Thesis
According to the concept modification diesis, a proof changes die sense o f  a mathematical 
proposition. Stricdy speaking then, the concept modification thesis requires it diat there be 
mathematical conjectures widi sense. That is, if a proof is to modify sense, then the
» Wright [1980], p. 43.
Altiiough we would want to admit that the understanding o f  a proof does sometimes require training in new 
concepts — perhaps if  serving as a paradigm sliift in Kulin’s sense — and it is interesting to note that
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proposition prior to proof (the conjecture) must possess sense to be modified. However, 
Wittgenstein, and this is still to focus on liis middle period, is clear in denying this. He 
maintains that there are no mathematical conjectures. Consider, initially, the following 
remarks:
How can there be conjectures in Matliematics? Or better, what sort o f  tiling is it tliat looks like a 
conjecture in mathematics? (PG 359)
Only the so-called proof establishes any connection between the hypothesis and tlie primes as such. And 
tliat is shown by the fact that — as I’ve said — until tlien the hypothesis can be construed as one 
belonging purely to physics. — On the other hand when we have supplied a proof, it doesn’t prove what 
was conjectured at all, since I can’t conjecture to infinity. I can only conjecture what can be confirmed, 
but experience can only confirm a finite number o f  conjectures, and you can’t conjecture tlie proof untE 
you’ve got it, and not tiien either. (PG 360)
We see here Wittgenstein uphold that there are no conjectures in mathematics.^^ Tliere is a 
manifest conflict between the concept modification thesis and the no-conjecture thesis. The 
former presumes that there are conjectures with sense in mathematics (for a proof is to serve 
to modify that sense) while the latter thesis denies that there are conjectures in mathematics. 
However, this conflict is only apparent. Under a more careful and appropriate reading of 
the concept modification tiiesis (which I will soon elaborate), there is no conflict: a proof 
modifies sense in virtue o f providing sense to the proposition (i.e., proofs introduce sense — 
they introduce a new rule to the calculus — and speaking of their “modifying” sense should 
not be read in a way that denies this point).
Wittgenstein does talk in terms o f  proofs as introducing new ‘paradigms’ — it is certainly not tlie norm tliat 
proofs require training in new rules and so Wright’s point still holds.
** Part o f  the motivation here, when Wittgenstein says that we cannot conjecture to infinity, should sound 
intuitionistic. There is an interesting similarity but also a dissimilarit)  ^between Wittgenstein’s view and 
traditional intuitionism and I will elaborate this in the section on the Law of Excluded Middle below. Here 
Wittgenstein is saying that we can only conjecture what we know we can confirm ^ e., what we know we can 
prove), but in matliematics, as opposed to the empirical sciences, tliis is already to have a proof; and so there 
are no conjectures in matliematics. I will elaborate this point fiirdier below. Also, furtlier remarks upholding 
the no-conjecture thesis will foEow.
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Wittgenstein does uphold both theses in the same period as the remadrs given testify. 
The pair o f theses, as noted, are outwardly inconsistent. Nevertheless, there is grounds for 
reading them as espousing the same thought: a proof is the source o f meaning for a 
mathematical proposition. Clearly though, GoldbacVs conjecture has a meaning even 
though we do not possess a proof; there is something that we are understanding o f the 
conjecture even though we do not Imow whether it is true.^^ And further, we want to say 
that our understanding o f the conjecture dkects us in looking for a proof (such that this 
proof be a proof o f this conjecture). Indeed, we should say that understanding a conjecture 
should offer no guidance in finding a proof if the proof is not a proof o f the conjecture. 
Wittgenstein does not seem to deny that there is something understood in a conjecture for 
he does admit that we can legitimately express the conjecture (see the remark below). 
Nevertheless, he asks: if we were to happen upon a proof, would we then be proving what 
we set out to — i.e., what we understood in die first place? His answer is “no” . Consider the 
following remark.
I am assuming tliat I conjectured tiie generalisation 'witliout conjecturing tlie proof. Does the proof 
now prove exactly tlie generalisation that I conjectured?!
Suppose someone was investigating even numbers to see if tliey confirmed Goldbachs conjecture. 
Suppose he expressed the conjecture — and it can be expressed -  that if  he continued witli dûs 
investigation, he would never meet a counterexample as long as he lived. I f  a proof o f  the theorem is 
then discovered, will it also be a proof o f the man’s conjecture? How is tiiat possible? (PG 361)
Bodi the concept modification thesis and the no-conjecture thesis are at play here in the 
discussion o f Goldbach’s conjecture. According to die concept modification thesis, the 
proposition we understand post-proof is not the same as the proposition we understood pre­
proof. Our understandings are different even if the expression o f the proposition is 
unaltered. But this means that we never prove any mathematical conjectures (for once we
Certainly we should say tiiat we have an understanding o f  Goldbach’s conjecture diat is compositional, i.e..
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happen on a proof, it is not a proof o f the original conjecture). And this means that, in 
effect, aU conjectures are idle. It is in this sense that there are no legitimate conjectures in 
mathematics. The concept modification thesis and the no conjecture thesis, far from being 
at odds, are clearly connected.
To elaborate, if  the prior meaning o f a proposition is not available after having 
understood a proof, then, as Wright observes, we should not even be able to say that it has 
changed.^^ It is, in effect, for us a new proposition or introducing a new concept. That is, 
we cannot, ex hypothesi o f the concept modification thesis (CM*), notice a change ia 
proposition or concepts and so a proof, in effect, is a source o f new concepts. Plainly, the 
understanding o f a proposition post-proof is as good as new. That is, from a post-proof 
vantage, there was no original conjecture which we set out to prove (for we have no 
understanding of the original conjecture post-prooQ. Thus, the concept modification thesis, 
read as CM*, leads us to the no-conjecture thesis. '^^ Indeed, we should say that the concept 
modification thesis is misnamed since the proof gives meaning and does not change it. To 
explain, it is part o f CM* that we notice no change in our understanding of a proposition 
and its attendant concepts from pre- to post-proof. But this should not be if  the proof is 
nevertheless affecting a change in our understanding; we should be able to marlc, if  not trace, 
this change. The no-conjecture thesis answers this difficulty by asserting that, prior to 
obtaining a proof, there was no mathematical proposition (i.e., there are no mathematical 
conjectures). The reason we notice no change in understanding is because there is no 
change; a proof is what introduces meaning and there is no meaning understood prior to 
possession of a proof. We need not find this acceptable — that there are no mathematical
an understanding o f  tlie component concepts.
" Wright [1980], 43.
And likewise, tlie no conjecture thesis supports die reading o f  die concept modification thesis as CM*.
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conjectures — in order to realise that it makes sense o f the concept modification thesis. 
Indeed, we can look again to some o f the quotations given as evidence for the concept 
modification thesis provided earlier and can easily see that they seem to justify a reading in 
terms o f the no-conjecture thesis. This is because Wittgenstein talks o f proofs as 
introducing mw concepts and new connections. Consider the following (again), but this time 
with an eye to the no-conjecture thesis.
a matliematical proof incorporates tlie mathematical proposition into a new calculus, and alters its 
position in mathematics. The proposition with its proof doesn't belong to the same category as the 
proposition without tlie proof. {PG 371)
Wlien I said tiiat a proof introduces a new concept, I meant somediing like: tlie proof puts a new 
paradigm among tlie paradigms o f  tlie language; like when someone mixes a special reddish-blue, 
somehow settles tlie special mixture o f the colours and gives it a name. But even if  we are inclined to 
regard a proof as such a new paradigm — what is the exact similarity o f the proof to such a concept- 
model? One would like to say: tlie proof changes tlie grammar o f  our language, changes our concepts. 
It makes new connections and it creates die concepts o f these connections. (It does not establish tiiat 
they are there; they do not exist until it makes them.) (RFM III 31)
The idea tiiat proof creates a new concept might also be roughly put as follows. A  proof is not its 
foundations plus the rules o f  inference, but a new building — although it is an example o f  such-and-such 
a style. A  proof is a new paradigm. The concept wliich the proof creates may, for example, be a new 
concept o f  inference, a new concept o f inferring... Tlie proof creates a new concept by creating or 
being a new sign. Or — by giving tlie proposition wliich is its result a new place. (RFM  III 41)
CM*, if  no t to be read as a portrayal o f the no-conjecture thesis, would require that proofs 
serve to enforce forgetfulness: once we have a proof o f a proposition, our understanding of 
the proposition and its attendant concepts involved prior to proof is now forgotten (for that 
is why we cannot trace our concepts to our old understanding of them). This is indefensible 
(even by the radical standards o f the issues being discussed). Further, it is a psychological 
matter which Wittgenstein is not lilcely to be after. Still further, there is reason for reading 
the concept modification thesis in light o f the no-conjecture thesis because o f Wittgenstein^s 
espousal o f both in the same period, in the same sections - indeed, as noted above - in many
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of the same remarks (and so it would be too much for them to be read as conflicting). O n 
the one hand, the two theses are at odds: the concept modification tliesis says that a proof 
serves to modify our understanding o f concepts in a mathematical conjecture (and hence 
presumes there are mathematical conjectures) whereas the no-conjecture thesis denies that 
tliere are mathematical conjectures. O n the other hand, the two theses are closely identified 
if  we read the concept modification thesis in terms such tliat a proof modifies sense in virtue 
o f its being a source o f sense. This latter reading is correct because, in addition to 
considerations raised above, it allows us to deal with the outward inconsistency between 
these two theses promoted by Wittgenstein.
The binding thought is that proofs are a source o f meaning. This is why we can say 
that proofs modify concepts (for they modify sense in the way of introducing it) and also say 
there are no meaningful mathematical conjectures. Clearly, this does not sit well with our 
intuitive views about conjectures and proofs. But that concern need no t be an obstacle 
because this chapter will argue that these theses are works in progress that do no t survive 
intact into the later period (i.e., diat they are consequences o f a parent thesis — a strong 
verificationism concerning mathematical propositions — that does not survive into the later 
period). The next section will serve to further cement the view that the correct reading o f 
the concept modification thesis (that is, o f the remarks in which it arises) is in terms o f the 
no-conjecture thesis by showing that they are both to be properly understood in terms o f 
this strong verificationism (this verificationism, as will be seen, is a dominant theme in 
Wit%enstein's discussion of mathematics in the middle period).
Prior to that, a few further comments. Wright considers the case of a proof that 
utilizes mathematical induction, our understanding o f which alters with the acceptance (and 
understanding) o f the proof. Wright asks if  we can then convey an understanding o f the
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prior meaning o f madiematical induction. We should want to say “yes” but it is a peculiarity 
o f the concept modification thesis (CM*) that we cannot draw on tlie previous 
understanding. But if we cannot draw on our previous understanding o f mathematical 
induction, on what basis then are we accepting the conclusion? It would seem that wifh the 
concept modification thesis (CM*), a proof does not prove anything. Hence the 
appropriateness o f the charge o f radical conventionalism and with it the thought that if  we 
accept a conclusion, it is not because we are compelled to do so by our understanding and 
acceptance o f the proof, but by a decision (for this seems to be the only option for accepting 
a conclusion given CM*). Notice, we are no t better off in fending off the charge o f radical 
conventionalism if we read CM* in terms o f the no-conjecture thesis. I f  there are no 
conjectures in mathematics, a fortiori^  there are no proofs o f conjectures, and again a foiiiori^  
no proofs whose acceptance and understanding compel an acceptance o f conjectures. 
Accordingly, the acceptance o f a mathematical proposition is not compelled upon us by a 
proof and hence, it seems appropriate to say, its acceptance must be a matter o f decision. 
That is, there is no mathematical proposition that we understand prior to a proof (i.e., no 
mathematical conjecture) and so no such proposition that we are compelled to accept by a 
proof; decision seems to be the next option for a basis o f acceptance. A t any rate, 
assimilating the concept modification tliesis to the no-conjecture thesis does nothing, by 
itself, to withdraw the apparent applicability o f the charge o f radical conventionalism (and so 
this was not an implicit aim o f doing so).
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the no-conjecture thesis, and with it the concept 
modification thesis, is a work in progress, as is much else discussed in the texts o f the middle 
period (which, unlike the first part of the Investigations  ^were not in a position even close to 
being ready for publication). Much o f this discussion (of both the concept modification
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thesis and the no-conjectute thesis) is in the Philosophical Grammar \sx the section having to do 
with the disanalogy between mathematical proof and scientific experiment. Unlike in the 
Tractatus, where mathematical propositions are termed ‘pseudo-propositions’, Wittgenstein, 
in his middle period, admits the locution o f ‘mathematical propositions’ bu t insists on a 
disanalogy between these and thek empirical counterparts. This disanalogy is brought out 
markedly in the distinction between empirical conjectures and would-be mathematical 
conjectures. Tliat is to say, there is no mathematical counterpart for Wittgenstein to a 
scientific or empirical conjecture. One does not make predictions (at least not in the same 
sense) and thereupon carry out experiments in mathematics as one does in science. To 
further his point, he makes a contrast between a geographical expedition and a mathematical 
one (so to speak) and notes how odd it would be if we did not Imow what we were after, or 
how to get where we want to go, in a geographical expedition while this, he contends, is 
precisely the case in mathematics. He states, “How strange it would be if  a geographical 
expedition were uncertain whether it had a goal, and so whether it had any route whatsoever. 
We can’t  imagine such a tiling, it’s nonsense. But tiiis is precisely what it is like in a 
matiiematical expedition. And so perhaps it is a good idea to drop the comparison 
altogether.”” (PG 365)
For Wittgenstein, mathematical proofs ate not experiments. We do not know what 
will constitute a proof in advance (at least in specific terms) in the mathematical case. This is 
because, in the mathematical case, to know how to get the result we want (again, in specific 
terms) is to akeady have a proof. Presumably, understanding a mathematical conjecture, if 
such were allowed, would require Imowing how such a conjecture, in a sufficientiy specific 
manner, would be satisfied. Since this would be to already possess a proof, there can be no 
mathematical conjectures. And so we may add that part of the motivation for the no­
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conjecture thesis is to retain a strong distinction between the mathematical and empirical 
cases (i.e., the no-conjecture thesis is partly a product o f working out this disanalogy). There 
is, for Wittgenstein, no understanding o f a mathematical proposition without a proof (and so 
there are no mathematical propositions that are not known to be true; and o f course, this 
again is to say that there are no mathematical conjectures). In contrast, we can understand 
an empirical proposition without Imowing that it is true (and this is because we can have an 
understanding of a method o f verification that is understood independently o f an 
understanding that the empirical proposition is true). Thus, there is a verificationist 
viewpoint about the truth and meaning o f mathematical propositions that underscores their 
disanalogy with empirical propositions: the truth o f a mathematical proposition consists in 
its proof and fiirther, tliere is no understanding o f a mathematical proposition witliout an 
understanding of a proof (for proofs are the source of meaning of mathematical 
propositions).^^
IV. Mathematical Verificationism 
rV, i. Introduction
Wittgenstein, in his middle period, clearly upholds that the sense of a mathematical 
proposition is its method of verification, i.e., its proof. As a result, if a mathematical 
proposition has not been proven (i.e., if  it is as yet undecided), then it is meaningless (and so, 
strictly speaking, it is not a proposition). Thus, what is called ‘Goldbach’s conjecture’ is 
meaningless. A proof provides a mathematical proposition with a determinate sense.
Note that intuitionists would generally agree with die former point but not this latter point. Tlùs comparison 
will be picked up in the next section.
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W ithout a proof, a mathematical proposition is without a determinate sense (and for 
Wittgenstein in his middle period, a mathematical proposition must have a determinate sense 
— I win elaborate this later on). Hence, this strong verificationist view o f mathematical 
propositions implies that there are no conjectures in mathematics. That is, the no-conjecture 
thesis (and so with it the concept modification thesis, for I have argued for thek 
assimilation) is a consequence o f this strong verificationist line on mathematical propositions 
(which I wUl henceforth call ‘SV’). Consider the following remarks, all from works from the 
middle period, which give unambiguous evidence for SV.
In. madiematics there are not, first, propositions that have sense by themselves and, second, a metliod to 
determine the truth or falsity o f  propositions; there is only a method, and what is called a proposition is 
only an abbreviated name for the method.^®
A  statement is relevant if  it belongs to a certain ^stem. It is in tliis sense that it has been maintained that 
every relevant question is decidable. What is not visibly relevant, is not relevant at aU.^ ^
We may only put a question in mathematics (or make a conjecture), where die answer runs: ‘I must 
work it out’ (PR 151)
We might also ask: what is it that goes on when, wldle we’ve as yet no idea how a certain proposition is 
to be proved, we still ask “Can it be proved or not?” and proceed to look for a proof? I f  we “try to 
prove it”, what do we do? Is this a search wltich is essentially unsystematic, and therefore strictiy 
speaking not a search at all, or can there be some plan involved? How we answer this question is a 
pointer as to whedier die as yet improved -  or as yet improvable -  proposition is senseless or not. For, 
in a very important sense, every significant proposition must teach us tiirough its sense how (wie) we are 
to convince ourselves whether it is true or false. “Every proposition says what is the case if  it is true”. 
(PR 148)
(For a mathematical proposition, die proof] is part o f  die grammar o f  die proposition.. .belongs to the 
sense o f  the proved proposition, i.e. determines that sense. It isn’t somediing that brings it about diat 
we believe a particular proposition, but somediing diat shows us what we believe. (PG II, Ch. V, §. 24, 
pp. 370, 375)
if  diere is no method provided for deciding whether the proposition is true or false, dien it is pointiess, 
and diat means senseless. (PG II, Ch. VII, §. 39, p. 452)
From conversations between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle recorded by F. Waismann in liis [1979], p. 
33.
Waismann [1979], p. 37.
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What is hidden must be capable o f  being found... Also, what is liidden must be completely describable 
before it is found, no less dian if  it had already been found. It malces good sense to say tliat an object is 
so well hidden tliat it is impossible to find it; but o f course die impossibility here is not a logical one; 
i.e., it makes sense to speak o f  finding an object, to describe die finding; we are merely denying that it 
will happen. {PG II, Ch. V, §. 22, p. 363)
Does your calculus have proofs? And what proofs? It is only from diem diat we will be able to gather 
the sense o f  these propositions and questions. {PG 370)
The .. - conception, the one I want to hold, says, *No, if  I can never verify die sense o f  a proposition 
completely, dien I cannot have meant anydiing by the proposition eidier. Tlien the proposition signifies 
nodiing whatsoever.’ ®^
In order to determine the sense o f  a proposition, I should have to know a very specific procedure for 
when to count the proposition as verified.^^
As an example o f a proof beittg the sense o f a (mathematical) proposition, FrascoUa offers the 
following remark from Wittgenstein:
To say that 6 permutations o f 3 elements are possible cannot say less, i.e., anything more general, dian is 
shown by die schema:
ABC
ACB
BAC
BCA
CAB
CBA
.. .The proposition diat diere are 6 permutations o f 3 elements is identical with die permutation schema 
. . .” {PG II, Ch. 4, §. 20, pp. 348-349).
FrascoUa relates: “But the construction o f this schema can be considered as nothing but the 
construction o f a proof of the statement that there are six permutations o f a three element 
set; thus, we have here a case in which the proof determines the sense o f the proven 
proposition.” (FrascoUa 66)
Let us convey the view expressed by SV as foUows:
i® Waismann [1979], p. 47. 
w Waismann [1979], p. 47.
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SV: The sense of a mathematical proposition is its ptoof.^®
IV. ii. Proofs Vs. Checks and Calculations
While it is clear, in the above remarks, tliat Wittgenstein identifies the proof o f  a proposition 
with its sense, the sense o f ‘p ro o f is ambiguous with what Wittgenstein elsewhere calls 
‘checking’ and which he means to distinguish from proofs. In  these remarks, Wittgenstein 
identifies the sense o f a mathematical proposition with the method o f “checldng”. Consider 
tlie following remarks (also ftom  a middle period work and specifically, as are some o f the 
remarks above, from the Philosophical Grammar, Part II, Chapter 5 entitled “Mathematical 
P ro o f’):
So i f  I want to raise a question wliich won’t depend on the truth o f die proposition, I have to speak o f  
checking its trutii, not o f  proving or disproving it. The method o f checking the trudi corresponds to 
what one may call die sense o f  the matiiematical proposition. The description o f this method is a 
general one and brings in a system o f  propositions, for instance o f propositions o f  die form a x b x c.
.. .If it’s impossible to speak o f  sucli a check, dien die analogy between “matiiematical proposition” and 
odier things we call proposition collapses. (PG II, Ch. V, §. 23, p. 366)
Tell me how you seek and I will tell you what you are seeking.. .Where you can ask you can look for an 
answer, and where you cannot look for an answer you cannot ask either. Nor can you find an answer... 
“the equation yields S” means: if  I transform die equation in accordance with certain rules, I get S. Just 
as the equation 25 x 25 =  625 says diat I get 625 if I apply the rules for multiplication to 25 x 25. But in 
diis case these rules must already be given to me before the word “yields” has a meaning, and before die 
question whetiier the equation yields S has a sense. (PG II, Ch. V, §. 24, p. 370; §. 25, pp. 377-8)
Wittgenstein distinguislies between ptoofs and calculations: tiiey both present problems but 
in different senses o f the word. Locutions such as ‘problem’, ‘question’, ‘answer’, ‘search’, 
etc., are for Wittgenstein internal to a calculus; that is, they presume tiiat a determinate set of
Although it is verificationism regarding madiematics diat is at issue here, Wittgenstein certainly did extend it 
to scientific discourse, and as Michael Wrigley points out, to evaluative discourse. He provides die following
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rules are in place by which one can pose a problem (read conjecture here), carry out a search, 
ask and then answer a question. These locutions do not apply, in the relevant sense, to 
proofs. Let us amend SV so as to account for the distinction between proof and checldng:
SV*: The sense of a proposition is the method of checking it.
With proofs, for Wittgenstein, we do not carry out a search in the same sense in which we 
carry out a search when the rules are given (mind you, we would not ordinarily caU a 
calculation, such as calculating 135 +  349, a ‘search’). Again, that is why we cannot have 
conjectures because for Wittgenstein there is no ready means of “searching” for an answer; 
i.e., there are not definite rules in place with which we may determine die answer. 
Goldbach’s conjecture would presume a search (in the sense m which we can carry out a 
calculation, or, carry out an experiment — tiiese are analogous for Wittgenstein) when a 
search is not what is called for. Wittgenstein, continuing on the topic o f searches, elsewhere 
notes:
And ‘search’ must always mean; search systematically. Meandering about in infinite space on tlie look­
out for a gold ring is no kind o f  research. You can only search widiin a system: And so there is 
necessarily something you can’t search for. (PR 150)
In mathematics, we cannot talk o f systems in general, but only witliin systems. They are just what we 
can’t talk about. And so, too, what we can’t search for (PR 152)
Where Wittgenstein says ‘search’, we can read ‘calculation’. Where he says ‘system’ we can 
read system of rules or calculus. A search can only take place within a system (a calculation 
within a calculus), and hence, we cannot search for a system. Proofs, in the sense that
quotation from Wittgensteiu’s 1930/32 Cambridge Lectures (p. 66): “ethical and aesthetic judgements are not 
propositions because they cannot be verified,” in Wrigley [1989], p. 267.
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Wittgenstein is speaking of, serve to modify the system in which searches can take place. 
That is why, strictly speaking, one camiot “search” for a proof; by similar reasoning, there 
cannot be mathematical conjectures that require a proof for diat would require an extra 
system search.^i W hen Wittgenstein says, in intuitionistic fashion (and this will be developed 
below), that we cannot conjecture to infinity, he means that we cannot legitimately search 
(and so cannot legitimately conjecture) beyond the set o f rules o f our calculus- This is not to 
say that such a system cannot change for proofs are what effect that change; they modify 
sense by introducing new rules to the calculus. However, we cannot search, in the relevant 
sense o f ‘search’, for proofs. A proof would be an ^x/m-system search (as opposed to intra- 
system) which is not possible according to Wittgenstein. But then, we may ask, how does 
one go about “finding” a proof. Wittgenstein answers;
It is a stroke o f  luck, as it were, tliat I come to see the new system. To be sure, I can go over tlie new 
system; but I camiot look for it, I cannot reach it by means o f  transformation, and I cannot come to see 
its possibility by means o f a p ro o fs
FrascoUa explains this as foUows: “Genuine novelties in mathematics cannot be expected as 
results o f a rational activity of solving problems, since this is carried out, by definition, within 
a given system. When a new system is recognized, what reaUy happens is a sort of 
revelation.”^^  But this should seem inadequate. Certainly, it is admitted that the 
“discovery” o f a proof is often occasioned by a feeling o f revelation.^"^ However, we would 
refrain from admitting that the “discovery” o f mathematical proofs is a matter o f luck; that it 
is not a rational activity. Wittgenstein is sensitive to this difficulty when he notes his views
The distinctioh bears much affinity to Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions; external 
questions to proofs, internal questions to searches/calculations.
22 In Waismann [1979], p. 146.
23 FrascoUa [1994], p. 71.
24 Such as, famously, Arcliimedes who exclaimed “Eureka!” upon discovering how to measure the volume o f a 
gold figure wliile in Iris badrtub (tire answer being via water displacement).
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would have it that there are no difficult problems in mathematics (since aU “problems” are 
simply searches or calculations witliin a given system of rules); he says:
One could lay down: "whatever one can tackle [anfassen] is a problem — Only where tliere can be a 
problem, can somediing be asserted”. Wouldn’t all this lead to the paradox that diere are no difficult 
problems in madiematics, since if  anydiing is difficult it isn’t a problem? What follows is, that the 
"difficult mathematical problems”, i.e., die problems for madiematical research, aren’t in the same 
relationsliip to the problem "25 x 25 =  ?” as a feat o f acrobatics is to a simple somersault. They aren’t 
related, that is, just as very easy to very difficult; they are “problems” in different meanings o f  die word, 
(PG II, Ch. V, §. 25, pp. 379-80)
It is informative that this last remark is partly repeated in the Philosophical Kemarks (an earlier 
middle-period work);
Wouldn’t all diis lead to die paradox that diere are no difficult problems in mathematics, since, if  
anydiing is difficult, it isn’t a problem?
But it isn’t like that: The difficult mathematical problems are diose for whose solution we don’t 
yet possess a written system. The mathematician who is looking for a solution dien has a system in some 
sort o f  psycliic symbolism, in images, ‘in his head’, and endeavours to get it down on paper. Once Ihat’s 
done, die rest is easy. But if  he has no kind o f  system, eidier in written or unwritten symbols, then he 
can’t search for a solution eidier, but at best can only grope around. - Now, o f  course you may find 
somediing even by random groping. But in diat case you haven’t searched for it, and, from a logical 
point o f  view, the process was syndietic; whereas searching is a process o f  analysis. (PR 151)
In  the former remark (from die Philosophical Grammai), Wittgenstein notes that proofs and 
searches pose problems in different senses o f the word. A proof does not involve a 
systematic search, or at least not simply so (certainly, for otherwise Goldbach’s conjecture 
would be easily proven). As to what it does involve, the remark is not elucidating. 
However, it is interesting that the latter remark, which is from an earlier work, does pick up 
this issue. The endeavour o f contriving a proof is described psychologically (in terms of 
trying to convey mental images onto paper — drought experiments perhaps). Arriving at a 
proof is a creative enterprise whereas performing a calculation within a system is not; fbis 
seems to be the substance of the reference to the analytic-synthetic distinction at the end.^^
25 It may be a reason, why Wittgenstein does not have more to say about die process o f  ardving at proofs that it 
is a psychological matter and diat he is continuing on his view in die Tractatus, itself adopted from Frege, that 
die proper study o f  pliilosophy should refrain from die psychologistic and stay with the logistic (logical).
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This psychological account o f proof “discovery” is left out o f the similar remark from the 
later work perhaps because it was speculative only or not philosophical.
A t any rate, this issue (regarding the “discovery” o f proofs) must be left unresolved 
(and not just for the reason that Wittgenstein’s position here is difficult to expound). What I 
wish to highlight in the distinction between proofs and calculations is that, in this middle 
period, the sense o f a mathematical proposition is its method o f calculation. And so, the 
sense o f a mathematical proposition is given in a set o f determinate rules o f a system of 
calculation (i.e., a calculus). Proofs serve to modify sense in that they introduce a new rule 
(or rules) to the calculus (this is what Wittgenstein conveys in saying that proofs draw “new 
connections”). They thereby expand the calculus for they expand the potential calculations 
or searches that can be performed in the calculus. Furthermore, the remarks given above 
wherein Wittgenstein describes the sense o f a mathematical proposition in terms of its proof 
and others in terms o f its method of checking are not in conflict despite the noted difference 
between proofs or proving and checking. Proofs bear on sense in virtue o f introducing new 
rules which are then available for use in checking. Once a proposition is proven, the 
calculus is effectively altered such that there is now a method for checldng it. I t now has a 
sense. And so, it is legitimate to speak o f a proof as giving sense to a proposition and o f its 
sense as lying in the method of checldng while maintaining an important difference between 
proofs and checks. In sum, an acceptance o f both SV and SV* (and Wittgenstein does seem 
to accept both formulations as the given remarks testify) is not to accept conflicting 
positions despite the noted difference between proofs and checks. This difference is 
nevertheless, for reasons noted, important for Wittgenstein (e.g., it underscores the no­
conjecture thesis because one cannot conjecture where one cannot legitimately “search” — 
this is why one cannot search for proofs and hence make conjectures).
30
Deteirninacy o f sense is very much at issue here in the discussion o f proofs and 
calculations and with Wittgenstein’s mathematical verificationism in general. Goldbach’s 
conjecture lacks sense in the way o f lacking a determinate sense. There are no specific rules 
in place with which we may determine its truth value.^^ And the same is the case for all 
other would-be mathematical conjectures. Sense is given by the rules o f the calculus (and is 
identified with a calculation or decision procedure in that calculus). And so, a proposition 
has a determinate sense prior to the carrying out o f a calculation; e.g., “ 11,003 is prime”, an 
example given by FrascoUa, has a determinate sense; there is a method o f checking it given 
the rules o f the calculus — as opposed to Goldbach’s conjecture. That is, “11,003 is prime” 
has a determinate sense prior to our having conducted the calculation because there is a 
definite method o f deterrnining its truth value given the rules of the calculus at our 
d isp o sa l.P ro o fs  introduce new rules to the calculus (or change the rules o f the calculus — 
they draw “new connections” as Wittgenstein says it), and thereby they can serve to modify 
the sense of mathematical propositions (for with a difference in rules, there is a difference in 
what can be checked, or how checks can be carried out, in the calculus). The calculus is not 
the same post-proof as it is pre-proof.^^
2® Although we may claim some understanding o f Goldbach’s conjecture, say, in terms o f  an understanding of 
its component concepts, (wliich dien offers at least some guidance as to what a sufficient proof must convey) 
our understanding o f  the "conjecture” is not o f  it as determinate, i.e., witii a determinate sense (wliich requires 
diat we know o f  a means o f checking it). Thus, again, given diis requirement o f  determinacy o f  sense — as 
given by a proof/calculation — “Goldbach’s conjecture” does not count as a madiematical proposition. This is 
SV!
27 We will see that diis view, viz., that a madiematical proposition has a determinate sense diat consists in its 
method o f  verification by the rules o f a calculus, and that it has this determinate sense in advance o f  our 
carrying out a check, is addressed (and to an important extent contested) in the rule-following remarks,
2® Hence, by die same reasoning we should say diat chess with a changed rule is no longer chess for die calculus 
is altered. Such a view would not stand in die later period for chess with a changed rule may stdl be "chess” for 
reason o f  beating a family resemblance (and die history o f chess, with its changes in rules, surely bears dtis out).
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IV. iii. The Law of Excluded Middle
Wittgenstein’s mathematical verificationism, as explained, underlies the no-conjecture thesis 
(and with, it, the concept modification tliesis). I t underlies his position that one cannot 
search for a proof (which leaves us with an unsatisfied curiosity concerning how proofs are 
then found — the answers given, including “luck”, are surely unsatisfactory). Furthermore, it 
also underlies his peculiar stance on the law o f excluded middle; peculiar because it offers 
botli affinities and differences with both mathematical realists/PIatonists and (traditional) 
intuitionists which I will soon explain.^^ Prior to that, consider the following remarks (again, 
aU from middle-period works):
The supposition o f  undecidability presupposes tliat tliere is, so to speak, an underground connection 
between the two sides o f an equation; tiiat tiiough tiie bridge cannot be built in symbols, it does exist 
because otiierwise tiie equation would lack sense. — But the connection only exists if  we have made it by 
symbols; the transition isn’t produced by some dark speculation different in kind from what it connects 
(like a dark passage between two sunlit places). (PG II, Ch. V, §. 25, p. 377)
The word "proposition”, if  it is to have any meaning at all here, is equivalent to a calculus; to a calculus 
in which p v"^p is a tautology (in which the “law o f  excluded middle” holds). When it is supposed not 
to hold, we have altered tiie concept o f proposition. (PG 368)
I need hardly say tiiat where tiie law o f  excluded middle doesn’t apply, no other law o f  logic applies 
eidier, because in that case we are not dealing witii propositions o f  mathematics. (PR 151).
2^  We may add Wittgenstein’s unique views on consistency and contradiction (wliich have largely been taken to 
be incorrect and uninformed) to this list for tiiese are also, at least to some extent, underHned by his 
commitment to SV. FrascoUa explains this as foUows, “from the verificationist point o f  view, the attempt to 
prove the consistency o f  aritlimetic cannot be legitimately described as true mathematical research. According 
to Wittgenstein, one can search only witiiin a system, namely within a space o f  acknowledged possibiUties, and 
witii the knowledge o f  a metiiod for finding the object looked for.. .Tlie situation o f  tlie proof o f  consistency o f  
aritlimetic is quite similar to tiiat o f  the search for a proof o f Goldbach’s conjecture.” (FrascoUa [1994], p. 102) 
Tiiat is to say, tiie search for a proof o f  consistency would be an ex/'m-system search and so, as with Goldbach’s 
conjecture, it is not something we can legitimately search for. Once we have a proof o f  consistency though (or 
a proof o f  inconsistency, as RusseU provided for Frege’s system), we have altered the calculus (introduced a 
new rule), and so have not actuaUy proven tiie consistency (or inconsistency as the case may be) o f  the original 
system; tiiat is, we now have a new calculus (RusseU’s contradiction introduced a new calcttius — c.f., FrascoUa 
[1994], p. 102). SV helps to explain why Wittgenstein affirms views such as that proofs o f  consistency or
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If the law o f  excluded middle doesn’t hold, that can only mean tliat our expression isn’t comparable to a 
proposition. (PG II, §. 31, p. 400)
Wittgenstein accepts the law o f excluded middle. However, his acceptance that a 
proposition must have only one o f two values is an acceptance that a proposition must 
either be provable or refutable to be meaningful. In other words, his acceptance o f the law 
o f excluded middle, contrary to what one might presume, is a consequence o f his strong 
verificationism. To explain, Wittgenstein, in assent with tiie intuitionists, found difficulty 
with quantification over infinite domains, specifically when this yielded undecided 
propositions. He did not agree, however, that such cases required forfeiting the law of 
excluded middle. According to Wittgenstein, cases in which quantification over infinite 
domains yield undecided propositions do not display the invalidity of the law o f excluded 
middle; instead, they show that the proposition is without sense. That is, the inapplicability 
o f the law o f excluded middle to a proposition does not demonstrate the invalidity o f the law 
o f excluded middle, but rather, it tells us that the proposition is meaningless. This is 
because, for Wittgenstein, tiie law of excluded middle is criteiial for what is to count as a 
proposition (see the last three remarks quoted above). A mathematical proposition that is 
undecided, that is, for which there is no effective rule or decision procedure is senseless.
This is an outcome o f Wittgenstein’s strong verificationism concerning mathematical 
propositions according to which we must have knowledge o f an effective and finite decision 
procedure or proof; the sense o f a mathematical proposition, as explained earlier, is its 
method o f verification (checking/proof). Undecidedness is simply not an option given SV 
(for an undecided proposition is a meaningless one). And so, Wittgenstein’s commitment to 
the law of excluded middle is an outcome o f his SV.
inconsistency are not important or relevant to the system in question (for once we have such a proof, it is not a
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This is certeinly contrary to an intuitionist account, according to which we need not 
possess an actual proof for a mathematical proposition to be meaningful, bu t rather, we need 
only know what form the (potential) proof or construction would take. And so, for the 
intuitionist, undecided propositions can be meaningful. Wittgenstein agrees with the 
intuitionists to a point, but opts for a different end. Whereas the intuitionists accept 
undecided mathematical propositions as meaningful with the consequence o f denying the 
validity o f the law o f excluded middle, Wittgenstein admits the law of excluded middle as a 
result o f his denying meaningfulness to undecided propositions (i.e., due to a verificationism 
stronger than that upheld by intuitionists). As FrascoUa puts it, “If  the range o f meaningful 
mathematical propositions is determined by the requirements o f the strong verificationist 
view expounded.. .the universal validity o f the LEM is guaranteed by definition.”^^  And so, 
Wittgenstein agrees with the intuitionist, against tiie realist, in denying the admissibility o f 
verification-transcendent truth; he agrees witii the realist, against the intuitionist, in admitting 
the validity o f the law of excluded middle. Wittgenstein, at least in attempt, tries to steer a 
course clear o f the ScyUa of intuitionism and the Charibdis o f realism.^^
Consider the example again o f Goldbach’s conjecture. A reahst would uphold that it 
is true or false, despite our not having “discovered” a proof as yet. An intuitionist would 
uphold that the law of excluded middle does not hold in this case; that the proposition is 
undecided but nevertheless meaningful (indeed, its meaningfiilness is part o f the case against 
the law of excluded middle — i.e., it must be accepted as meaningful so as to show that there 
can be meaningful propositions which are undecided; to which the law o f excluded middle 
does not apply). Wittgenstein’s verificationism, however, leads him to a different response.
proof o f  the same system). 
30 FrascoUa [1994], p. 107.
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Goldbach’s conjecture, it is true, is undecided. However, this does not show that the law of 
excluded middle is inapplicable to all propositions, but rather, that the proposition is 
meaningless. But to say that it is meaningless is just to affirm, in alternative words, the no­
conjecture thesis. Goldbach’s conjecture, strictly spealdng, is not a conjecture.
Wittgenstein’s verificationism is stronger than that o f intuitionists and this difference is 
displayed in his treatment o f conjectures/undecided mathematical propositions. Furdier, his 
adoption o f the law o f excluded middle is no t a commitment to realism (indeed, it is a 
consequence o f a very strong verificationism regarding mathematical propositions).
V. Wittgenstein is not a Radical Conventionalist in the Middle Period
V. i. Strong Verificationism and Radical Conventionalism:
A Conflict (of the Middle Years)
There is compelling grounds in Wittgenstein’s remarks, in the middle period, for reading him 
as denying the charge o f radical conventionalism. To explain, m the view o f Dummett, 
understanding a mathematical proof requires that one accept it; the two cannot be divorced. 
Contrarüy, to understand a proof but not accept it is to uphold a distinction between 
understanding a proof and feeling its force; i.e., “seeing” it as proving what it claims to 
prove. This distinction is the entryway for a decision o f acceptance, and with it, the charge 
o f radical conventionalism. Dummett’s charge, then, may be restated as follows: the radical 
conventionalist upholds a distinction between understanding a proof and accepting it; he can 
do the former without doing the latter. Alternatively worded, this is a distinction between 
knowing how to verify a mathematical statement and knowing that it is true. However, this
3* This would tlieu be a counter-example, if  legitimate, to Dummett’s contention that an acceptance o f the law
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is a distinction that Wittgenstein explicitly denies. Widi this distinction in mind,
Wittgenstein observes that there is a disanalogy between an empirical investigation and a 
mathematical proof. The former is properly characterized by this distinction: knowing how 
to carry out the investigation or experiment and knowing whether or not it will succeed.
The latter is not. (c.f,, LF M  64) Experiments are not conducted in mathematics: to know 
how to carry out a proof of a statement in mathematics (in specific terms) is to know that it 
is true. “Nothing is more fatal to pltilosophlcal understanding than the notion o f proof and 
experience as two different but comparable methods o f verification” says Wittgenstein. (PG 
361)
Indeed, we can further say that this distinction, between Imowing how to verify a  ^ ' 
mathematical proposition and knowing that it is true, is unavailable to Wittgenstein given his 
strong verificationism (SV). According to SV, the meaning of a mathematical proposition is 
its method of verification. There are no unproven mathematical propositions (i.e., 
conjectures) because they would be meaningless. Thus, there is a very strong connection 
between a proof and the proposition proven for the former gives content to the latter. In 
contrast, Dummett’s above distinction denies a strong connection between a proposition 
and its proof (this is why, given Dum m ett’s distinction, decision has room  to be the basis o f 
acceptance for the proposition). And so, to understand a mathematical proposition is to 
understand it as proven. There is no space available, given SV, to understand a proof but 
not accept the statement o f which it is a proof (the two are connected, as it were, 
analytically: the one is the meaning o f the other).
Thus, the radical conventionalist picture is inapplicable under Wittgenstein’s SV. 
Wright characterizes this conflict in the following terms:
o f  excluded middle (or o f  bivalence) demands an acceptance o f  realism for the class o f  statements in question -
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two foundational aspects o f  Wittgenstein’s drought about mathematics are in flat collision; die 
‘constructivist’ idea diat it is by reference to the notions o f proof and disproof, radier dian trudi and 
falsity, that die sense o f  madiematical statements is to be thought o f  as grasped, and the radical 
conventionalist thesis that there are no constraints on what we accept as a proof o f  a particular 
statement - in particular, therefore, none imposed by the general character o f  our understanding o f  such 
statements.32
The radical conventionalist charge has it tiiat, given a proposition and a proof, despite an 
understanding o f the proof, we are not compelled to accept the original proposition; hence, 
our acceptance o f the original proposition would seem to be on the basis o f a decision. This 
is the radical conventionalist charge as applied to the concept modification thesis (i.e., the 
proof modifies the concepts in the original proposition to the extent that the proof does not 
prove it — hence, our acceptance o f the original proposition must be based on decision). But 
we see that this does not fit SV.^  ^ SV, as noted, implies the no-conjecture thesis; there is no 
original proposition pre-proof. I t is not the case that we can decide to accept a mathematical 
proposition in disregard o f its proof because without a proof, there is no original proposition 
to accept (there are no mathematical conjectures under SV). The proposition comes into 
being only when the proof is understood (this understanding constitutes an understanding of 
the meaning o f the proposition). The concept modification thesis, from wliich the original 
charge o f radical conventionalism is developed, has no home in SV if  it is not read in terms 
of the no-conjecture thesis. But once it is so read, the charge of radical conventionalism no 
longer applies (i.e., radical conventionalism is lost in the assimilation of the concept 
modification thesis to the no-conjecture diesis). As Wright characterizes it above, according 
to the ‘constructivist idea’ there is a connection between a proposition and its proof; an 
understanding o f the former is gained through a grasp of the latter. However, according to
c.f. Dummett [1991], p. 9.
32W tight[1980],p.229.
33 Or for tiiat matter, SV*; the difference is immaterial here.
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the radical conventionalist view again, this connection is denied (we may understand and 
accept a proposition in disregard of its prooi^. SV may have difficulties, we can surely admit, 
but the consequence o f radical conventionalism is not among them.
Nevertheless, the radical conventionalist charge still seems to lurk for, under SV and 
the no-conjecture thesis, proofs do not prove. They are misnamed. W hat they do is give 
sense. But then it may seem that the radical conventionalist charge still has force; if proofs 
do not prove, then it should be that we are not compelled to accept a mathematical 
proposition by a proof and hence, it is open to decide to accept a mathematical proposition. 
The thought here is that while a proof may give sense to a mathematical proposition, it does 
not compel the acceptance o f the proposition as true (for it is not doing the work of 
“proving” it to us). Hence, it is still open to accept the proposition as true or not on the 
basis o f a decision. Still, this characterisation does not fit with SV. Under SV, a proof gives 
sense to a mathematical proposition as true. That is, the proposition cannot be thought o f as 
false, or even as undecided, once tlie proof has been understood (there is no scope for 
understanding a proof but not accepting the proposition as true). This is the substance of 
the disanalogy between the mathematical case and the empirical case. In  the empirical case, 
we can understand a method for verifying an empirical proposition independent of knowing 
the truth value o f the proposition (for the former is not constitutive of the latter). In 
contrast, in the mathematical case we cannot understand the method of verifying (in specific 
terms, again) without knowing that the proposition is true. Thus, while it is admitted that 
Wittgenstein does offend against our intuitive understanding o f proofs and conjectures^'^, he 
does not do so by upholding radical conventionalism. Radical conventionalism would deny 
what is a key element o f his strong verificationism (which is die dominant m otif in his
38
writings on mathematics in the middle period): the connection between tlae acceptance o f 
the truth o f a mathematical proposition and an understanding o f its proof; when we 
understand a proof, we understand a mathematical proposition as true.
I take it as sufficiently defended tliat Wittgenstein’s middle period views (curious as 
they may be) do not imply a commitment to radical conventionalism. Hence, I take it as 
sufficiently defended that Wittgenstein is not a radical conventionalist in his middle period. 
However, even if this point cannot be made, that is, even if his middle period views do 
imply radical conventionalism, it still stands that these middle period views do not survive 
much intact into the later period. Hence, even if  Wittgenstein is a radical conventionalist as 
derived from the concept modification thesis in the middle period, he is still no t so in the 
later period due to a change in views. There is no indication that the concept modification 
thesis or tlie no-conjecture tliesis are held in place into the later period; they are 
preoccupations o f the middle period. There is indication that SV — which has been 
defended as the parent o f both these theses and is a dominant theme o f the middle period — 
is not held in the later period. It is to this case that I now turn.
V, ii. Strong Verificationism and Rule-Following: 
A Conflict (between Middle and Later Years)
Wright observes a conflict between the concept modification thesis and a prime rule- 
following consideration:
Unless one’s understanding o f  an expression may be tlaought to have a determinate character, it seems 
to make no sense to speak o f a modification in it; but if  it may be allowed to have a determinate 
character, it would seem that it would at least have to make sense that certain linguistic moves made 
widi it should accord with that character. How, dien, are we to reconcile Wittgenstein’s sloganising
34 For instance, Wittgenstein’s strong verificationism does have the outcome that there are no matiiematical 
propositions tliat are not known to be true (tiiis is liis no-conjecture tliesis).
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about concept modification with liis repudiation o f the idea tiiat our understanding o f  expressions 
reaches ahead o f  us to so far unconsidered situations in a predeterminate way.3®
Wright is drawing attention to a conflict between a sceptical (but not putative, although I 
will explain and defend it in the next chapter) rule-following consideration, viz., tliat there is 
in our understanding of a concept or expression no advanced determination o f a unique 
application in unconsidered situations, and the thought tliat if die concept modification 
thesis is to be taken at face value an expression must akeady have a determinate sense if we 
are to legitimately accept that that sense has undergone a change (as a result o f acquking a 
proof). This conflict, at least, is resolved if we read the concept modification thesis in terms 
of the no-conjecture thesis according to which there is no sense to a mathematical 
expression prior to proof, afortion, no determkiate sense. However, tiie conflict rears its 
head again since, according to Wittgenstein’s SV, post-proof a proposition does have a 
determinate sense. The sense o f a mathematical proposition is given ki the rules o f a 
calculus with which it is checked. And so, there is a similar conflict between the above 
noted rule following consideration and Wittgenstein’s SV in the middle period. FrascoUa 
echoes this thought: “There is no doubt that Wittgenstein’s considerations on rule-foUowing 
destroy the very premises o f that conception [mathematical verificationism].” *^’ Two similar 
points may be made here. Fkst, this conflict is grounds for saying that SV, dominant as it is 
in the middle period, is not a feature o f Wittgenstein’s later thought for k  is in conflict with a 
key consideration o f the later thought; and consequently, the concept modification thesis 
(which, as argued, is to be read in terms o f SV and the no-conjecture thesis) is also not a 
feature o f Wittgenstein’s later thought. Second, arguing similarly, if the concept 
modification thesis is not to be assimilated to the no-conjecture thesis (such that we cannot
35 Wright [1980], p. 48.
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draw on the first point in saying that the concept modification thesis is abandoned by the 
later period), we can still draw on Wright’s point above that the concept modification thesis 
taken by itself (i.e., in its unassimilated reading) is in conflict with the noted rule-following 
consideration and therefore still employ this conflict as grounds for maintaining that the 
concept modification thesis is abandoned by the later period. Either way, the concept 
modification thesis, as promoted in the middle period, does not survive into the later period 
due to a change in view concerning the determination, or lack thereof, in our understanding 
o f a concept or expression.^^
V. iii. Strong Verificationism and Language Games: A Change in Approach
More can be said in favour o f Wittgenstein dropping SV. According to SV, as noted, the 
method o f verification (be this a proof or check) constitutes the meaning o f a mathematical 
proposition. This meaning is determined in a calculus o f rules (whose rules are used to carry 
out a check). I f  the rules used to verify a proposition change, then the sense o f the 
proposition alters (i.e., we now have a new proposition). Proofs serve to introduce new 
rules to the calculus and it is in virtue of this introduction that they change what can be 
checked or verified witii that calculus. This change in what can be checked, brought upon 
by a.new proof, is the substance o f the concept modification thesis: since the sense o f a 
mathematical proposition is the method o f checking it, a change in what can be checked 
(due to a change in rules) leads to a change in sense (hence, propositions with different
3^  FrascoUa [1994], p. 125.
37 Tills, o f  course, does not deny diat radical conventionalism cannot be charged against die later view in wliich 
rule-foUowing considerations are dominant (and this is somediing to be addressed in later chapters). But it is to 
say that this charge cannot be leveled in die same way as against the views o f die middle period W.ttgenstein.
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metliods o f checldng have different sen ses)W ittg en s te in  stotes (again, in middle period 
works): “The system of rules deterniining a calculus determines the ‘meaning’ (Bedeutung) 
o f its signs too. Put more strictly: The form and the rules of syntax are equivalent. So if I 
change the rules — seemingly supplement them, say — then I change the form, the meaning.” 
(PR 152). He furdier says, “only die group o f rules defines the sense [Sinn] o f our signs, and 
any alteration (e.g. supplementation) of the rules means an alteration o f the sense” (PR 154) 
In  effect, a calculus with a new rule is not the same calculus (and we may say that this is why 
we cannot compare old and new senses, i.e., old and new methods o f checking, for they are 
not internal to die same calculus; comparing old and new senses would involve an extra­
system view). That is, a proof, by introducing a new rule or connection, changes what can 
be checked or verified in a calculus. But for Wittgenstein, this means that the calculus is not 
the same pre-proof and post-proof (we now have different calculi and any comparison 
would be an extra-system, and so illegitimate, comparison); and this further explains why the 
concept modification is read as CM*, i.e., as saying that the sense o f a proposition post­
proof cannot be compared to that pre-proof. Let us apply this view outside the domain of 
mathematics to chess and its rules for illustration.^^ According to SV, the rules constitute 
the game (such that to understand the game is to understand its rules). This is fait but the 
implications o f SV extend further. Any alteration o f the rules o f chess constitute a change in 
the game o f chess; that is, the sense o f die game has changed; chess with a changed rule is a 
different game. But surely this need no t be the case, as the history o f chess testifies."^ An
We may say that if  proofs do not introduce new rules, but use existing rules with ingenuity, then tliis still 
serves to introduce a new use or establish a new connection (and thereby a new method for checking). Hence, 
the position o f  the proposition in the calculus still changes (i.e., its sense still changes as new connections are 
established).
It is fair to do tliis because the objective here is to compare (and contrast) SV to Wittgenstein’s later view o f  
rules in mathematics wliich is part o f  a general account o f  rule-following and language that accommodates, but 
is not restricted to, an account o f  rules and rule-following in. matliematics.
Gerrard discusses tltis example in the same context in Gerrard [1996], p. 176.
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added rule may alter the game o f chess (such that our understanding is now different) but we 
need not admit that it is consequently a different game (a different calculus).
This view o f language as a calculus changes by the later period where the notion o f a 
language game is introduced. The later Wittgenstein would not uphold tliat chess with a 
changed rule fteedh^ a different game. The two “versions” may bear enough o f a family 
memblance to not constitute different games or calculi. Wittgenstein speaks o f language 
games and the notion of family resemblances in the later period in discussing language in 
general and different spheres o f linguistic activity in particular; but the view is certainly not 
exclusive o f mathematics. Wittgenstein notes, for example, “Would it be any wonder if the 
technique o f calculating had a family o f applications?” (RFM, V, 8), and “Why should I not 
say that what we call mathematics is a family o f activities with a family o f purposes?” (RFM, 
V, 15)."^  ^ Indeed, Wittgenstein is clear to include as a family resemblance concept die 
concept o f number (c.f., PI 67,68). The point here is that SV sets up a view o f the meaning 
o f a mathematical proposition as rigid and determinate. As noted in the previous section, 
this determinacy is in condict with the later Wittgenstein’s discussion o f rule^fohowing. As 
noted here, this rigidity and determinacy is in conflict widi the later Wittgenstein’s discussion 
o f language games and family resemblances (which extend a dynamic and flexible view of 
meaning to mathematical concepts and propositions). This is not to deny any element of 
verificationism in the later period (which I will say more about in connection to rule- 
following and private language beginning in die next chapter), but it is to deny that this 
mathematical verificationism survives in its strong middle-period form. That is, this strong
Geriatd interestingly characterizes this shift from a calculus view o f  mathematics to die language game view 
in terms o f  a shift in die use o f  Frege’s context principle: “We can see diis change as enlarging the scope o f  
Frege’s context principle: “never to ask for the meaning o f  a word in isolation, but in die context o f  a 
proposition.” From die Tractatm' “An expression has meaning only in a proposition” (3.314), to die middle 
Wittgenstein’s “Tlie meaning is die role o f a word in die calculus” (PG 63), we arrive at die later Wittgenstein’s 
“Words have meaning only in the stream o f  life” (L.ÏFT 913),
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veiificationism (that implies the no-conjectute thesis, the concept modification thesis and 
promotes a view o f the sense o f mathematical propositions as possessing a determinate 
character as given by a proof, and is so understood in an understanding o f the proof) does 
not survive to the later period,
YI, C oncluding Rem arks
To conclude, I will recapitulate some o f the main points and then present comments to link 
the foregoing discussion to the forthcoming chapters on rule-following. First, the charge of 
radical conventionalism applies to the concept modification thesis only if the latter is 
construed as However, if  it is so read then, as argued, the concept modification
thesis (CM*) is to be assimilated to the no-conjecture thesis. Further, the no-conjecture 
thesis is a facet o f Wittgenstein’s strong verificationism regarding matliematical propositions 
(SV). This verificationism is a dominant m otif in Wittgenstein’s writings on mathematics in 
the middle period and it is within this m otif that we make sense o f the concept modification 
thesis and the no-conjecture thesis (along with Wittgenstein’s unique positions on the law of 
excluded middle and consistency proofs, as outlined above). This reading provides an 
account o f the relatedness o f these views (views that are espoused in connected passages, 
and sometimes in the same passages, of the middle period texts) and explains these views.
**2 Hence, we may admit that Wittgenstein retains sometliing o f  tlie concept modification diesis into the later 
period widiout tliereby committing to radical conventionalism as long as it is not an admission tiiat takes the 
form o f CM*. However, there is a notable dearth o f  remarks fcom the later works that speak to the concept 
modification thesis. Tlie following is an exception from a later section o f  die RFAf: “N ow  how about diis — 
ought I to say.. .diat when a proof is found die sense alters? O f course some people would oppose this and 
say; “Tlien die proof o f  a proposition cannot ever be found, for, i f  it has been found, it is no longer the proof 
o f  proposition”. But to say diis is so far to say nothing at all.” (RFMYII, 10) Notice that the remark 
begins by asking after die trutii o f  CM. The interlocutor’s interjection is in effect an expression o f CM* (for it 
says diat the proof bears no connection to the original proposition). Wittgenstein’s response is that CM* says 
“nothing at ah”, pediaps because it is a misreading o f  liis intention Çn asking after CM) or because it is a
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which might individually seem unfathomable, in terms o f a strongly observed verificationist 
position concerning mathematics. The no-conjecture thesis, as others, may be no more 
acceptable for drawing out its basis in SV, but at least we have a better understanding of why 
Wittgenstein is led to promote such a thesis.
A case is also made that this strong veiificationism (SV) is in conflict with radical 
conventionalism, and so cannot imply radical conventionalism. Indeed, it is argued along 
similar lines that the charge o f radical conventionalism does not even survive the 
assimilation o f the concept modification thesis to the no-conjecture thesis. Hence, once we 
read the remarks that promote the concept modification thesis under the bearing o f SV (and 
the no-conjecture thesis), we find that the charge o f radical conventionalism does not stick, 
SV may be incredible, but not for reason of a consequence of radical conventionalism. 
Hence, Wittgenstein is not a radical conventionalist in his middle period. It is further argued 
that SV, along with the concept modification and no-conjecture theses, are in conflict with 
dominant views o f Wittgenstein’s later thought (i.e., views on rule-following, family 
resemblances and language games). Accordingly, SV, and these attendant views, are better 
looked upon as works in progress; the concept modification tliesis and the no-conjecture 
thesis are consequences o f Wittgenstein’s working through a verificationist understanding of 
mathematics, and this, as argued, does not survive into the later period (at least not in a form 
recognizable as having the same strength and consequences).
As noted, much o f this argument has been exegetical in nature. I want to, briefly, 
travel further down this exegetical train and note that Wittgenstein in his later period 
explicitly denied the charge o f radical conventionalism as drawn against rule-following 
considerations. Consider the following oft-quoted rule-following remark:
ridiculous view. In any case, Wittgenstein in this later period remark is clear to dismiss CM* and not CM. See
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What you are saving, then, comes to this: a new insight - intuition - is needed at every step to carry out 
tire order *+n' correctly.. .It would almost be more correct to say, not tiiat an intuition was needed at 
every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage.(PT186).
The latter part o f this remarie, which concerns the role o f decision in mle-foUowing, is 
certainly in line with the charge of radical conventionalism. However, note that Wittgenstein 
is carehü to say that “it would almost he. more correct to say.. .a new decision was needed at 
every stage.. [italics are mine]. It would “almost” be more correct to say implies that it 
would not be more correct to say. In  other words, Wittgenstein claims to skirt radical 
conventionalism but not to fall to it. H e elaborates this thought in a passage in the B tvm  
Book:
It is no act o f insight, intuition, which makes us use the rule as we do at tlie particular point in tlie series.
It would be less confusing to call it an act o f decision, though this too is misleading, for nothing like an 
act o f  decision must take place, but possibly just an act o f  writing or speaking. (BB, p. 143)
Thus, although it may be more correct to speak o f our proceeding along the stages o f a 
proof as a matter o f decision than o f intuition, this picture is also not correct for, as 
Wittgenstein claims, “nothing hke a decision must take place” (and whatever an “act of 
writing or speaking” is to amount to, which I whl address in Chapter 4, Wittgenstein is clear 
that he means for it not to be construed as a decision). Wittgenstein herein denies being a 
radical conventionalist as, and this is important to note, drawn from rule-following 
considerations. Wittgenstein explicitly cautions against an understanding o f die rule- 
following remarks as involving a decision, and thereby, radical conventionalism. However, 
the maldng of this case, in contrast to much o f the case made in this chapter, will not be 
mainly exegetical. The case made in diis chapter was basically two-fold: the middle period 
views neither espouse nor commit Wittgenstein to radical conventionalism (no matter if they
tbe next footnote for examples that offer an apparent commitment to a watered down version o f  SV.
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are still incredible on other grounds) and that even if they did, they do not survive into tlie 
later period (and so we may at least say that Wittgenstein, at the end o f the day, is not a 
radical conventionalist as the charge is drawn from these mid-period views). This latter line 
o f defense, however, is not available against the charge o f radical conventionalism as applied 
to the rule-following considerations for these considerations are not ones that Wittgenstein 
abandons or significantly amends. Further, it is not sufficient to show that the rule- 
following considerations do not imply radical conventionalism to convey that Wittgenstein 
explicitly cautions against such a reading (as he does in the above two remarks). These 
remarks may offer us a guide for interpreting Wittgenstem but an argument must 
nevertheless be given showing why the rule-following considerations do not imply radical 
conventionalism (for, as will be shown in the next chapter, they surely seem to). Hence, the 
task of the following chapters then, unlike the first, will require more in the way of 
argumentation than exegesis.
In closing this chapter, I wish to briefly raise some points of analogy between aspects 
o f SV, so dominant in the middle period, and the rule-following considerations, so dominant 
in the later period. These points may be points o f foreshadowing: the ideas o f the middle 
period, more so than earlier and later, are fairly characterized as works in progress and so 
points raised (which bear commonality to later views) may be points in development which 
reach maturity in the later period (and so may constitutepfvto-Yiews o f the later lines of 
thought); in contrast, views fliat are abandoned in their development can show us how not 
to read the later Wittgenstein. The first point, concerning verificationism, seems to lean 
both ways. The verificationism o f SV is evident (and discussed). There are (at least) two 
main respects in which the rule-following considerations are, in appearances at least, 
verificationist. The first is the thought that the understanding o f a rule does not transcend
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an understanding o f explanations o f the rule (although we should not want to equate the 
denial o f an explanation-transcendent understanding with the denial o f a verification- 
transcendent understanding, die semblance is at least cause for a suspicion o f a form of 
verificationism here). The second is the thought that one cannot follow a rule privately 
because, in this case, one cannot know that one is following it correctly rather than it just 
seeming to be so (that is, one must be able to know that this distinction obtains in order to 
be able to follow a rule). The verificationism of these considerations, and in particular the 
first, may not be obvious, especially on so cursory o f an account. But these are leading and 
important rule-following considerations for which we will see that the charge o f 
verificationism, at least somewhat apparent here, must be faced. It is interesting to note the 
similarity o f employment between these considerations from the later period, which are both 
in play in Wittgenstein’s argument against Platonism regarding rules (as I will show in the 
next chapter), and SV which provides an obvious constructivist denial o f Platonism in the 
middle period (for the truth or falsity o f mathematical statements is solely a matter of 
provability and refutability). Hence, in both periods we seem to have a sympathy for 
verificationism that is at work in  an anti-Platonist view o f madiematics (which manifests as 
an anti-Platonist view o f rules in general in the later period). However, despite initial 
appearances, I wiU argue that the two rule-following considerations just briefed are without 
verificationist presumption, I believe that this makes for a stronger anti-Platonist argument 
in the rule-following remarks (for it does not beg any constructivist or verificationist 
questions which a Platonist would deny). Hence, not only is the anti-Platonist argument 
concerning rules (including mathematical rules) o f die later period made widiout the strong 
verificationism o f the middle period, it is made without verificationist presumption at all. A t
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any rate, we may note that whatever verificationism we can attribute to the later Wittgenstein 
concerning rules, it is certainly not as strong as that admitted under
Secondly, we may say that “proofs” are misnamed under SV. This is because proofs 
do not seem to prove. This should be obvious, in a sense at least, if we accept tlie no­
conjecture thesis: there are no conjectures to be proven. Proofs gives sense. And so the 
basis o f acceptance o f a proposition, as it has been charged, is not a proof but a matter of 
decision. But this is phenomenologicaHy incongruous: proofs seem to us to prove; they 
seem to us to compel; and any account o f proofs that is incongruous with this experience 
would he, prima facie, unacceptable.'^'^ W hat I wish to draw out here is a point o f
Remarks from (he later works (specifically, the PI and die later parts o f die RFM) do not offer much 
discussion o f  veiificationism in die same vein as the middle works, i.e., in terms o f  SV (and so diis change o f  
attention should indicate a change in approach). Here is an apparent exception: “One can often say in 
mathematics: let the ptvoft&^éa. you being proved.” (PHI, p. 220) Notice that diis seems to say diat a
proof can convey die sense o f  a madiematical proposition that we may not be privy to widiout an 
understanding o f  the proof. But also notice that it is much less strong than SV (for to say “one can often say” 
indicates diat “one cannot always say” or diat “one need not say”). Hence, although there is a basis for reading 
diis passage as conveying a verificationist sympathy that is to some extent in line with SV (for it says diat proofs 
can often convey die meaning o f a mathematical proposition), it is still a far cry from SV; it does not assert diat 
i f  we are widiout an understanding o f  a proof tiiat the proposition must then be meaningless to us. Also, die 
above passage indicates that there is something that is being proved and so is, stricdy speaking, in conflict widi 
die no-conjecture thesis.
Here is anodier exception to the noted dearth o f  discussion (diis time from a later section o f  die 
BFM): “I once said: I f  you want to know what a mathematical proposition says, look at what its proof proves’. 
N ow  is diere not both truth and falsehood in this? For is the sense, die point, o f  a mathematical proposition 
really clear as soon as we can follow the proof?” (RFM VII, 10) A  note is given diat Wittgenstein refers in this 
remark to his view in die PG, a middle period work. Wittgenstein here responds to SV and expresses diat diere 
is bodi trudi and falsehood in it. Thus again we find that Wittgenstein does not favour SV intact, that is, in its 
strong form, mixed with a reticence to abandon it entirely (that there is somediing to a verificationist view o f  
the meaning o f  mathematical propositions). Tlie concept modification diesis (CM*) and the no conjecture 
thesis are consequences o f  die strong verificationism (and no indication is given in this remark, as opposed to 
the one above, as to whether they would survive diis weakened verificationism). A t any rate, we may note diat 
whatever verificationism concerning mathematical propositions survives into die later period, it is assimilated 
into a general discussion o f  rules for the rule-following remarks are intended to have compass over 
mathematical rules as well as others.
I should add diat this denial o f  a strong verificationism from Section VII o f  the RFM, togedier with 
the rule-following remarks presented in Section VI o f the RFM (which, as discussed, raise considerations that 
conflict with SV), show that die RFM is an inconsistent work in die themes it advances. This is no minor 
inconsistency since it evinces a change in dominant motifs from SV in die early sections (also earlier in date o f  
composition) to rule-following in die later section. The editors o f die RFM, while collecting Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on the foundations o f  madiematics from 1937-44, have brought in two dominant and conflicting 
viewpoints o f  Wittgenstein’s into a single work diat should be kept separate so as not to mislead (and so diis 
should be seen as a weighty editorial error).
This incongruity o f  Wittgenstein’s view with our experience o f  proofs is observed by Wright in Itis [1980], 41.
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commonality with the mIe-foUowing considerations in the point that proofs do not compel 
(or at least need not). In  tlie rule-following considerations this is conveyed in the thought 
that the correct way to follow a rule is not fully determined in our understanding o f the rule 
(e.g., the full and correct application of the rule add 2 is not determined in our grasp o f the 
rule; it should seem, then, that we may find ourselves one day following the rule differently 
than we now do without breaching what we now view as correct). This lack o f 
determination in our understanding of a rule must be addressed (and will be) if  we want to 
maintain that there is a correct way to follow a rule (that is not a matter o f a decision). 
Alternatively approached, as we will come to see, Wittgenstein seeks to accommodate a view 
o f necessity with the view that, for most any rule, there is scope for saying diat it could be 
(or perhaps, could have been) followed differendy or be subject to doubt. Again, although 
this account is very cursory, it does serve to point out that there is a connection in the charge 
o f radical conventionalism between the middle and later periods in the apparent disregard of 
the thought that proofs necessitate die acceptance o f a conclusion.
The last point I wish to bring up in addressing both SV and the rule-following 
considerations is that although both are the basis for the charge o f radical conventionalism, 
they have been described as incompatible (see above). It is not logically impossible that two 
incompatible “theories” should have the same consequence but it should be a cause for 
further scrutiny. As it turns out, I will argue, there is no incompatibility. There is a case to 
be made (and has just been made) that SV does not lead to radical conventionalism (and 
even if  it does, the exegetical case is made that it is a position abandoned). In addition, the 
mle-foUowing considerations do not imply radical conventionalism. This is a case that wUl 
require more in the building (for it is less exegetical and more argumentative) and wiU begin 
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
Riile-Followiiig and Scepticism: 
The Negative Ptogtamme
I. Introduction
It was stated, in the previous chapter, that the charge of radical conventionalism has its 
source in two different sets of views of Wittgenstein’s: the concept modification thesis (and 
with it the no-conjecture thesis and the strong veiificationism of the middle period) and the 
rule-following considerations. This distinction in source o f radical conventionalism is not 
brought out by Dummett. I t is with Wright that we see this distinction first attended to.^
The concept modification thesis and kin were discussed in the first chapter. The discussion 
o f the rule-following considerations (and their bearing on radical conventionalism, inter alid) 
begins in this chapter,
Dummett, in drawing his charge o f radical conventionalism, does not refer to the 
different texts of Wittgenstein to any great deal. He focuses primarily on the RFM  with a 
single other reference to the PL^ This is fair enough for his agenda is to offer an account o f 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy o f mathematics as it is discerned firom the RFM. A t the beginning 
o f the paper Dummett notes that the RFM, a set o f notebooks comprising Wittgenstein’s 
thoughts on the philosophy o f mathematics, was not “intended by its author as a book”; tliat 
its thoughts “are expressed in a manner which the author recognized as inaccurate or 
obscure; some passages contradict otliers; some are quite inconclusive; etc.”; and notes tliat 
the contrast with the PI is “marked, and is due entirely to the different origin o f the two 
books’’.^  Given aU this, it would be a simple strategy to dismiss the charge o f radical
 ^ In Wright [1980], especially Ch. 3.
2 As noted in die first chapter, there is a rift in the RFM between Parts 6 and 7, wliich were composed later and 
conform to Wittgenstein’s views in the PI and Parts 1-5, wlilch were composed earlier and conform to and 
espouse Wittgenstein’s mid-period views, e.g., a strong verificationism concerning mathematical propositions 
which is not upheld in the later period. Tliis unnoticed but noteworthy division widiin the RFM explains, to 
some extent, Dummett’s conflation in sources o f the charge o f radical conventionalism in liis treatment o f the 
work.
 ^Dummett [1966], pp. 420-421.
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conventionalism on the grounds tliat the thoughts that lead to it are sufficiently unworked; 
tliat they are thoughts of Wittgenstein’s as found in a work o f progress which do not 
indicate a final commitment on the subject. Indeed, this was much o f the strategy employed 
in the first chapter. However, this strategy will not work for the charge o f  radical 
conventionalism as derived from the rule-following considerations. The RFM  may have 
been a set of notebooks o f jotted thoughts but the thoughts on rule-following are to a fair 
extent repeated in the There is no scope for claiming a change o f mind on the topic o f 
rule-following such that we can say that the charge o f radical conventionalism as drawn from 
rule-foUowing considerations falls by the way side in the later period.
Having said this, there is something remarkable in Dummett’s charge o f radical 
conventionalism as derived from his reading o f rule-foUowing remarks in the RFM, There is 
an important parallel between this charge and a sceptical reading o f the rule-foUowing 
remarks. W hat is remarkable is that this sceptical reading emerges in the late 1970’s with 
Kripke and Wright. Dum m ett drew his charge o f radical conventionalism in 1959.^ The 
charge o f radical conventionalism makes no explicit mention o f a sceptical take on the rule- 
foUowing remarks but we wiU see that they are on a joined path. Briefly, the tiiought is this: 
the aUegation of radical conventionalism, that we are at liberty to foUow a rule as we please 
(that we are not compeUed except by our own decision) is a close sister to the sceptical 
consideration that it is not determined in our understanding of a rule what wiU count as its 
correct future application. Dummett portrays the charge o f radical conventionalism as 
drawn from rule-foUowing considerations in tliese terms: “There is nothing in our 
formulation of the axioms and o f the rules o f inference, and nothing in our minds when we
 ^And fuither, according to die editors, both were written very close in date: Section 6 o f  the RFM—where its 
rule-following remarks are found — is dated at 1943/44 while Part I o f  die P I—which contains its rule- 
following remarks — is said by its editors to have been completed by 1945.
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accepted these before the proof was given, which of itself shows whether we shall accept the 
proof or not; and hence, there is nothing which forces us to accept the proof.”*^ This bears a 
favourable comparison to a central sceptical rule-following consideration, expressed by 
Wright, that “there is in our understanding o f a concept no rigid, advance determination of 
what is to count as its correct application.”  ^ Thus Dummett is, perhaps unwittingly, 
prescient in drawing his charge of radical conventionalism. They are not the same theses: 
radical conventionalism and the sceptical thought just expressed. But they are closely tied. 
Tliis will be further described below and further developed in later chapters.
Upcoming in this chapter, I wUl first give an account of basic rule-following 
considerations (and their connection to die charge o f radical conventionalism). I wUl then 
present Kripke’s sceptical argument, with special attention to his employment of these 
considerations, and briefly, his sceptical solution (primarUy to point out that it does not 
withstand the charge o f radical conventionalism and that this is a major flaw o f the solution). 
Following this, I wUl submit two separate sceptical arguments. These arguments share a 
common negative conclusion concerning rule-foUowing and a common initial premise; they 
are nevertheless separate arguments for reason o f having other premises not in common and 
employing different tactics. I submit these both as Wittgenstein’s own for the 
considerations which form the arguments are drawn closely from the rule-fbUowing remarks. 
These arguments bear important simUarities and differences to Kripke’s which I wUl 
describe. Also, the first argument wiU be seen to contain an unabashedly anti-reaUst premise. 
This premise features in Wittgenstein’s case against rule-reaUsm. I wUl present this case 
against reaUsm primarUy through a defense o f this premise. I wUl show that there is non-
5 In Dummett [1966].
Dummett [1966], pp. 426-427. 
7 Wright [1980], p. 21.
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verificationist support for this premise that makes use o f private language argument style 
considerations as they are presented in the rule-following remarks. In the end, defending 
tliis anti-realist premise o f the first sceptical argument wUl involve considerations drawn 
from the second sceptical argument. The concerns o f commentators that disagree with a 
sceptical reading o f the rule-foUowing remarks wiU be addressed in the next chapter.
II. Basic Rule-Following Considerations
Consider the foUowing oft-quoted passage:
N ow  we get die pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000 - and he writes 1000,1004,1008,1012.
We say to him: "Look what you've done!" - He doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to 
add Wo\ look how you began tlie series!" - He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought tiiat was how I was 
mmiit to do it." - Or suppose he pointed to tiie series and said: "But can't you see...?" - and repeat the 
old examples and explanations. - In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to tliis person 
to understand our order witii our explanations as we should understand tlie order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 
up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on." (PI 185)
This remark is the first o f a cluster o f remarks about lule-foUowing in the PI. I wiU utUise 
the case of the deviant pupU presented in this remark often through this thesis as stage- 
setting for points I wish to make beginning now with some key rule-fbUowing 
considerations. First, note tliat the pupU in the remark foUows the rule incorrectly. The 
remark indicates clearly that there is a correct way to follow a rule and tliat the pupil does 
not understand this. Let this be the first rule-fbUowing point.
RFl: There is a correct way to follow a rule.
Second, normally a certain amount o f instruction is sufficient to convey to someone 
the correct way to follow a rule. Our own ability to learn and follow rules is a testament to
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this, Wittgenstein is not putting this up for argument. Rather, he observes that this certain 
amount o f instruction (and indeed, any amount o f instruction) not be sufficient to
convey to someone the correct way to follow a rule (while maintaining that tlie person is 
responding rationally — in a sense to be later specified — to the instructions given). If we 
consider a set o f instructions for following a rule in terms o f a set o f examples (and any 
instruction in a rule ultimately makes essential use o f learning from a set o f examples or 
illustrations, so the contention runs — and this point wRl be defended at length later), then 
there are an indefinite number o f courses o f action that are consistent with the instructions 
but not correct to the rule or the instructions as intended. Wittgenstein affirms this very 
point when he says, at the end o f the paragraph quoted above, “It comes natural to this 
person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: 
“Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on,”” H ie  pupil is following the 
instructions differently than we would hâve him but his behaviour is still consistent with the 
instructions; it is just that tiiere are different interpretations of the instructions (i.e., different 
courses of action consistent with the instructions), not all o f which are correct to the rule as 
intended. Let us express this point generally as follows:
RF2: Indefinitely many courses of action can be interpreted to be in accord with
the instructions for a rule.
This is because the instructions for a rule underdetermine the rule.® N ote that RF2 admits 
that someone may pursue a course o f action that is a consistent interpretation o f the 
instructions given but still act wrongly. And this is to admit that someone may be rational 
but still wrong in their rule-foUowing behaviour. This is a distinction I wiU make use o f in 
Chapter 4.
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Also, notice that the above remark raises a difficulty for the charge o f radical 
conventionalism: if there is a correct way to follow a rule (RFl), then one may not decide to 
follow a rule differently tlian this way and still be correct. It may seem that if  the correct way 
to follow a rule is the product o f an individual decision — as per the charge o f radical 
conventionalism — that this is consistent with R Fl (which only says that there is a correct 
way to follow a rule and does not deny that this way may be the result o f an individual 
decision). But this is still counter to the quoted passage above which clearly upholds that the 
way tlie deviant pupil followed the rule is not correct; hence, if  he had decided to follow the 
rule as he did, his decision would not be correct. Radical conventionalism upholds that the 
logical necessity o f a statement is decided; that the correct way to follow a rule is decided and 
that this decision is all that there is to following it correctly. Further, as the charge was 
originally levelled by Dummett, this decision is the individual’s. Hence, there is no incorrect 
individual decision because the individual’s decision determines the correct way to follow a 
rule in any case. But again, in the remark above, if  the deviant pupil had decided to follow 
the rule add-2 as he did (rather than, as it is presented, reacting spontaneously), then his 
decision would be incorrect. And so it seems we have a difficulty with reading the first rule- 
following remark consistendy with the charge o f radical conventionalism.
The charge of radical conventionalism is in need of an amendment that is no less 
damaging to Wittgenstein (and renders the charge stronger for dealing with this noted 
inconsistency with the text). The amendment submits that the decision that establishes the 
correct way to follow a rule (at any given step) is the community’s. Thus, in the above 
remark, the pupil wrongly follows the rule because he acts contrafily to the communal decision 
concerning how it ought to be followed. The charge o f radical conventionalism is still
 ^H iis thought will be further explained and developed below,
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maintained because it is stiîl by a decision that the correct application o f a rule is determined, 
albeit now it is a communal one. This conventionalist view clearly runs against our intuitions 
concerning rules we consider necessary (that they be followed in a certain way) and is 
thereby still a radical view.^ A  community is free to accept the steps in a proof but reject the 
conclusion (or what we would otherwise view as the conclusion) and this rejection is thereby 
the correct response (and so we see that the proof does not compel the acceptance of the 
conclusion).
This view pairs well with what we may call ‘Simple Communitarianism’, according to 
which the correct way to follow a rule is simply the way that the community happens to 
follow it (and so there is no doing wrong for the community; there is no going collectively 
off the tracks). Thus, if  the community were to decide to follow a rule differently, for some 
reason or not, then this different way would become the correct way. Hence, Simple 
Communitarianism is subject to the criticism o f radical conventionalism (unless we say that 
the community is not fiee to decide to do differendy or does not decide at all; but whatever 
grounds we give for saying this is grounds for saying that diere is more o f a story to teU 
about why the community follows a rule as it does than admitted under Simple 
Communitarianism — a sophisticated communitarianism perhaps). Kripke’s Sceptical 
Solution, as we will furdier see, is a version o f Simple Communitarianism. Hence,
 ^And notice tliat the community, under this view, is free to decide how to follow a rule at any step. Hence this 
view is different from the “modified” or “restrained” conventionalism according to which, as described by 
Dummett, “all necessary trudi derives, immediately or remotely, from linguistic stipulations we have tacitly 
made, linguistic conventions we are trained to observe.. .Other necessarily true statements, however, do not 
directly reflect conventions we consciously follow, but are conséquences o f  more basic conventions,” As 
Dummett then observes, “This prompts the objection diat it leaves die necessity o f  consequences unaccounted 
for,” and diat “radical conventionalism escapes diis objection by treating every necessary trudi as the direct 
expression o f a linguistic convention.” (Dummett [1993b], p. 447) The amended take on radical 
conventionalism, according to which it is by a communal decision rather dian an individual decision diat the 
necessity o f a statement is established, is still “radical” under Dummett’s account as outlined here.
Tliere are no truth conditions that bear on the correct way to follow a rule, he says, but only assertibility 
conditions and these are given by reference to a community. H e does not develop tills community view much
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Knpke’s solution is subject to the charge o f radical conventionalism (in this amended form). 
A t any rate, with radical conventionalism so amended, tliere need be no conflict with RFl 
nor with the case o f the deviant pupil presented in PI 185: there is a correct way to follow a 
rule (such that the deviant pupd o f PI 185 is in violation) and this correct way is given by a 
communal decision.^^ DispeUing the radical conventionalist charge will require showing that 
we can follow a rule correctly, and that tiiis is not a matter of decision, despite the fact that 
instructions in a rule underdetermine this correct way of following the rule.
Continuing on with rule-following considerations, it was noted that the pupil’s 
actions in following what he beheves to be the rule add-2 can be interpreted so as to be in 
accord with the instructions given him for the rule add-2. This interpretation allows us to 
malce sense o f the pupil’s actions even though we believe he is not following the rule 
correctly. This draws on RF2. Let us suppose that a?ry or every course o f action can be 
interpreted to be in accord with a rule or instructions in a rule. This is m uch more extreme 
than RF2 (which admits that only indefinitely many courses o f action can be made out to so 
accord). We can rationalise the behaviour o f the deviant pupil in P I 185 because his course 
o f action in following the rule was a consistent interpretation o f the instructions given to 
him (granting that an understanding o f those instructions involves, ultimately, an 
understanding gained from a series o f examples or illustrations). Certainly and in contrast,
and so perhaps k  is only for reason o f a lack o f furdier development that die Sceptical Solution is a Simple 
Communitarian solution.
Tltis amendment may seem ad hoc. However, die amendment is needed if  die charge o f  radical 
conventionalism is to be drought to consistendy apply to die rule-following remarks for there is no rule- 
following by an individual (considered in isolation). According to Wittgenstein, rule-following is a practice diat 
takes place only in a community; it instantiates, as he says, “an institution”. Alternatively, we may turn to the 
private language argument (and I will argue for a version o f this in the rule-following remarks) and say that 
diere is no private rule-fallowing; all rule-following is public and involves essential reference to a community. 
Tltis amendment, thus, actually strengthens die diarge o f  radical conventionalism for it is now consistent with 
key positions o f Wittgenstein’s wltile the charge itself remains truly damning.
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we would want to say that not any coui'se o f action can be so tationalised. Nevertheless, let 
us give expression to and generalise this point:
RF3: Any or every course of action can be interpreted to be in accord with the 
instructions for a rule.
RF3 is involved in the paradox as stated by Wittgenstein in P I 201: “no course o f action 
could be determiaed by a rule, because every course of action can he made out to accord with the ruld  ^
[italics are minejl^ RF3 is a difficult point to accept and goes well beyond what RF2 admits. 
These rule-foËowing considerations (viz., RF2 and RF3 — I will take R Fl to be 
uncontroversial) have been introduced but not yet much supported. RF3 no t only seems to 
be the consideration in play in PJ 201, as just indicated, but also, as we will see, it seems to be 
imphed by RF2 (if RF2 is true o f certain very basic cases o f rules) and also plays a role in a 
separate sceptical argument (for as noted in the Introduction to this chapter, I wiU present 
two overlapping but separate sceptical arguments as Wittgenstein’s own and that are 
different from Kripke’s). Kripke focuses on PI 201 in his discussion o f the sceptical paradox 
in his Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language. In this discussion we find Kripke utilise 
(albeit with a twist) and present a defense of RF2 which, he attests, is drawn from 
Wittgenstein. It is to this discussion that I now turn.
III. Kripke’s Paradox
I will now present Kripke’s sceptical argument. This is an argument for which he claims 
Wittgenstein’s influence, in the least, if  no t an attribution to Wittgenstein. I will give greater
This manner o f wording is also present in FI 198 where Wittgenstein says, “Whateperl do is, on some 
interpretation, in accord widi the rule.” — again, die italics are mine. I do not enter an important distinction
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attention to considerations he raises that can be sourced and /or compared with those of 
Wittgenstein. Accordingly, beyond initial presentation, I will to a fait extent ignore his 
discussion o f dispositions as a candidate source o f meaning facts for the reason that the 
discussion, at this point, veers from Wittgenstein.
The conclusion o f Kripke’s sceptical argument is tliat there are no meaning facts.^  ^
Kripke begins his discussion with a quotation from PI 201 wherein Wittgenstein speaks o f a 
paradox: “this was our paradox: no course o f action could be determined by a rule, because 
every course o f action can be made out to accord with the rule.” '^^  I t is this mentioned 
paradox that Kripke attempts to develop. Kripke develops the paradox with the use o f a 
mathematical example, namely, “plus” (altliough his case is not to be restricted to 
mathematical terms and their rules). Kripke considers a sum which he assumes the 
protagonist has never carried out: 68 4- 57 (and he assumes tiiat all sums carried out in the 
past involved numbers smaller tiian 57; clearly, if this example will no t do, there are otliers). 
Kripke’s sceptic poses a dual challenge: first, is there any fact of the matter as to whether, 
upon performing an addition, I meant “plus” or “quus” (quus, for any addition involving a 
number equal to or greater than 57, yields a sum o f 5)? Second, do I have any reasons for 
answering 125 (as per “plus”) rather than 5 (as per “quus”)? Correspondingly, the answer to 
the sceptic, Kripke challenges, must be two-fold: “First, it must give an account o f what fact 
it is (about my mental state) that constitutes my meaning plus, not quus,” and second “It 
must, in some sense, show how I am justified in giving the answer T25’ to ‘68 + 57’,”^^  
These are certainly related challenges: if there is no fact o f the matter as to which function
between saying any course o f  action can be made out to accord with a rule and saying that any course o f  action 
can be made out to accord with instructions for a rule, and I will explain tliis in Section IV. ili. below.
Kripke will say that it is because meaning statements lack trutli conditions that there are no meaning facts. 
His sceptical solution attempts to redeem tlie possibility o f  communication by arguing that Wittgenstein admits 
assertibhlity conditions, given by reference to a community, as applying to meaning statements.
Kripke [1982], p. 7.
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was intended, then there is no justification to be had by appeal to some fact of the matter; 
lilcewise, if  tiiere is no justification to be had about which function was meant by appeal to 
some fact about, say, past behaviour and mental states, then on assumption of perfect access 
to these presumed sources o f facts, there is no fact (about past behaviour and mental states) 
as to which function was meant. Kripke utilises this latter strategy: the protagonist is 
assumed to have perfect access to and recall o f past behaviour and mental history. Hence, if 
such an agent cannot justify whether plus or quus was meant tiirough recall o f past 
behaviour and mental history (for both o f these are indifferent between which function was 
meant), then there cannot be any fact about past behaviour or mental history that establishes 
which function was meant (the idealisation o f the agent links up the lack o f justification to 
tlie lack o f a fact). As long as other candidate sources for meaning facts are also found 
wanting (e.g., dispositions), then there cannot be meaning facts at aU. The argument, at 
large, is one o f elimination o f candidate sources o f meaning facts.
Kripke sums his argument as fohows:
Tlie skeptic argues that when I answered T25’ to tlie problem ’68 +  57’, my answer was an unjustified 
leap in the dark; my past mental history is equally compatible witli the hypotliesis diat I meant quus, and 
dierefore should have said ‘5’. We can put the problem this way: Wlien asked for the answer to ’68 +  
57’, I unhesitatingly and automatically produced T25’, but it would seem diat if  previously I never 
performed this computation expUcidy I might just as well have answered 'S’. Nodm ig justifies a brute 
inclination to answer one way radier than anotiier.**^
Kripke adds that the sceptic, “merely questions whether my present usage agrees with my 
past usage, whether I am presently conforming to my previous linguistic intentions.”^^  Kripke 
argues that if  the sceptic establishes that there is no fact o f the matter, either about my 
behaviour or episodes in my mind, as to wliich function I meant in the past, then neither is
15 Kripke [1982], p. 11.
Kripke [1982], p. 15. 
17 Kripke [1982], p. 12.
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there a fact about my present usage. I f  there is no fact about what I meant, there is no fact 
about what I now mean. And so he explains, “O f course, ultimately, if  the sceptic is right, 
the concepts o f meaning and o f intending one function rather than another will make no 
sense. For the sceptic holds that no fact about my past history — nothing that was ever in 
my mind, or in my external behaviour — establishes that I meant plus rather than quus. But 
if  this is correct, there can o f course be no fact about which function I meant, and if there 
can be no fact about which particular function I meant in the past, there can be none in the 
pi'esmt either.” ®^
Kripke then considers the objection that, while it is agreed that if  we consider 
instructions and explanations as involving the provision o f a finite number o f examples then 
there are indefinitely many compatible functions, if  we rather consider instructions as 
involving the provision of a formula or algorithm, then this problem o f indefinitely many 
compatible interpretations does not arise. The objector notes that Kripke may have learned 
to add at his mother’s knee, as it were, counting the number o f marbles in one püe and then 
another, and then after shoving them together, counting up the sum. Tliis method, as 
Kripke notes, is perhaps simpler but no different in principle than the algorithm we may 
now use. Kripke’s answer runs as follows, “True, if ‘count’, as I  used the word in the past, 
referred to the act of counting, then ‘plus’ must have stood for addition. But I applied 
‘count’, like ‘plus’, to only finitely many past cases. Thus the sceptic can question my present 
interpretation o f my past usage o f ‘count’ as he did with ‘plus’. In particular, he can claim 
that by ‘count’ I formerly meant quount, where to ‘quount’ a heap is to count it in the 
ordinary sense, unless the heap was formed as the union o f two heaps, one o f which has 57 
or more items, in which case one must automaticaUy give the answer ‘5’.. .the point is
18 Kripke [1982], p. 13.
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perfectly general; if  ‘plus’ is explained in terms of ‘counting’, a non-standard interpretation 
o f the latter will yield a non-standard interpretation o f the former.”^^
I t will be instructive to explore Kripke’s manner o f dealing with this objection for it 
is certainly one that is reasonable to pose (indeed, it is the objection tliat should come first to 
mind against RF2 given above). This is that while admitting the point that instructions 
construed as a series o f examples or illustrations underdetermine the rule as intended the 
objector counters that instructions construed as an algorithm or formula do not; that 
learning how to foUow a rule upon being provided an algorithm does no t encounter the 
underdetermination of a set o f instructions in the form o f a finite series o f  examples.
Indeed, this is the substance o f Dummett’s point when he asks why it is that a machine can 
foKow an algorithm but we, given the same presentation, encounter a degree o f freedom; he 
states, “whence does a human being gain a freedom o f choice in this matter wliich the 
machine does not possess.” ®^ Kripke responds by first noting that our understanding o f a 
rule, such as that for plus, may involve an understanding o f a more basic rule, such as that 
for counting. However, he continues, there is no reason why the same sceptical thought 
cannot attach to this more basic rule. Thus, if the objector is to make hay o f the notion that 
we can understand the difference between plus and quus in virtue o f an understandmg of 
counting, then Kripke counters by asking how do we know we are counting and not 
quounting (i.e., what is it about our past mental or behavioural history that justifies the view 
that we are counting and not quounmg?).^^
Knpke [1982], p. 16. 
Dummett [1966], p. 428.
1^ And there is no reason tliat we cannot continue to apply tlie sceptical consideration here to more basic rules 
(rules an understanding o f  wliich is a prerequisite for being able to count). This will be discussed to a fair 
length later in this chapter.
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To continue with Kripke’s response to this line o f objection, Kripke acknowledges 
his source here in Wittgenstein: “Here o f course I am expounding Wittgenstein’s well 
Imown remarks about “a rule for interpreting a rule”. It is tempting to answer the sceptic by 
appealing from one rule to anotlier more Basic’ rule. But the sceptical move can be repeated 
at the more Basic’ level also.”^  He further explains, “True, I may not merely stipulate that 
is to be a function instantiated by a finite number of computations. In  addition, I may 
give myself directions for the further computation o f ‘+ ’, stated in terms of other functions 
and rules. In  turn, I may give myself directions for the further computation o f these 
functions and rules, and so on. Eventually, however, the process must stop, with ‘ultimate’ 
functions and rules that I have stipulated for myself only by a finite number o f examples.”^  
Thus, however far we go in explaining our understanding o f a rule by appeal to an 
understanding of a more basic rule, we must reach a point where such a process ends and we 
have only a recourse to examples to explain our understanding o f a rule. These examples, as 
the sceptical thought contends, underdetermine the rule we come to understand (and so the 
examples can be variously understood to yield various rules). Therefore, any rule is 
underdetermined by its instructions for the understanding o f any set o f instructions 
ultimately involves an understanding which we gain by a consideration o f a finite number of 
examples.
A similar response to the objector observes that our first tool in teaching the 
uninitiated is via examples and, as noted, it is always the case that these examples can be 
variously interpreted. This response differs from that made just above in that the focus is 
not a competent rule-fohower (who is the target of Kfipke’s sceptic — indeed, the target of 
Kripke’s sceptic is more than competent: he is ideal for reason o f having perfect recall o f
22 Kripke [1982], p. 17.
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past behaviour and mental episodes) but someone learning such rules for the first time. In 
this case the point that, contra die objector, instruction in a rule proceeds via examples is 
perhaps more clear for the child or language initiate would not yet have an understanding of 
the formula or algorithm in question; his initial training, say in producing the even number 
series (although this too would involve an understanding o f more basic rules) is more readily 
seen as proceeding upon the provision o f examples (for it is upon the grasp o f the series 
from the examples diat the formula is grasped and the stage set for the more advanced 
understanding involved in producing the series from an algorithm or formula). Alternatively 
stated, not having to use examples when explaining a rule presumes the learner has a facility 
with how rules of that type are followed. A t the beginning o f the day, as it were, the cliild 
who we are instructing in language does not yet have this facility and so we must use 
examples.
I want to make clear that what we have here is a defense o f RF2. RF2 claims that 
indefinitely many courses of action can be interpreted to accord with any set o f instructions. 
This is more obvious if we consider a set o f instructions to take the form o f à finite series of 
examples or illustrations. For instance, we may offer a finite series o f examples in giving 
instruction for the function add-2. But there will be infinitely many ways o f proceeding that 
are consistent with the examples given but then veer away (from die correct way o f 
proceeding in applying the rule add-2) for instances not explicidy covered by the examples. 
In  this sort o f case it is clear that the examples given underdetermine the correct way of 
following the rule. The objection raised above asked why all instructions and explanations 
(that are used to convey an understanding o f a rule) should be thought o f in this way. Prima
23 Kripke [1982], p. 17.
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facie  ^an mstmction for a rule that takes the form of an algorithm does not underdetermine 
the correct way to proceed for following the rule.
Kripke responds to this objection (see just above for quotations) by attesting that if 
an instruction in a rule does not involve tlie provision o f examples or illustrations, if, say, it 
involves the provision of an algorithm for following a rule, then it provides instruction in the 
rule through an appeal to another rule; that is, the provision o f algorithms or formulas for 
instruction in a rule (such as add-2) involve an appeal to other rules. Kripke argues that if 
examples are not directly provided in the instructions for a rule then what we have is the 
offering o f rules for following rules. These would include comparatively more basic rules 
since they must be understood for the rules being instructed to be understood. But if 
furtlier rules are appealed to tiien we begin a regress. That is, if  the instructions for a rule do 
not involve the provision o f examples, then, says Kripke, they involve an appeal to another 
rule (a rule for following the rule being learned). But now the same thought applies to the 
appealed-to rule: instruction in this rule must either involve a direct appeal to examples or 
illustrations, or, an appeal to a further (and again, comparatively more basic) rule.
Ultimately, Kripke contends, and we may say that this is on pain o f a regress, our 
understanding o f any rule must involve an understanding gained from a finite series of 
examples or illustrations.
The basic thought here in response to the objection relates that if  an instruction in a 
rule does not take the form o f a provision o f a set o f examples or use o f illustrations, then an 
understanding of this instruction presupposes an understanding of a more basic rule that is 
learned firom examples and illustrations. We may make this case a Htfle differently than 
Kripke does for wliile Kripke contends that if  we suppose that we can come to understand 
how to follow a rule in a way that does not ultimately involve an understanding gained
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through the provision o f examples and illustrations then we are led into a regress (where our 
understanding o f any rule is gained only through instruction involving other rules), we may 
argue differently to the effect that basic rules (or at least, very basic rules) must be learned 
tlirough the provision of examples and illustrations. Since an understanding o f non-basic 
rules win presuppose an understanding o f basic rules, an understanding of any rule wih 
ultimately involve an understanding gained from the provision o f examples and iMustrations.
To this end, it was noted above that if someone does not understand how to foUow 
a rule upon the provision o f an algorithm or formula, we may provide a series o f examples 
for instruction. Indeed, we should say that if he is able to grasp a rule from the algorithm or 
formula, tlien he aheady has a facility with following rules of this sort. But this picture does 
not fit the language initiate; it does not fit the person learning basic rules. For the language 
initiate (or at least, an initiate to the language game in question; that is, someone learning the 
basic rules for the language game to which he is being introduced), instruction in the rule 
would involve the provision o f a series o f examples or the use o f illustrations (for if  he could 
grasp the rule from an algorithm or formula — that is, through some means that does not 
involve examples or illustrations — then he would not be an initiate to the language game in 
question). For instance, someone being taught how to continue a simple arithmetical series 
for the first time would not learn to do so from an algorithm; such a method o f instruction 
presumes tliat he has some mastery o f tliese sorts o f rules. Someone who is being instructed 
in basic rules does no t have this mastery or facility for he does not have an understanding of 
the rules that are basic for the language game being introduced. Such a person must grasp 
these rules through a set o f instructions that involve examples or illustrations for he does not 
have a mastery o f the language game being played that would allow him to no t have to learn 
through these means of instruction. But if our grasp o f basic rules proceeds upon a
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consideration o f examples and illustrations (and so is underdetermined by these examples 
and illustrations), our understanding o f less basic rules which presuppose an understanding 
of these basic rules, is also (and thereby) underdetermined (and no matter that these later, 
less-basic rules are learned through means that do not involve examples and illustrations); it 
is an understanding that is underdetermined for reason o f being budt on an understanding of 
basic rules that is underdetermined. Since indefinitely many courses of action can be 
interpreted to be in accord with the instructions for a basic rule, and since an understanding 
o f basic rules is presupposed in an understanding o f comparatively non-basic rules, 
indefinitely many courses of action can be interpreted to be in accord with any rule or the 
instructions for any rule.
We see Wittgenstein offer anotlier (but not altogether different) line o f defense for 
this thought (i.e., in support o f EP2) early in the PL He argues that ostensive definitions can 
be variously interpreted in every case (PI 28). For instance, he notes that if  I  am teaching 
someone the use o f the word Ted’ by pointing to red objects (and saying Ted’), then I can be 
taken to refer to the shape o f the objects, the number, the position, and many other things 
(and this presuming the language initiate at least knows that I am referring). As I will make 
more o f a point o f later, for the language initiate to learn from an ostensive definition, given 
this various interpretabdity, requires that the learner be able to grasp a rule in a way that does 
not involve interpreting (and this already involves having some facility with learning from 
ostensive definitions). The point here supports RF2 for, insofar as we consider instruction 
in a rule as involving ostensive definition, we see that these instructions can be interpreted in 
indefinitely many ways. The use o f ostensive definitions for instruction is especially 
prominent in the instruction of basic concepts to language initiates and so we have further 
good cause for upholding that an understanding o f basic concepts involves an understanding
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of instructions that can be interpreted in indefinitely many ways. The point here does not 
turn on the finiteness o f the examples used (as in the case of instructions for continuing an 
arithmetical series), although this too would be a factor, but on the point that there are 
indefinitely many features o f the examples that can be interpreted to be the point of 
reference in the ostensive definition. This is a defense o f RF2 that observes that ostensive 
definitions can be variously interpreted in every case and as basic concept instruction often 
takes the form of the provision o f an ostensive definition, this form o f instruction in basic 
concepts is variously interprétable in every case; there are indefinitely many interpretations 
that can be made to accord with such instructions. And since these basic concepts may be 
presupposed in an understanding of other non-basic concepts, we have anotiier means of 
defending the point that, at least for tiie large class o f cases o f rules the understanding of 
which ultimately involves an understanding o f concepts gained through ostensive definition, 
these rules can be interpreted in indefinitely many ways.^ "^
Continuing with an account o f Kripke’s sceptical argument, Kripke proceeds to 
make the point that the sceptical challenge is not merely epistemological; it establishes that 
there are no meaning facts (neither concerning my past nor my present usage). This point, 
as described above, proceeds on assumption that the subject has perfect access to (potential) 
sources o f meaning facts (in this case, mental history and past behaviour). I f  such an 
idealised agent cannot answer the sceptic’s epistemological challenge, then the (active 
conclusion follows (i.e., if  the agent witii perfect recall cannot justify whether he meant plus 
or quus by appeal to past behaviour and mental history, then there cannot be any fact about 
which function was meant in terms o f past behaviour or mental history). Kripke states.
24 As noted, die notion o f a basic rule here is so far a relative one: some rules are basic to, in the sense diat an 
understanding o f  diem is presupposed in an understanding of, other rules. Tiiis notion will be elaborated at
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“Given, however, that everything in my mental history is compatible both with the 
conclusion that I meant plus and with the conclusion that I meant quus, it is clear that the 
sceptical challenge is not really an epistemological one. It purports to show that nothing in 
my mental liistory or past behaviour — not even what an omniscient G od would know — 
could establish whether I meant plus or quus. But then it appears to follow that there was 
no fact about me that constituted my having meant plus rather tban quus. How could there 
be, if  nothing in my internal mental history or external behaviour will answer the sceptic who 
supposes that in fact I meant quus?”^
With this Kripke concludes.
This, dien is die sceptical paradox. When I respond in one way radier than another to such a problem 
as '68 +  57’, I can have no justification for one response rather than another. Since the sceptic who 
supposes that I meant quus cannot be answered, there is no fact about me that distinguishes between 
my meaning plus and my meaning quus. Indeed, diere is no fact about me diat distinguishes between 
my meaning a definite function by ‘plus' (which determines my responses in new cases) and nothing at aU.27
Kripke moves on to consider whether a dispositional account can redeem meaning 
facts (i.e., whether dispositions can serve as a source o f meaning facts where behaviour and 
mental history have failed), I will no t elaborate this much; it is at this point that the 
discussion’s source in Wittgenstein begins to depart. W hat I will proceed to offer in the next 
section is an account o f two sceptical arguments that stays close to the text o f die 
Investigations  ^draw out die case against rule-realism from these arguments, and thereafter 
compare these to Kripke’s account. Prior to that, I want to draw attention to the last line in
different points in die diesis but primarily in the discussion o f bedrock in Chapter 4 (for we will see diere that 
‘bedrock’ is used to exact a discussion o f  basic rules).
25 Kripke [1982], p. 21.
25 The mediod o f  argument here proceeds to exhaustion: Kripke exhausts the possibilities o f  wherein meaning 
facts may He, looking to behaviour, mental history, and later, to dispositions, and finds them wanting. The 
argument thus Ues susceptible to the charge that not all sources o f  meaning facts have been properly 
considered. Ruth Millikan objects along these lines (c.f. “Truth Rules, Hoverflies and the Kiipe-Wittgenstein 
Paradox”, in A. Miller and C. Wright (eds) [2002]).
27 Kripke [1982], p. 21.
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the quotation firom Kripke just above. It is one thing to say that there is no fact about me 
tliat distinguishes between my meaning plus or quus by ‘plus’. It is a stronger claim to say 
that there is no fact that distinguishes between my meaning plus and nothing at all. Given 
the argument we have accepted so far, this should seem to involve a leap. To explain, it has 
been granted that given the numbers upon wliich I have performed sums in the past, there is 
nothing in my past usage o f ‘plus’ to distinguish my having meant plus or quus (‘quus’ 
applying, ex hjpothesi, to a sum not as yet performed). Further, as with my past usage, there is 
nothing to distinguish my presently meaning plus or quus by ‘plus’. Let us grant tiiis having 
observed earlier that the support in favour o f this relies on the point that a series o f 
examples underdetermines a rule (i.e., the set o f additions I have previously performed does 
not differentiate between whether I was performing the operation o f plus or quus). This 
draws on RF2 above. However, how does this establish that there is no difference between 
my meaning plus and my meaning nothing; or, alternatively, between my meaning plus and 
my meaning “hello”; or, between my meaning plus and my meaning that you should jump 
off a cliff; etc. The claim here, in brief, compares to that o f RF3. And it does not seem 
justified by the considerations hitherto given.
The argument so far has relied on the point that the examples given for instruction 
underdeterrnine the rule. Kripke admits this and offers a good defense, which has been 
further supplemented, for the point that instruction in a rule, ultimately, must involve 
learning from examples (see above). But to underdetermine is not the same as to not 
determine at all (the point that Kripke ends up making in the quotation given above). 
Kripke’s former claim is that there is no fact that distinguishes my meaning plus rather than 
quus by ‘plus’ (i.e., no fact about past behaviour and mental history, he then adds 
dispositions to the list). Kripke’s latter and stronger claim, given in the above quotation, is
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that there are no facts that would distinguish between my meaning plus and my meaning 
nothing at all, or anytliing at all. Kripke wishes to conclude from this that there just are no 
meaning facts. But this stronger claim is not established by the case that examples we use 
for instruction underdetermine a rule (or that examples o f past usage underdetermine which 
rule was meant). This case is in line with RF2. Kripke is now after stronger game that is in 
line with RF3. For this he needs a stronger case diat shows there is nothing which can serve 
as a basis for any meaning facts at all. He argues that dispositions do no t provide any basis 
for meaning facts in his lengthy discussion o f dispositions that follows the sections treated 
here, but we should say that the case is no t yet adequately made that past behaviour and 
mental history do not determine at all, rather than underdetermine, what is meant by any 
particular utterance. RF2 allows that there may be facts about meaning for while indefinitely 
many courses o f action can be made out to accord with a rule or set o f instructions, it is not 
yet admitted tliat any course o f action can be so made out (and admitting this much 
determination is consistent with admitting that there is something — some fact — in virtue of 
which a course o f action cannot be made out to accord with a rule or set o f instructions). 
Wittgenstein and Kripke both admit RF2 and utilise it to sceptical effect. Matters do not 
stand the same with RF3. I t seems, based on the case so far considered, that Kripke is not 
entitled to the stronger consideration. And although there are good reasons for saying that 
RF3 follows from RF2 (such that if  RF2 is true in certain basic cases o f rules then RF3 is 
also true — and these reasons are to come soon — and o f course, it is open to Kripke to adopt 
these reasons), we will see (in the last chapter) that Wittgenstein nonetheless denies that 
these reasons obtaiu and hence denies that RF3 is true.
Above it was argued that since we cannot escape the point that ultimately our 
understanding o f any rule involves an understanding gained from a consideration o f
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examples or illustrations, we cannot escape the point that our understanding o f any rule is 
underdetermined. This is a case for RP2. RF3 seems to follow if we admit that RF2 is true 
for very basic rules. I will explain the general drought to some depth soon but for now 
consider the basic rule that governs our understanding o f accordance (i.e., the rule for 
sameness). This is the rule in virtue o f which we understand that a course o f action is in 
accord with a set o f instructions for a rule. I f  the notion o f accordance, between an act and 
a rule (or an act and instructions in a rule), is up for grabs then it should seem that any act 
can be made out to accord with any rule. But this is the claim o f RF3. I f  we have differentiy 
(and hence incorrectly) grasped the meaning o f accordance (due to underdetermining 
instruction in the rule, say), then it seems that we may find any course o f action to be in 
accord with a set of instructions for a rule. For instance, we may view running down the 
road to be in accord with the instructions given for the function plus if  we have the “right” 
notion o f accordance between the act of running down the road and the instructions for plus 
(but o f course, this is to admit that the concept o f plus has not at aU been grasped). This is 
admittedly a very liberal view o f “accord”, but that is very much the point. Once it is 
admitted that our understanding o f very basic rules, such as that which pertains to 
accordance, is underdetermined, such that we can make out indefinitely many interpretations 
o f these rules, then it seems we are led to admit that for comparatively less basic rules (an 
understanding o f wliich presupposes an understanding o f tliese very basic rules — and a 
correct grasp o f any rule will presuppose a correct grasp o f the rule for accordance or 
sameness, see Chapter 4, Section V), any course o f action can be interpreted to be in accord 
with these rules (or for the instructions for these rules). There seems to be nothing that 
restricts the interpretations we can make (of a comparatively non-basic rule) if  we admit that 
our understanding of the m ost basic rules is also open to interpretation. It is admitted.
74
though, that our understanding o f very basic rules is underdetermined for this is part o f the 
defense that, ultimately, an understanding o f any rule rests on an understanding o f a series of 
examples (which gives the case for RF2). And so this defense o f RF2, which upholds that 
our understanding o f basic rules is underdetermined and so open to interpretation along 
indefinitely many lines, seems to lead us to RF3 (and ominously so for RF3, in contrast to 
RF2, should seem quite implausible).
It is worthwhile making conspicuous, at this point, the difference between these two 
sceptical considerations. The first begins with the point that my past behaviour and mental 
history do not determine (offer no fact as to) whether plus or quus was meant by ‘plus’.
This draws on RF2: RF2 upholds that instructions in a rule, construed as a set o f examples, 
underdetermine the rule. Accordingly, the point here is that past behaviour and mental 
history, offering a finite set o f  examples or instances, underdetermine the rule. This does 
not yet show that there is no fact (about mental history and past behaviour) about whether 
any function was m eant (i.e., to say that there are no meaning facts that distinguish which o f 
two fimctions was meant is not yet to say that there are no meaning facts at all in this case). 
The second consideration, the more egregious (and incredible), is tliat tliere is notliing — no 
fact about me, in my mind or in my behaviour — diat distinguishes between my having meant 
plus (or any definite function) by ‘plus’ and my having meant nothing (or anything. This is 
likened to the claim o f RF3 (which says that any or every course of action can be interpreted 
to accord with the instructions in a rule, in which case, as we will see Wittgenstein argue, 
there is no rule-following. There is a movement in considerations we see in Wittgenstein 
from RF2 (presented in PI 185) to RF3 (presented in P I 198 and 201) which is mirrored, 
though differendy, in Kripke’s analysis (for while Wittgenstein accepts RF2 as generally true 
but ultimately rejects RF3, Kripke seems to accept both as true).
75
Kripke’s development from the former to the latter sceptical consideration seems to 
proceed simply. He establishes that there are no facts (in my past behaviour or prior mental 
history) that distinguishes between my having meant plus rather tiian quus. This point then 
generalises to the present: there are no facts that distinguish my currently meaning plus 
rather than quus. The argument hitherto is grounded in the consideration o f RF2: the 
instructions we have for tiie rule (the examples we have so far considered) are indifferent 
between plus and quus. The next step is important. Since there are no facts that distinguish 
my currently meaning plus rather than quus, there are no facts^ about my meaning plus.
The rest is downltill: since this can apply equally to any term, there are no facts about what I 
mean by any term; generalising to every individual tiien, tiiere are no meaning facts.
But what of this “important” step (and thus to continue with the question pressed 
above)? Does it follow from the point that there is no fact that distinguishes my meaning 
plus rather than quus that there is no fact about my meaning plus? The analogue in the case 
o f the deviant pupil o f PI 185 is as follows. It is admitted that the instructions we have so 
far given the pupil are consistent with the course o f action of adding 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 
2000, etc., as much as that of adding 2 (this follows from RF2); both these courses o f action, 
which serve different rules, are consistent with the instructions. However, is the course o f 
action o f jumping off a cliff equally consistent with the instructions given as adding two? 
Alternatively stated, would we say that the rule (or order) for jumping off a cliff and that for 
adding two are equally served by the same set o f instructions (that we would normally give 
for adding two); the same set o f examples? Surely not. But an analogous move is being 
made in Kripke’s analysis. Plus and quus both tit tiie facts o f past usage; this is because the 
agent in question has not hitherto had to calculate a sum tliat would serve to distinguish the
28 That is, facts about mental Hstoty and past behaviour; tlie lack o f  facts in tlie realm o f  dispositions is added
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two. However, it is not the case that plus and schmus both fit the facts o f past usage where 
schmus is a function such that, when given any addition to be carried out, die agent jumps 
off a cliff. And so there would seem to be some facts (about meaning): facts that distinguish 
between plus and schmus even though diey may not distinguish between plus and quus. 
Kripke jumps from a point about underdetermination to the point that there is no 
determination (and so from a point that upholds RF2 as true to a point that, as we will 
further see, upholds RF3).^^
later.
2® We may say that someone who jumps o ff a cliff in response to the request to apply the rule add-2 is 
following this rule: add 2 up to time t  and at or after time t  jump off a cliff. Time t  is the time that he actually 
jumps o ff a cliff. We may say tliat tliis person’s behaviour is consistent witli the instructions given for adding 
2, and his past behaviour in adding 2, because tiie rule just noted is consistent with these instructions and his 
past behaviour (i.e., tlie instructions given and past instances o f  adding 2 took place prior to time t  and so could 
just as well instantiate the rule add 2 as add 2 up to time /  and tliereafter...). This would seem to admit that any 
course o f action can be interpreted to accord widi the instructions for a rule as long as those instructions 
underdetermine tlie rule (for it seems we can always contrive a rule, as here, that forges a fit between the 
instructions given and tlie action taken). Hence, given RF2 we get RF3; that is, if  the instructions 
underdetermine a rule, tlien any course o f  action can be made out to accord witli tliat rule (in which case, tlie 
instructions do not determine the rule at all). Tliis point would vindicate Kripke from the criticism I am raising 
here (I argue tliat RF2 implies RF3 only if  RF2 is true for tlie most basic rules; tlie point here is that RF2 
implies RF3 even if  basic rules are not considered, as the above illustration tries to show).
However, suppose we add an instruction that, when applying tlie rule at time /, one may not jump off 
a cliff. O f course, die person may do sometliing else inappropriate ^ e  jump o ff a bridge), but as long as he 
feels he cannot do something in applying the rule (h  this case jump off a cliff), tlien we do not have RF3 (for 
not anytliing can be interpreted to accord; not anytliing goes). In a sense, witli tliis added instruction we have 
overdetermined how the rule is to be applied at time P, this added instruction is aldn to telling tlie deviant pupil 
to answer 1002 at tlie 501®' step (and so the correct application o f the rule add-2 at tlie 501®' step can be arrived 
at with tiùs rule or with the add-2 rule if  followed correctly). O f course, someone may follow tlie added 
instruction differently than we would have him (but still somehow be acting consistently witli tlie instructions), 
but the point should still stand tliat as long as the instructions bar liim from responding in some way — i.e., as 
long as some course o f  action cannot be made out to accord witli tlie instructions — then RF3 is not true o f  die 
rule in question. Ultimately, the point is tliat if  instructions in a rule are flouted in such an egregious way — 
such that any course o f action can be interpreted to accord witli the instructions — then we do not have 
instructions; tliey are idle and delimit or determine no course o f  action as in accord or out o f  accord (tliis point 
will be developed furtlier in Section IV. iii.). And so contriving scenarios, such as the one above, so as to try to 
show that if  our understanding is underdetermined by a set o f instructions then it is not determined at all only 
serve to show that once we move to view a set o f instructions as open to interpretation in any way, tiien tiiey 
cease to be instructions; they cease to be examples for how to apply a rule. That is why, if  someone jumps off a 
cliff in a sincere attempt to follow the instructions for add-2, we should say tliat he did not understand die 
instructions at all (rather tiian say, as we may with the deviant pupil, that he is following the instructions 
incorrectly but is still consistent to tiie letter o f  the instructions). And so we should stUl say that it is only if  
RF2 is true for tiie most basic rules, such that our understanding o f the most basic rules is open to 
interpretation, that we can see a way that RF3 follows from RF2 (and again, I will further develop this point 
below).
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It should be noted that while Kiipke’s dialectic prior to the discussion o f dispositions 
makes essential use o f the point that instruction in a rule underdetermines the rule, the 
discussion o f dispositions does not. The argument against dispositions as a basis for 
meaning facts rests on other considerations. Wright notes two (and very briefly they are): 
first, our use of rules, such as plus, can apply to an infinite number o f cases for which we can 
have no dispositions o f judgement (for presumably these would be finite in number).
Second, dispositions cannot account for the normarivity of meaning (I may be disposed to 
misuse an expression and so, this disposition cannot account for how I ought to use it).^ ® I 
will now proceed to present Wittgenstein’s own sceptical arguments and theit use in arguing 
against rule-realism.
IV. Scepticism And Explanation-Transcendence
It is an important thought in Wittgenstein’s rule-fbhowing considerations that an 
understanding of a rule does not transcend an understanding o f an explanation o f the rule.
I shall call this thought an ‘anti-realist premise’ (for reasons that wiU become clearer soon).
In  this section I will begin by introducing and explaining this premise, then present and 
defend two separate sceptical arguments building on rule-following considerations (the anti- 
realist premise is a premise in the first argument but, as we wiH see, draws support from the 
second) and finally, with use o f these arguments, which I maintain to be Wittgenstein’s 
arguments, present the case against the realist view of rules. The case against the realist will 
largely proceed as a case against the rejection o f the anti-reaMst premise (to which, it is 
argued, the realist is committed) and this has three lines. The first line argues that a denial o f
50 See Wright [2001f|, p. 120.
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the premise renders the epistemology of rule-following a mystery. The second line argues 
that the denial o f the premise leaves the rule-reahst prey to private language considerations 
as applied to rule-following. O f the three, this case is presented as being Wittgenstein’s own 
and I take this to be the main argument against the possibility of explanation-transcendent 
understanding (i.e., against the rejection o f the anti-realist premise) offered by Wittgenstein. 
The third line, which is connected to the first, argues that if  the premise is denied then 
instructions become superfluous to rule-following and this is clearly at odds with the 
phenomenology o f coming to understand rules and the observed practice o f following rules. 
The sum of these arguments finds its conclusion to be that understanding does not 
transcend explanation and, as a consequence, a realist view of rules is no t a viable option.
IV. i. The Anti-Realist Premise (AR**)
Consider the following remarks:
But if  a person has not yet got tixe concepts, I shall teach liim to use the words by means o f  examples and 
by practice, - And when I do dûs I do not communicate less to him than I know myself. (PJ 208)
“But tlien doesn't our understanding reacli beyond all the examples?” - A  very queer expression, and a 
quite natural one! -
But is that all? Isn't tliere a deeper explanation; or mustn't at least the understanding o f  the 
explanation be deeper? - Well, have I myself a deeper understanding? Have I ^ 0/ more than I give in the 
explanation? - But then, whence die feeling that I have got more? (PJ 209)
“But do you really explain to the odier person what you yourself understand? D on’t you get liim to guess 
die essential thing? You g^ve him examples, - but he has to guess their drift, to guess your intention,” - 
Every explanation wliich I can give myself I give to liim too. (PJ 210)
In  addition, consider these very similar remarks from the Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics (tlie previous were all taken from tlie Investigations)-.
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N ow  I ask myself, what is it that I want him to do, then? The answer is: He is always to go as I have 
shewn him. And what do I really mean by: he is always to go on in tliat way? The best answer to tliis 
tliat I can give myself, is an example like tlie one I have just given. (RFAf VI —17, p. 320)
And again I don’t myself know any more about what I want from him, than what the example itself 
shews. I can o f  course paraphrase the rule in all sorts o f  different forms, but that makes it more 
intelligible only for someone who can already follow these paraphrases. (RFM VI — 21, p. 322)
You do not yourself understand any more o f tlie rule than you can explain. (RFM VI — 23, p. 325)
There is a diought conceriimg understanding and explanation conveyed in the above 
remarks, Tliis is:
AR There is not more to my understanding of a rule than what I can convey in an 
explanation or instructions.
But often times, we do understand more than we can convey. For instance, when we have a 
word at the tip of our tongues - we have an understanding of what we want to say but are 
just missing tlie appropriate word. O r when we are HI or fatigued and just not up to 
conveying what we understand. And so, let us admit that Wittgenstein is making a 
principled point to which these considerations of circumstance do not apply:
AR’^  There is not more to my understanding of a rule than it is possible for me to 
convey in an explanation or instructions.
However, since explanations and instructions for a rule are public goods (they are common 
means by which members of a linguistic community communicate an understanding to each 
other), they provide a constraint on what can be understood in that linguistic community. 
Alternatively, AR* applies to any individual (I am not special in this regard); what can be said 
o f me can equally be said of all. And so, Wittgenstein’s remarks apply generally; he is
80
making a comment about understanding jtigr and not simply some particular individual’s 
understanding. Hence we can say:
AR** The understanding of a rule does not transcend an understanding of an 
explanation of or instructions in the rule.
That is, whatever there is to be understood o f a rule is available from an understanding o f an 
explanation or instructions.^^ I will use ‘instructions’ interchangeably with ‘explanation’ for 
both explanations and instructions are means by which we convey our understanding of a 
rule and further, as per AR**, both are means by which we may fully or exhaustively convey 
an understanding of a rule.^^ The exegetical basis for AR** is not simply the remarks given 
a b o v e , b u t  also the place it fills in a sceptical argument which shows that such a premise is 
needed and, in connection, tlie role it plays in the case against rule-realism (more on this 
further below), I wdl return to an elaboration and defense o f AR** but will now turn to 
present the first sceptical argument where we will see AR** feature as a premise.
IV. ii. The First Sceptical Argument; The Sceptical-Inductive
Wittgenstein, we will see in Chapter 4, maintains an important difference between 
justification and explanation: we can successfully explain how to follow a rule even when we
51 The denial o f  AR** is the claim that understanding is explanation-transcendent. This is terminology adopted 
from C. Wright.
52 It may be the case tliat an explanation need not involve the provision o f instructions but any such difference 
is not germane. I am interested in the tliought tliat whatever there is to be understood o f  a rule can be 
communicated via some public means o f  communication; instructions and explanations are botli means by 
wliich we communicate our luiderstanding o f  a rule to others. AR** tells us that tliere is no understanding o f a 
rule that cannot be conveyed in some explanation or instruction to others. In otiier words, and I wül make an 
issue o f tliis later (in Sub-section iv. B below), tliere is no understanding o f  a rule that is private.
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cannot fully justify a course o f action in following the rule (i.e., justification may come to an 
end but this need not bode ill for conveying an understanding of a rule). It may seem at first 
that the denial of explanation-transcendence is a basis for charging AR** as a verificationist 
premise. But this is not so far clear if  verificationism involves a denial o f justification- 
transcendence in our understanding of a rule (rather than a denial o f explanation- 
transcendence). A t any rate, the question concerning whether AR** is verificationist or not 
is not idle. AR** plays a pivotal role in a sceptical argument, built on rule-following 
considerations (in addition to AR**), that serves to argue against the realist view o f rules.
The realist, as we will see, will want to say that this argument, and specifically the use o f this 
premise against him, begs the question for being verificationist. I wiU be denying this 
rebuttal.
Consider a rule for the development o f a number series (say add-2). Any 
formulation, set of instructions, or in short, any explanation we give for the rule 
underdetermines the correct application o f the rule; they do not determine how the rule is to 
be followed at every step. Consequently, an indefinite number o f courses of action, often 
exclusive o f each other, can be interpreted to be in accord with the instructions for the rule 
(for they vary at places or steps not covered explicitly by the instructions — this, to remind, is 
RF2). This is not to say that the rule, or its instructions, can be correctly interpreted (and 
followed) in an indefinite number o f ways (for there are not an indefinite number of ways o f 
following the rule that are correct). It is to say that the instructions given do not fuUy 
determine the correct way to follow the rule (more accurately, they underdetermine the 
correct way to follow the rule).
55 The fact that this tliought is repeated in the RFM and in the PI (as seen in tlie above remarks), and expressed 
in very similar terms, testifies not only to the importance o f  the tliought expressed but also tliat ^ Xtittgenstein 
was satisfied with the expression from one text to tlie otlier.
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Now let us consider the following argument,^ '^
SI. Instructions cannot but underdetermine a rule, [from the case for RF2 
above]
82. The understanding of a rule does not transcend an understanding of an 
explanation of or instructions in the rule, [fcom AR** above]
53. Therefore, the understanding of a rule is underdetermined.
54. An underdetermined understanding of a rule requires that the rule be 
interpreted to be understood (and followed).
55. But if a rule must be interpreted to be understood (and followed), then we 
fall prey to a sceptical paradox.
56. Therefore, we fall prey to a sceptical paradox (alternatively, there is no 
rule-following).
I wiU. call this tlie ‘Sceptical-Inductive’ argument. Premise SI has been defended above (in 
the case for RF2) and I will soon defend premise S2 (in sub-section IV. iv. below). Notice 
that S3 (the product o f SI and S2) does not assert that there is no rule-following (i.e., it is 
not paradoxical). I t  does not assert that indefinitely many courses o f action are in accord 
with the understanding o f a rule (and hence that any o f these options is arbitrary), but only 
that indefinitely many courses o f action can be interpreted to be in accord with the 
understanding of a rule (i.e., given that SI above can be read to say that indefinitely many 
courses of action can be interpreted to accord with the instructions in a rule, and S2 again 
that the understanding o f a rule does not transcend an understanding o f instructions, it 
follows — as an alternative way o f reading S3 above — that indefinitely many courses of action 
can be interpreted to accord with what is understood of a rule.) Hence, it is only if
54 Again, to remind, a reference sheet with this argument, togetlier witli die next argument and the various 
theses presented, is attached at die end o f the diesis, after the Bibliography, and can be extracted for 
convenience in reading.
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understanding involves interpreting, that there are indefinitely many courses o f action in 
accord with the understanding of a rule. Thus, if  understanding is or involves interpreting 
(S4 above), then we would be unable to follow a rule for reason that we would have no basis 
for opting for a particular course of action over indefinitely many others (and so any course 
of action we pick wdl be arbitrary). Alternatively, we may say that if  understanding a rule 
involves interpreting the rule (or its instructions), then there is no rule-following because we 
would need to understand the correct way to follow the interpretation and this leads us to a 
regress o f interpretations (this is the regress o f interpretations characterisation o f the 
sceptical paradox used by McDowell). Either way, avoiding a sceptical paradox requires that 
there be a way to understand a rule that does not involve interpreting. A nd this, it is 
important to see, does not require forfeiting any o f SI, S2 or S3.
I wdl focus on steps S4 through S6 in the next chapter (for these steps, as I wdl there 
argue, pertain to a correct “reductio” reading o f the argument which I wdl focus on in the 
next chapter). To foreshadow, I wdl there argue that step 84 is the weak link in the 
argument for Wittgenstein; there is certainly some reason to think that if our understanding 
of a rule is underdetermined (S3) then we must interpret a rule in order to fodow it (S4) — 
(for there are indefinitely many courses o f action that can be interpreted to be in accord with 
what is understood o f a rule, i.e., with the instructions and explanations given o f the rule), 
but this connection is denied by Wittgenstein (explaining and defending this point — that we 
can correctly fodow a rule despite an underdetermined understanding, or that we can 
correctly grasp a rule despite underdeterrnining instructions — wid be a preoccupation of the 
fourth chapter on rationadty and rule-fodowin^. Steps SI to S3 are accepted by 
Wittgenstein. But S6, the paradoxical conclusion, does not fodow witliout S4. I wid focus
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on steps SI to S3 in this chapter for these provide the basis of the argument against tlie 
realist view o f rules,
I wdl now present the case provided by Wittgenstein against the realist view o f rules, 
in its initial steps, and then return to this case in full after having presented the second 
sceptical argument available from the rule-following remarks — the Sceptical-Conceptual 
argument — for steps from this second argument are key to the argument against rule- 
realism, To start, Wittgenstein characterises the realist view in related, but different, ways.
He describes it as involving an intuition — and this is, as he characterises it, an explanation- 
transcendent understanding — in virtue o f which we are able to grasp that “essential thing”
(PI 210) that is necessary for an understanding o f how to follow a rule bu t is not conveyed 
through the instructions or explanations. He also describes a realist view o f our 
understanding of a rule as “flying ahead” to unconsidered steps; that an “act o f meaning the 
order had in its own way already traversed all those steps.. .and took all the steps before you 
physically arrived at this or that one” (PI 188). The thought here is one after determination: 
our grasp o f a rule is a grasp in which every step is, in some way, already determined. These 
are bodi epistemic characterisations and, as we will see, Wittgenstein’s case against rule- 
realism is an epistemic one.^^ Wittgenstein adds that a realist view o f rules, to draw another 
metaphor, is o f rules as “rails invisibly laid to infinity” (PI 218). Under this view o f rules as 
rails, tlie grasp of a rule involves a grasp in which “all the steps are already taken” (PI 219); in 
which the correct application o f the rule is fully determined in advance o f any consideration 
by ourselves (and thus that our following a rule involves following along this predetermined
55 And perhaps this is not surprising as we commonly find that arguments against Platonism in matliematics (at 
least in more traditional forms) are epistemological in nature. For instance, it is argued that a Platonist 
iituition, which is to make contact with mathematical objects, PlatonisticaHy construed, violates a causal theory 
o f  knowledge. This is an epistemic criticism o f  Platonism tliat raises a “problem o f  access” (see Brown [1999], 
pp. 15-16). But we will see that Wittgenstein’s argument against realism regarding rules unfolds differently (for 
it argues that a realist intuition must be a private understanding and that this is not possible).
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and set path). This connects to the other metaphorical characterisation noted above for in 
grasping a rule our understanding, in some way, flies ahead along tliis rail; that is, our 
understanding, in some sense, takes in all these steps before we reach them  in applying the 
rule.
The base o f Wittgenstein’s case against the realist, as I take it, is a case against a role 
for intuition in our understanding o f a rule (i.e., against an explanation-transcendent 
understanding; against a denial o f AR** or S2 above). But we may add that Wittgenstein’s 
other characterisation o f the realist view, the second offered above, i.e., as requiring that our 
understanding o f a rule be one in which all the steps are determined in advance of our 
application, calls for a commitment to a role for intuition in our understanding of a rule for 
the realist. This diought proceeds along the following lines.
A role for intuition, in the realist’s epistemology o f rule-following, is perhaps aheady 
evident for it is common to characterisations o f Platonist epistemologies in the philosophy 
o f mathematics.^*’ But Wittgenstein has something specific in mind with ‘intuition’, viz., an 
explanation-transcendent understanding, and he offers reason to think that the realist is 
committed to such an epistemology. A realist understanding o f a rule, as also characterised 
by Wittgenstein and as noted above, is an understanding in which all the steps are aheady 
determined prior to our reaching any given step in applying die rule (again, our mind “flies 
ahead” when we grasp a rule). But any instructions or explanations that can be given cannot 
but underdetermine a rule; they cannot account for this “flying ahead” because they can only
5*5 For instance, in describing Platonism,}. Brown offers: “Mathematical entities can be ‘seen’ or ‘grasped’ with 
the ‘mind’s eye’. These terms are, o f  course, metaphors, but I’m not sure we can do better. The main idea is 
tliat we have a kind o f  access to the mathematical realm that is something like our perceptual access to the 
physical realm.” (Brown [1999], p. 13). Famously, we see tliat Gddel upheld a role for intuition by arguing tliat 
there are mathematical propositions that we can “see” to be true but that we cannot prove. There are many 
characterisations o f Platonism in matliematics that defend and criticise appeals to intuition in different ways. 
XXrittgenstein’s criticism o f a realist view o f rules should be inclusive o f a realist view o f  rules in mathematics.
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determine a finite number o f instances at best. Hence the need for a further epistemic 
resource and this is intuition (an explanation- and instruction-transcendent source of 
understanding.
To further explain, given that indefinitely many courses o f action can be interpreted 
to be in accord with any set of instructions or explanations (by RF2), our comiug to 
understand the correct way to follow a rule upon the provision o f a set o f instructions would 
seem to involve an epistemic leap. It is a leap from underdetermining instructions to a 
correct and unique understanding o f how to proceed. Alternatively stated, whatever we say 
by way o f explanation to account for our understanding o f a rule will underdetermine the 
rule (and so will not determine a correct and unique application). But we don’t hold 
anything back — something essential — in our explanations or instructions (by AR**), says 
Wittgenstein. A nd so how do we even know the correct way to go on? The realist’s 
response, in Wittgenstein’s view o f tlie matter, is that something essential is held back and 
this is an intuition that transcends the explanations that we can give o f the rule; intuition 
bridges this epistemic gap. The point may be put this way: supposing we grant an 
understanding o f a rule to the realist, we may ask how it is that the realist knows how to 
correctly apply a rule from step to step. These steps must be determined in advance o f any 
consideration by ourselves, by the realist account, but the instructions and explanations 
given can only determine a finite number o f steps at best. Hence, for steps not explicitly 
covered or determined by those instructions, the realist must call on something else to know 
that he proceeds correctly and this is intuition. This is the “something essential”, a source of 
understanding that transcends what there is to be understood from the instructions and 
explanations available.
but it should be kept to mind that, as I will say above, Wittgenstein has a somewhat specific view of intuition in
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But for Wittgenstein, following a rule from an underdetermined understanding does 
not involve an epistemic leap; it does no t call for an intuition. I t involves our ability to 
follow a rule hlindjy. I will explain blind rule-following in the fourth chapter and convey that 
it involves an alternative rational response to rule-instruction that allows us to follow a rule 
from underdetermining instructions without epistemic difficulty (and that this is connected 
with being able to follow a rule without reasons, or at least, reasons that fall short of 
justifying a course o f action). But notice that this option, that o f following a rule blindly, 
should not appeal to the realist because it does not face the epistemic gap; it does not admit 
that our understanding o f a rule is o f it as fully determined (for our understanding remains 
with underdeterrnining instructions).
Wittgenstein does not say that we cannot gain a correct understanding o f how to 
follow a rule or that we proceed arbitrarily when we follow rules as we do (for reason that 
we could be pursuing any one o f indefinitely many other consistent interpretations); he does 
no t say that, aldiough our understanding remains underdetermined, that we view a rule as in 
some way indeterminate in what it proscribes. But it remains to give an account o f blind 
rule-following to show why Wittgenstein is allowed (or at least, why he thinks he’s allowed) 
to not say these things (i.e., to show why we do not conftont an epistemic inductive problem 
when trying to follow a rule from underdeterrnining instructions) and do so without 
appealing to an intuition. But the provision o f tliis account (again, to follow in the fourth 
chapter) is aside from the case that is to be made against the realist. This case proceeds as a 
case against explanation-transcendent understanding or intuition (i.e., against the rejection of 
AR**) for, as motivated here, the realist must commit to an explanation-transcendent source 
o f understanding o f a rule (for the determination that is held by the realist to be required in
mind in his case against a tole foi’ intuition in rule-foliowing.
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our understanding o f a rule is no t secured through underdeterrnining instructions and 
explanations). That is, an explanation-transcendent understanding is required for tlie realist 
to bridge an epistemic gap from underdeterruinmg explanations and instructions to a correct 
and unique understanding of how to follow a rule.^^
Thus, we see that SI and 82 provide the keys to Wittgenstein’s case against a realist 
view o f rules. And so even if  we deny that understanding a rule involves interpretation (84), 
and so deny that the above argument results in a sceptical conclusion (86) — as we will see 
Wittgenstein do — this does not at all undermine the use of steps 81 through S3 of this above 
argument (and specifically o f premise 82 or AR**) in an argument against rule-realism. As 
stated, I win present this case largely as a case against the possibility o f explanation- 
transcendent understanding or intuition (i.e., a case against the rejection o f AR**), having 
above motivated the case that the realist is committed to an explanation-transcendent 
understanding (i.e., committed to rejecting AR**). Prior to undertaldng this task, I will 
present a second sceptical argument, also taken closely fcom the text, for this wiU prove 
germane to the above task. This second sceptical argument wiU prominently feature RF3.
IV. iii. The Second Sceptical Argument: The Sceptical-Conceptual
According to Wittgenstein in PJ 201, a paradox ensues if RF3 is tme.^® Wittgenstein says: 
“This was our paradox: no course o f action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course o f action can be made out to accord with a rule. The answer was: if  everything can
57 Tliis is, o f  coutse, Vrittgenstein's chaiactetisalioii o f realism concerning rules and it is tliis view tliat is being 
criticised and denied. Given die variety o f characterisations o f realism (and anti-reaUsm, for that matter) on tlie 
market, there is perhaps a construal o f  realism as it pertains to rules — different tlian that characterised by 
Wittgenstein — diat can cohabit with following a rule “blindly”.
58 That is, diere is no rule-following i f  RF3 is true, or at least, as we will see, diere is no following o f rules for 
which EP3 holds or is true.
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be made out to accord with a rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so 
there would be neither accord nor conflict here.” Wittgenstein’s remedy, expressed in the 
second paragraph o f this remark, is to affirm that there must be a way to follow a rule 
without interpreting.^^ This argument is not the same as that given just above (i.e., the 
Sceptical-Inductive). This argument reasons differently and, unlike the previous argument, 
makes essential use o f RF3.
Wittgenstein relates, in the passage just quoted, that if  every course o f  action can be 
interpreted to be in accord with a rule or set o f instructions (RF3), then no course o f action 
is determined by a rule or set o f instructions. That is, if RF3 holds (as opposed to just RF2), 
instructions in a rule do not determine the way to follow a rule at all. Wittgenstein continues 
on to say that if this is the case, then a paradox results; there is no rule-following (for there 
is “neither accord nor conflict here”). I wdl present the argument directly below and then 
proceed to explain and support the premises.
Cl. Indefinitely many courses of action can be interpreted to be in accord with 
the instructions for a rule. [RF2]
C2. If indefinitely many courses of action can be interpreted to be in accord with 
the instructions for a rule, then any (or every) course of action can be 
interpreted to be in accord with the instructions for a rule. [RF2 -> RF3]
C3. If any (or every) course of action can be interpreted to be in accord with the 
instructions for a rule, then no course of action is determined by the 
instructions for a rule. [From P I  201]
C4. If no course of action is determined by the instructions for a rule, then there is 
no rule-following. [Also from P I  201]
C5. Therefore, there is no rule-following.
55 Notice tliat this remedy — tliat there must be a way to follow a rule that is not an interpretation — wiU serve as 
tlie means o f  avoiding tlie paradox o f  die first sceptical argument, i.e., die Sceptical-Inductive. Tliis discussion
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I wdl call this argument the ‘Sceptical-Conceptual’ argument, in difference to the ‘Sceptical- 
Inductive’ argument given above. I have defended die first premise above in the discussion 
o f RF2. I have said some words about the second premise, i.e., o f why we might think that 
RF3 follows from RF2. I wdl now elaborate this and the otiier premises. The second 
premise (C2) aims to connect the thought expressed in PI 185 (i,e., RP2) to that expressed in 
P I 201 (i.e., RF3). It upholds that if an indefinite number of courses o f action can be made to 
accord with the instructions in a rule, then aty course o f action can be made to accord.
Once again, the movement from the one claim to tlie other, I offer, resides on whether RF2 
is true in very basic cases of rules. The connecting thought is that if  indefinitely many 
courses o f action can be made out to accord with the training and instructions for basic 
rules, then the training and instructions for comparatively non-basic rules, an understanding 
o f which presupposes an understanding o f these basic rules, is opened to a wider range of 
interpretations (i.e., the range of interpretations that can be made out accord to with a non- 
basic rule widens if  grasping the non-basic rule presupposes an understanding o f a basic rule 
that is lilcewise open to interpretation). The obvious candidate, again, pertains to 
accordance. If we have incorrectly grasped the notion of accordance or sameness (such that 
we incorrectly grasp what it is for an act to accord with a rule or instruction in a rule), then it 
is conceivable that we can find any act to be in accord with any rule (given a sufficiently 
liberal and admittedly incorrect understanding of accordance).
Recall that it is part o f the defense of RF2 that if the instructions for a given rule do 
not involve the use o f illustrations or examples, then there is a more basic rule, an 
understanding of wliich is presupposed in an understanding o f the given rule, that does. 
That is, the point was made, in defense o f RF2, that indefinitely many courses of action can
will be taken up in the next chaptet.
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be interpreted to accord with the instructions for any rule because the instructions for any 
rule will either involve examples or illustrations or will presuppose an understanding of more 
basic rules which were learned from examples or illustrations (and of course, there is the 
point that any set of examples and illustrations can be interpreted in indefinitely many ways). 
But if  indefinitely many courses o f action can be made out to accord with basic rules, then it 
seems that for rules (comparatively non-basic) that presuppose an understanding of these 
basic rules, that the number o f courses o f action that can be interpreted to accord with these, 
granting that there are already indefinitely many, widens. And further, the thought 
continues, if indefinitely many courses o f action can be interpreted to accord with the most 
basic rules (again, tire rule pertaining to accordance is first to mind), then it seems tiiat for 
rules that presuppose an understanding o f these most basic rules, any or every course o f 
action can be interpreted to accord.'*® A n example illustrating this general thought, besides 
that involving the notion o f accordance, is in order.
As Kripke observes, an understanding o f counting is a precondition for an 
understanding o f plus. Hence, relative to plus, the rule for counting is a basic rule. In 
Kripke’s dialectic, it was observed that there were an indefinite number o f ways o f 
proceeding that are in accord with tiie instructions for plus (and, as he makes his case, with 
my past behaviour and mental history concerning the rule also). Suppose my iustmctions 
for plus consisted in a set o f examples o f addition for pahs of numbers up to ten only (i.e., 1 
+ 1,1 + 2, ... , 9 +  10,10 + 10), Following Kripke’s line, since I have not been instructed 
in sums involving individual numbers greater than 10 (and let us assume I have never 
encountered such a sum), this set of instructions is compatible with an indefinite number of 
functions that differ from plus in the results they yield when numbers greater than 10 are
Tliat is, as we move to ever mote basic rules, and find tliat tliese are open to interpretation along indefinitely
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involved (this is RF2). Now, let us suppose that I have not understood correctly the rule for 
counting (and note that a correct understanding o f counting allows me to effectively follow 
the rule for plus by counting the objects in one pile, then another, and tlien counting them 
when püed togetlier). Suppose my instruction in counting consisted o f examples involving 
no more than 10 objects (this instruction is then compatible with rules that differ from that 
pertaining to counting when more than 10 objects are involved). Suppose my understanding 
of the instructions for counting is such that whenever more than 10 objects are involved, I 
count the number as 10 and always 10 (strictly spealdng then, this is not counting; we may 
call it quounting to avoid confusion). This means my ability to carry out sums correctly is 
limited to cases where the numbers added result in a sum o f no more than 10. For example, 
if I were asked to add 8 + 8 ,1 would respond with TO’ since I add by counting (i.e., 
quounting 8 objects in one pile and then 8 objects in another pile and then shove them 
together and quount the objects in the joined pile and — since my understanding o f the 
instructions for counting results in an answer o f TO’ for any group o f objects greater then 10 
— I respond with the answer TO’. We see that the instructions for plus are consistent with 
deviations when the numbers added are greater then 10 (since all the examples given were 
for numbers up to 10). But this should allow me to effectively add 8 + 8, i.e., reach the right 
answer (for these numbers are each less than 10). However, since tire instructions for 
counting are consistent witli deviations when the group to be counted contains more than 10 
members (and since I understand these instructions by responding TO’ to any group with 
more than 10 members), my misunderstanding o f the instructions for counting enables a 
wider deviation in my misunderstanding o f plus than the instructions for plus could by 
themselves license.
many lines, we observe a trend towards RF3 for rules tliat presuppose an understanding o f  tliese basic rules.
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In  general terms, we see a trend towards RF3: the indefinite number o f courses of 
action that can be made out to accord with the instructions for any given rule widens as we 
move to find more basic (prerequisite) rules open to interpretation. As just illustrated, the 
number of courses of action that can be made out to accord widi the instructions for plus is 
less than the number enabled when a deviant understanding of tlie instructions for counting 
is figured in. Thus, per this trend, if  RF2 is true for very basic rules, then we approach RF3. 
And, as also described, if  RF2 is at least true for tlie rule tliat pertains to accordance, such 
that we can view this rule as open to interpretation along indefinitely many lines, then we can 
come to view any or every course of action as in accord with any rule (for, and this point will 
be developed in Chapter 4 on a section devoted to the rule for accordance or sameness, an 
understanding o f the rule pertaining to the notion o f accordance or sameness is presupposed 
in our understanding o f any rule — for with any rule we must correctly understand what it is 
to apply the rule the same firom step to step, from occasion to occasion, if  we are to 
understand it correctly).'**
At this point I wish to make clear that Wittgenstein means to uphold a difference ' 
between RF3 and RF2; that he is not being cavalier in his phrasing in PI 201. If  in PI 201, 
when he discusses the ckcumstance in  which ‘%very course o f action” can be made out to 
accord with a rule, he means only that “an indefinite number o f courses o f action” can be 
made out to accord with a rule then this would place our reading o f P I 201 in line with the 
case o f the deviant pupil o f PI 185. It may just seem tliat Wittgenstein, in PI 201, is 
expressing himself imprecisely. One problem with reading Wittgenstein as meaning no more 
by ‘every’ than ‘indefinitely many’ is that he uses the same form o f phrasing in  P I 198 where
The Üiought here, to be further discussed in Chapter 4, is that if  accordance or sameness is opened to 
interpretation, then what is in accord versus what is not in accord need not be set by die rule, or its 
instructions, but by die interpretation o f accordance.
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he says: ""'Whatever  ^do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule,” (italics are mine). 
Attention to the German usage corroborates that Wittgenstein was not being cavalier in his 
phrasing. The German word for ‘every’, as it occurs in PJ 201, is ‘jede’. As expected, this 
translates as ‘every’ or ‘any’. The German word for ‘whatever’, as it occurs in PJ 198, is ‘was 
immer’. Again, as expected, this translates as ‘whatever’, ‘whatsoever’, or ‘no matter what’. 
In  contrast, tlie German word for ‘indefinitely many’ is ‘unbesthumt’ (close variations, but 
not capturing quite the same sense, are ‘unendlich’ and ‘unbegrenzt’). Notice that this (or 
any o f the close variations) occurs in neither PJ 198 nor PJ 201 in their original German.'*^ 
The German usage shows no sloppiness in the phrasing that would count against the 
distinction as being intended and so we can say that the distinction under scrutiny is not an 
artefact o f the translation.
We may say more in favour of the distinction between ‘indefinitely many’ and ‘every’ 
(and so in favour o f a distinction that establishes RF3 as a rule-following consideration of 
note separate firom RF2). In  PJ 185, Wittgenstein argues, by illustration, that indefinitely 
many courses o f action can be interpreted to accord with the instructions for a rule (for 
instructions in a rule underdetermine tlie rule). Left by itself, this neither achieves the 
conclusion that our understanding of any rule is underdetermined (which is a consideration 
employed in the case against the rule-realist) or a sceptical conclusion. T o establish that tlie 
understanding of any rule is underdetermined AR** must be added. To establish a sceptical 
conclusion, as per the Sceptical-Inductive argument, a further premise m ust be added to the 
effect that an underdetermined understanding o f a rule necessitates a role for interpretation 
(see the Sceptical-Inductive argument above for more). Furthermore, if  Wittgenstein had 
meant to assert RF2 rather than RF3 in PJ 201 then no sceptical conclusion would
Sovirce for German translations is tire useful online German-English dictionary provided by Informatik der
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immediately follow here either. For one thing, RF2 is not strong enough to serve in the role 
o f RF3 in the above Sceptical-Conceptual argument (i.e., the argument o f P I 201). This is 
because it is not true that, if indefinitely many courses of action can be made out to accord 
with a rule (RF2), then no course o f action is determined by a rule; this consequence only 
holds (as I win shortly explain) if  RF3 holds. That is, if  RF2 holds (without RF3 also 
holding) it only follows that the instructions underdetermine a rule (and this is no t the same 
as to not determine a rule at all). A sympathetic reading o f the paradox o f PI 201 would 
requite that we read it literally, i.e., as involving RF3. Additionally, I will explain that RF3 
(and not RF2) figures in a non-verificationist reading o f the private language argument 
(wliich I will initially present below and more generally defend in the Appendix to this 
chapter) and this further supports an important difference between RF2 and RF3. RF3 takes 
us straight to a sceptical conclusion, but RF2 does not; appropriately, RF2 is a consideration 
that Wittgenstein accepts as generally true, I claim, but RF3 not.
With C3 and C4 o f the above argument we find conditionals taken ftom  PI 201. The 
thought conveyed is that if  RF3 holds then no course o f action is determined by instructions 
for a rule and, therefore, there is no rule-following. This is put across as a conceptual truth. 
There is a contrast at play here between RF2 and RF3. RF2 seems to lead us towards an 
inductive scepticism,: if there are indefinitely many courses o f action that can be interpreted 
to be in accord with a rule — i.e., if  each o f these courses of action is consistent with the 
instructions given — then how do we determine the correct way to follow a rule. There are 
indefinitely many hypotheses we may form tliat are equally well supported by the data, i.e., 
the instructions given. And so, on the presumption tliat we must form a hypothesis or 
interpretation, we are stuck; any attempt to follow a rule correctly, on this presmnption,
Technisclien. Universitat München at http://dictleo.org.
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would involve an epistemic leap (or just be arbitrary). The problem here is epistemological. 
But with C3 (and with it C4), the issue is not epistemological; the conditional turns on a 
conceptual point. If  any or every course o f action can be interpreted to be in accord with 
the instructions for a rule, then the problem is not one of choosing the right interpretation 
(as with RF2); rather, if such were the case, there would be no instruction in the rule. This is 
more clearly seen with illustrations. I wiU offer two.
Consider a road sign as an instruction in a rule. A sign tliat is ambiguous (say, part 
o f an arrow that is ambiguous as to its direction) is not useless. It can still offer some 
direction to us (e.g., an arrow that is ambiguous between pointing north or east may still 
serve to tell us not to head south or west). likewise, the instructions given to  the deviant 
pupil o f PI 185 do some work; they are informative for not every course o f action can be 
made out to accord with the instructions. Indeed, since any set o f instructions 
underdetermines a rule (a point that Wittgenstein accepts), it had better be the case that 
instructions can be useful even if they are underdetermining. But what if  a sign were such 
that any way o f proceeding could be made out to accord. In  this case, the sign would offer 
no guidance at all, imprecise or not, ambiguous or not. It would not determine any course 
o f action for us (it would not contribute to an understanding of the rule at all). I t would not, 
in this case, be a sign for us (for it is not serving the function of a sign: to offer direction). 
The point here is that if  we were to come to view a sign as accommodating any way o f going 
on, then it would not determine any way o f going on for us. Notice that the point here can 
be made to apply to any instruction: given any instruction, if  we thought that any course of 
action could be made out to accord with the instruction, then it would no t determine any
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course o f action for us (and so, to view it this way would be to no t see it as an instruction).'*^ 
Once we move from RF2 to RF3, we move from the inductive threat o f having to pick the 
correct interpretation o f the instructions to not having any instructions. That is, once we 
admit that RF3 is true of the instructions for a rule, we admit that the instructions do not 
determine any course of action and thus (as in the case o f the road sign), we do not have 
instruction in the rule.
An elucidating way o f thinking o f an interpretation of a set o f instructions is as an 
hypothesis consistent with a set o f data. Wittgenstein affirms: “Now it is easy to recognise 
cases in which we are interpreting. W hen we interpret we form hypotheses, which we may 
prove false.” ( f  J II , p. 212). With this in mind, consider the following illustration. Suppose 
we have an observation set consisting o f exactly 5 black ravens seen in tlie back garden of 
Edgecliffe at a specific date. This is consistent with indefinitely many hypotheses. For 
instance, at that date, there are 5 black ravens in the back garden o f Edgecliffe, there are 5 
black ravens in the world, there are 6 ravens in Britain, aU ravens are black, etc. However, 
this data set is not consistent with any hypothesis. For instance, there are 4 black ravens in 
the back garden o f Edgecliffe, there are 4 ravens in Britain, there are no black ravens in the 
world. To say that there are indefinitely many hypotheses consistent with the data is not to say 
that the data do not determine, to some extent, the hypotheses made or that can be made 
(for they surely do, for not any hypothesis can be made). However, to say any or every 
hypothesis is consistent with the data is to say that the data do not determine the hypotheses 
made at all (e.g., to say that there are exactly 3 black ravens in the world flatly ignores the 
observation set). The data are idle. Further, to say that the data do not determine the
But the same “insttuctioii” may detetmine a course o f action for someone else who did not view it as so open 
to interpretation. Tlùs is a way o f  making tlie point that what counts as a rule or instruction in a rule depends 
on its use.
98
hypothesis made at all is to say that the data are not data o f or for the hypothesis; in the 
analogy, they are no t instructions in a rule. And so there is a critical difference between RF2 
and RF3: the former allows for instruction in a rule and the latter does not. Appropriately, 
the former invites an epistemological problem and the latter leads us to a paradox by 
asserting a comment on the (grammar o f tlie) concept o f instruction in a rule. It is the 
argument that utilises RF3 that is the argument of PI 201.'*'*
I have given argument in favour o f the above premises. However, as noted, for RF3 
to follow firom RF2 (as contended in C2 above), it is required that RF2 be true o f very basic 
cases o f rules (and especially for the rule pertaining to sameness or accordance, which is for 
Wittgenstein the most basic rule — see Chapter 4), But this, as indicated, will be denied in 
Chapter 4, i,e., it will be argued that for the rule for sameness, we cannot understand it in a 
way that involves interpreting; it is not the case that someone can latch onto a deviant 
interpretation o f this rule because to fail to grasp at least this rule correctly is to fail to grasp 
the rule necessary for an understanding of any other rule (and hence, it is to fad to become a 
rule-fodower or member o f the linguistic community).'*^ And so RF3 is a consideration that 
is not true or does not hold and this is because RF2 is a consideration that does not hold of 
at least one basic rule (that at least for one basic rule, it is not the case that indefinitely many
Again, tlie point is not that if  any or every course o f  action is in accord with a set o f  instructions then we do 
not have instruction in a rule. This is a much more obvious point Radier, the point is tiiat if  any course o f  
action can he made out to, or can be interpreted to, accord widi die instructions for a rule dien we do not have 
instructions. This follows because if  instructions are viewed as so open to inteipretation then tiiey are not at all 
instructive. Also notice, it is not enough to admit that there must be a way o f grasping a rule tiiat is not an 
interpretation (wliich will be called the ‘master thesis’ in the next chapter), to deny RF3 for this — the master 
thesis — still admits that interpretation may have a role in our grasp o f a rule. Wliat we want, when we do turn 
to interpret in grasping the requirements o f  a rule, is that we find at most indefinitely many and not any or 
every way o f  proceeding to be in accord with tlie rule or its instructions (and tliis will involve showing tiiat at 
least for some very basic rules — viz., the rule for sameness again — that interpretation can play no role in our 
grasp, and tiiis tiiought will be developed in die fourth chapter).
45 Also, it will be argued that basic rules, taken generally and so not without exception, must be grasped 
correctly and without interpreting.
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coutses o f action can be made out to accord with the rule or instructions in the rule)/^ This 
is not to say that our understanding of basic rules, including the rule for sameness, is not 
underdetermined by the instructions given and available; rather, it is to say that, at least for 
the rule for sameness, our understanding o f  the rule cannot admit a role for interpretation 
despite this underdetermination. Thus, it is still upheld that our understanding o f any rule is 
underdetermined by (underdetermining) instructions and explanations. And so it is stül 
upheld that there is an apparent epistemic gap firom an understanding o f tliese 
un der determining instructions in a rule to an understanding o f the correct and unique way o f 
applying the rule that needs to be addressed.
Prior to closing this section, I want to address the bearing o f a distinction between 
instruction in a rule and a rule on the above argument.'*^ Let us admit that if  any course of 
action can be made out to accord with the instruction in a rule (RF3) then there is no 
instruction in the rule. Does it follow from there being no instructions in a rule that there is 
no rule or rule-following (and notice that this transition is in play in the conditional 
expressed in C4 above)? The answer is “yes” for Wittgenstein and may be approached in 
two ways. The first, and shorter, is to affirm that there is not an important difference 
between a rule and an mstruction in a rule. They are both, after all, followed (and are in this 
way epistemologicahy undifferentiated; i.e,, our epistemic response to an instruction and a
4*^ We may call this, ie ., RF2 so qualified, RF2* and say while RF2 implies RF3 k>i'^suming RF2 is true o f  
certain very basic cases), RF2* does not. I refrain from formally entering Üiis — RF2* — as a further and 
separate rule-following consideration because I don’t think the added formalization yields added clarity or 
simplicity, preferring (in dûs case) to simply say diat RF2 is a consideration that is admitted as generally true by 
Wittgenstein and RF3 not at all, and that die latter point is a consequence o f  the former (but this will not be 
argued for until Chapter 4, and so will become clearer then). Reasons have been given in dûs chapter, reasons 
staying within an account o f  Wittgenstein’s views on rule-following, explaining why RF3 might be drought to 
be true and this involves its following from RF2 if  RP2 is true in certain basic cases; hr Chapter 4, exposhrg and 
defending Wittgenstein’s positive views on rule-following, a responding case will be made explahring why, 
nonedreless, these reasons don’t obtain (and thus die conclusion o f the Sceptical-Conceptual argument 
avoided).
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rule are the same: they are both to be grasped and followed). We may express the difference 
by saying that instructions are rules we must follow if  we are to follow a rule (i.e., rules for 
following a rule). We may also say that there should not be a relevant difference between 
instructions in a rule and a rule for Wittgenstein once we take note tliat Wittgenstein is not a 
rule-realist or Platonist (and so does not bestow an existence to rules that would differentiate 
them ontologically from instructions — but of course, to deny this distinction, for this reason, 
would beg the question against the Platonist).
Let us nevertheless admit that there is a difference between instructions in a rule and 
a rule, to the effect that the conclusion o f the above argument should not be that there is no 
lule-foUowing, but that there is no instruction-following (or alternatively, there are no 
instructions, for instructions must be capable of being instructive — capable o f  being 
followed — to be instructions). In  response, we may draw on AR** (our “anti-realist” 
premise) and affirm tliat since there is no instruction-transcendent understanding o f a rule, if 
there are no instructions then there is no understanding of rules. AR** diereby denies any 
important epistemic difference between rules and instructions in a rule.'*  ^ Alternatively, 
without appealing to AR**, we may say that if understanding instructions is a necessary 
element of coming to understand how to follow a rule (rather than more strongly require it 
that an understanding o f instructions is aU that there is to an understanding o f a rule, as per 
AR**), then it still follows that there is no rule-following (for without instructions a 
necessary element o f coming to follow rules is lacking). Even the rule-realist, who would 
want to reject AR** (as explained, and as we will soon firrther see), should admit that
47 For, to a certain, extent, I have let Üûs distinction slip; e.g., I have said, in C4 above, that if  instructions 
determine no course o f  action, tlien tliere is no rule-following, rather tiran say that there is no instruction- 
following. I will now explain why this intended slip is not germane.
48 And appropriately, as has been pointed out and we will shortly see, AR** is central to the case against tlie 
realist or Platonist view o f  rules.
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instructions play an essential role in our coming to understand how to follow rules. To deny 
this would be to deny commonly observed practice. The point developed here is to affirm 
that if  there is no instruction in a rule (or no instruction-following, then there is no rule- 
following.'*^
And so we have it, by the above argument, that given RF3 there is no instruction- 
foEowing and hence, no rule-following. And so we have two separate sceptical arguments. I 
wiE begin to explain Wittgenstein’s response to the first sceptical argument (the ‘Sceptical- 
Inductive’) in the next chapter and wiE discuss the response to the second (the ‘Sceptical- 
Conceptual’) in the fourth. I wiE now return to discuss the use of the first argument, and 
specificaEy of the “anti-reaHst” premise, in the case against rule-reaEsm.
IV. iv. Rule-Realism and AR**
In this section I wiE return to a discussion o f a premise from the Sceptical-Inductive 
argument and its bearing on rule-reaEsm. As described earEer (in Section IV. E. above), 
according to WittgensteEi, the rule-reaEst is committed to rejecting AR**; i.e., a rule-reaEst is 
committed to a role for intuition (described as an instruction- or explanation-transcendent 
understanding).^® Briefly, to remind, the line o f thought is this. A rule-reaEst (or at least, a 
reaEst about the class o f rules under consideration), by Wittgenstein’s account, upholds diat 
a rule, independent o f any consideration by ourselves, determines its extension fuEy; an 
understanding o f a rule, accordingly, is o f it as fuEy determined (metaphoricaEy stated, in 
foEowing a rule our minds “fly ahead” to aE unconsidered steps). However, any set of
49 And so to also affirm that tlie distinction between rules and instructions in rules is not germane here,
501 use the term ‘intuition*, despite its pltilosopliical baggage, because, as we will furtiier see, this is tlie term 
used by Wittgenstein to characterize understanding tliat is allegedly explanation transcendent.
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instructions or explanations can only determine a finite number o f steps at best (tliis is one 
reason why it is said that any instruction or explanation is variously interpretable). Hence, 
there is a seeming and yawning epistemic gap from an understanding of the instructions to a 
correct understandiag o f how to follow a rule (metaphorically stated again, an understanding 
o f underdetermining instructions does not allow our minds to “fly ahead” to steps not 
determined in advance by tlie instructions). That is to say, different and conflicting 
interpretations o f the instructions are available which, although consistent with the 
instructions, are not in accord with the series as fully determined. Thus, as alleged by the 
realist, an intuition — i.e., an explanation or mstruction-transcendent understanding — is 
required in order to bridge this epistemic gap and know how to correctly follow the rule; to 
secure an understanding o f the rule as fully determined. Someone who understands a rule, 
and so how to apply it correctly from step-to-step in previously unconsidered instances, 
must understand more than can be conveyed in any explanation or instruction according to 
the realist; and tliis something more, this further understanding, is an intuition.^* Therefore, 
an argument against explanation-transcendent understanding is, by modus tollens, an argument 
against rule-reaHsm so construed (and so it should be clearer why AR** is called an “anti- 
reaHst” premise).
I will now present the case that the rule-realist camiot reject AR** (i.e., he cannot 
uphold a role for intuition or explanation-transcendent understanding in our grasp o f a rule) 
and this will involve, as earlier briefed, three different (albeit connected) lines o f argument.
5^  Certainly, the phenomenology o f  rule-following suggests a role for intuition in guiding us: when given 
instructions often it seems as if  we are grasping something beyond what we are told (because, for instance, in 
being told we often do not immediately understand but later understand widi a feeling o f  insight).
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A, Epistemology is Rendered a Mystery.
There is the thought that our understanding of a rule must be explanation-transcendent 
because we are generally successful in understanding rules when explained without falling 
into a sceptical paradox; without being beset by indefinitely many interpretations of how to 
proceed. But if we agree with this we are left without means to explain how this 
understanding is conveyed since it is outreaching the explanations and instructions given.
The following quote from Wright makes this point. He says, “if we attempt to 
construe grasp o f a rule as the presence in mind o f an explanation-transcendent item, as the 
conception of the autonomy o f rules expressed in tlie rule-as-rails imagery suggests, we are 
beggared for any satisfactory epistemology o f step-by-step rule-following.”^^  A “satisfactory 
epistemology” of rule-following should require that we be able to adequately explain why it 
is that we foUow a rule as we do; that the explanation we can give o f our understanding of a 
rule be sufficient to convey our understanding o f tlie rule, but this is denied in the rejection 
of AR**. The acceptance o f explanadon-transcendence in rule-following is an acceptance 
that an account of the epistemology o f rule-following is beyond our reach. This is an anti­
rationalist account o f rule-foEowing for it prohibits being able to give reasons sufficient to 
the task o f convincing and educating others (not being able to give reasons to account for 
why you follow a rule as you do is not startling since AR** is being denied)
52 Wright [200%  p. 186.
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B. Intuition and Private Language Considerations
A case is given, by Wittgenstein in the PJ, against a role for intuition or explanation- 
transcendent understanding in rule-following that utilises a private language argument 
consideration; with an intuition concerning the correct way to follow a rule, anything we 
think to be correct will be so. I will now develop this case.
Consider the following claim:
CP. If AR** is not true of the understanding of a rule, then the understanding of 
the rule is necessarily private.
To explain, when it is said in AR** that the understanding (of a rule) is not explanation or 
instruction-transcendent, the scope o f ‘explanation’ or ‘instruction’ is exhaustive o f public 
means o f conveying understanding; o f whatever can be publicly communicated in conveying 
an understanding of a rule. Thus to say that understanding transcends explanation is to say 
that understanding transcends any public expression o f a rule. That is, the instructions and 
explanations that intuition is to transcend are public instructions and explanations in that 
they are means by which one member o f a community conveys an understanding o f a rule to 
another (be this through the provision o f examples, algorithms, formulas, etc.); they are 
public goods. Thus, if  understanding is explanation and instruction-transcendent, it is 
transcendent o f public means of conveying understanding; of any means by which one 
member of a community publicly communicates his understanding to another. The claim 
CP (a Consideration o f Privacy) is that an explanation-transcendent understanding is a 
private understanding. That is, if AR** does not apply to our understanding of a rule, then
55 Wittgenstein does say that our reasons in justifying a course o f  action in following a rule run out, as we wûl 
see in Chapter 4, but he does nevertheless affirm (in contrast to die position here) that die reasons we can give
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OUI* understanding is necessarily private for, by the definition o f AR**, it is not possible for 
us to convey our understanding through public means.
But if our understanding is necessarily private when AR** does not hold, then 
private language argument considerations can be brought to bear when AR** does not hold. 
PI 202 makes a case that there cannot be private rule-foEowing (and hence, that there cannot 
be an understanding of a rule that is private): “And to think one is obeying a rule is not to 
obey a rule. Hence it is no t possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was 
obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.” (PI 202) To explain, there cannot be 
private lule-foUowing because the private rule-foUower cannot make tlie distinction between 
foEowing a rule and tliinldng he was foEowing it. Let us, for the moment, accept that 
foEowing a rule requires being able to make this distinction. Since intuition is private (by CP 
and the denial o f AR**), intuition is not a candidate for being foEowed. Hence, intuition is 
not a source o f understanding that can guide us in foEowing a rule. I t may be wondered why 
anyone — especiaEy the reaEst — should be required to be able to make this noted epistemic 
distinction (between Imowing that one is foEowing a rule correctly and it just seeming so). I 
wiE deal with this point soon — for it is surely a crucial concession — but for now wiE 
continue elaborating and tlien exegeticaEy defending the argument.
We have it, by the use o f tlEs consideration against private rule-foEowing, that AR** 
is a necessary condition o f rule-foEowing.^'* But this means that intuition — or whatever we 
are to caE an understanding that outreaches the understanding that can be gained from an 
explanation o f or mstruction in a rule — cannot be a source or means o f understanding a rule.
are sufficient to convey an understanding o f  a rule.
54 Notice that dûs vindicates Kiipke's view diat the first issue o f  the private language argument is in the rule- 
foEowing remarks, and fiiither, its role is not merely to foreshadow die private language argument starting at PI 
243 but is essential to die dialectic o f  the argument against die rule-reaEst.
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Thus, die rule-realist cannot deny AR**. But, as has been argued above, the realist’s position 
is committed to a denial of AR**. And so rule-reaHsm is no t a viable position.
There is clear exegetical support for the above argument: Wittgenstein, in arguing 
against a role for intuition in rule-following (i.e., o f explanation-transcendent understanding 
in rule-following) utilizes the above noted private language argument consideration. He says:
So it must have been intuition tiiat removed this doubt? [regarding which is tlie correct interpretation of 
a rule for the development o f  a series] - I f  intuition is an inner voice - how do I know how I am to obey 
it? And how do I know that it doesn't mislead me? For if  it can guide me right, it can also guide me 
wrong.
((Intuition an unnecessary shuffle.)) {PI 213)
Wittgenstein’s argument against a role for intuition in rule-foEowing is essentiaEy a private 
language argument consideration: he says that intuition could guide me wrongly just as 
much as righdy without my bemg able to teE. This is a private language argument 
consideration (as it appHes to private rule-foEowing because it says that if  we were to claim 
that intuition was guiding us correctly, we would have no basis for this otiier than its 
seeming so (for it is denied tiiat we could know that it was doing so). In arguing against 
intuition as such, Wittgenstein is arguing against explanation-transcendent understanding. 
The exegetical case is strong that the “something essential” that is grasped but not conveyed 
by the explanation of a rule is Hkened to and caEed ‘intuition’.^  ^ And so, Wittgenstein’s 
remark supports the point that where AR** does not hold, private language argument
55 If  not already clear, a strong exegetical case is available tiiat by ‘intuition’ Wittgenstein refers to that alleged 
understanding tiiat transcends explanation; tiiat intuition enables the grasp o f  that “sometiiing essential” tiiat is 
ineffectually conveyed by tiie instructions for a rule. For instance, in PI 209 he responds to tlie question 
concerning whether “our understanding reach[es] beyond all tlie examples?”; he accepts the locution but not 
tlie tiiought that there is a special feat o f  understanding — an intuition — behind this. In PI 210 he similarly 
responds to the question whether witii any explanation someone must '‘guess tiie essential thing” or to guess the 
intention by an act o f  understanding transcendent o f an understanding o f  the explanation. In PI 213 he 
responds to the point tiiat an intuition is needed to remove the doubt raised by the various interpretations that 
are possible o f  any explanation in a rule. AE tiiree o f  these remarks concerning understanding that is 
explanation-transcendent lead directly to the case against intuition in PI 213 — quoted in the passage above — 
utilizing a private language argument consideration.
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considerations are to be brought to bear. This supports my reading that where the anti- 
realist premise does not hold, we are dealing with an understanding that is private, and 
hence, susceptible to private language argument considerations.
Clearly though, the rule-realist would reject this use o f the private language 
argument. The thought here is that a defense o f AR** in terms o f the noted argument in PI 
202 against private rule-following begs the question against the realist. I t  begs the question 
by being verificationist: possession o f an external and non-private correctness criterion is 
required for us to follow a rule correctly. This is an assumption the realist would want to 
deny. The realist would say tliat we can Just te/lhosu an intuition is to be followed so as to 
follow a rule correctly. Given a set of instructions, it is an intuition that enables us to follow 
them correctly (without want o f interpretation) and this intuition is itself no t in need o f an 
understanding o f something else — an appeal to an external and non-private correctness 
criterion — so that it may be followed correctly. I t is o f the nature o f an intuition that it is an 
understanding that does not need to be verified; we can just know what to do when alighted 
by an intuition. Let us look to our sceptical considerations, viz., RF2 and RF3, to see if they 
offer any (non-verificationist) support.
The appeal to an intuition is, allegedly, an appeal to an explanation-transcendent 
understanding that allows us to understand how to foEow a rule where the underdetermining 
instructions faÜ us. But we may wonder whether the understanding of an intuition is 
Wcewise underdetermined (recaE that the point that instructions underdetermine a rule is the 
basis for saying that instructions can be interpreted in indefinitely many ways, i.e., RF2). 
There is a thought — reflected in the Hne o f argument o f the Sceptical-Inductive argument — 
that an underdetermined understanding requires a firrther epistemic resource to settle the 
correct way to foEow a rule (for, presumably, there are indefinitely many interpretations of
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the rule consistent with this underdetermined understanding. This thought underlies the 
appeal to an intuition in the first place (and obviously, it would lead to an unacceptable 
regress to say that a further intuition allows us to correctly follow an underdeterruining 
intuition). But again, the rule-realist would counter that our understanding o f an intuition is 
not underdetermined: having experienced an intuition, one just knows which course o f action 
is correct to the intuition (further, the privacy o f this matter makes it difficult, if  not 
impossible, to directly challenge the realist on this point). That is, if intuition is given as the 
answer to how it is that we can foEow a rule correctly even though the instructions we 
receive underdetermine the rule, then to say that intuition provides no such answer because 
the same sceptical worry attaches to an intuition begs a verificationist question according to 
the reaEst.
Furthermore, we may note that the understanding gained from an intuition (and the 
private instruction it yields) is just no t Eke the understanding o f a set o f (pubEcly given) 
instructions and so it should not simEarly stand that an understanding o f an intuition is 
underdetermined by the intuition. There is no finite series o f examples or instances given in 
an intuition which can be interpreted hi indefinitely many ways (or at least, it is incorrect to 
describe the phenomenal experience o f a single intuition in this way). The experience o f an 
intuition, as a private instruction in a rule, is no t analogous to the understanding o f a pubEc 
Eistruction in a rule which, as discussed, ultimately involves an understanding gained from a 
finite set o f examples. And this is to say that RF2 is not the appropriate consideration to 
bring to bear on Eituition-foEowing.
Rather, the appropriate sceptical consideration to bear on private rule-foEowing is 
RF3: any course o f action can be made out to accord with an intuition. Given that with an 
intuition there is no distinction between what seems to be the correct way to follow an
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intuition and what is the correct way, the correct way to follow an intuition is just what the 
agent believes (i.e., what seems to the agent) to be the correct way. But there is no bar on 
what may seem to be the correct way to foUow an intuition (not without bringing in another 
intuition). But given the argument o f PI 201 (i.e., given the steps from C3 to C5 in the 
Sceptical-Conceptual argument), if any or every course of action can be made out to accord 
with an intuition, then there is no foEowing o f intuitions. This consequent foEows, as per 
the Une o f argument o f the Sceptical-Conceptual Argument, as a conceptual po in t
To elaborate, if an agent has an intuition with regards to foEowing the rule for add-2 
and he beUeves that the correct response is to jump off a cEff, we could no t say that he is 
foEowing his intuition incorrectly (for, after aE, tlie content o f his intuition is private to him). 
We would say that his intuition for foEowing the rule is incorrect. But it stiE stands that it is 
open to an agent to beEeve any course o f action to be appropriate for foEowing an intuition. 
But again, if any course o f action can be made out to accord with an intuition, tlien we have 
an inst^ince o f RF3. In  sum, RF3 is true o f private rule-foEowing (foEowing a rule by 
intuition) and this leads to the appEcation o f the Sceptical-Conceptual argument (and 
SpecificaEy steps C3-C5) as an argument against private rule-foEowing.
i
Notice that there is no verificationist question begged here. It is no t said that the 
agent has to epistemicaEy estabEsh, or ideaEy be able to estabEsh, a distinction between 
foEowing an intuition correctly versus it seeming to him that he is foEowing it correctly in 
order to legitimately claim that he is foEowing his intuition correctly. Rather, it is only 
asserted that witli an intuition, the agent could beEeve any course o f action to be in accord 
with the intuition. There are no bars on what can be beEeved or be seen to accord with an 
intuition. Indeed, the privacy o f the matter ensures that any such bar on what can be 
thought to accord with an intuition would have to involve the understanding gained through
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another intuition — i.e., another private source o f understanding — and this would be 
unsatisfactory for leading to a regress (for then any way o f proceeding can be seen to be in 
accord with this further intuition). And by the Sceptical-Conceptual argument, once RF3 is 
admitted (as being true of intuitions), it foUows as a conceptual point that there is no 
following o f intuitions. Just as there is no public instruction in a rule if  any course of action 
can be made out to accord with the instructions for a rule, likewise there is no private 
instruction in a rule (i.e., intuition) if  any course o f action can be made out to (i.e., be seen to 
be) in accord with the intuition. That is, just as there is no rule-foEowing if  any course o f 
action can be made out to accord with the instructions for a rule, Hlrewise, there is no 
foEowing o f intuitions (i.e., private rule-foEowing) if aty course o f action can be made out to 
accord with an intuition.
The reaEst does not deny the lack o f a seems right/is right distinction in tlie case of 
intuition. He retaliates against the (epistemic) requirement that such a distinction musth^ 
able to be made in order to correctly foEow an intuition (charging that this is a verificationist 
requirement); he says that with an intuition, the correct way to foEow an intuition just is 
what seems light. An argument that tried to ^gue  that there is no intuition-foEowing 
because there is no way o f knowing the correct way to foEow an intuition from the 
indefinitely many that may seem to be correct would beg the question against the reaEst (and 
notice this is to argue along the Enes o f the Sceptical-Inductive argument). It would be to 
require a further epistemic move in foEowing an intuition when the reaEst is denying that a 
further epistemic move is needed. This approach involves RF2. The picture is different 
once we see that RF3 is the consideration Ei play in private rule-foEowEig. There is no 
further epistemic move requEed and so no question begged. Since the correct way to foUow 
an intuition is given by what seems right (given the lack o f the noted distinction) it is
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thereupon noticed that any course o f action can seem right. The argument now moves 
conceptually: for the concept o f accordance to have a place, it cannot be possible for any or 
every course of action to be seen to accord with an intuition (we have neither accord nor 
discord, Wittgenstein says, when RF3 holds). Lilmwise, it cannot be possible for any or 
every course o f action to be made out to accord with the instructions in a rule because then 
the instructions are not instructive; they are idle and offer no guidance. I t  is exegetical 
corroboration that Wittgenstein makes a point against private rule-foUowing (following an 
intuition) in P I 202 which is immediately after he makes the argument that the admission o f 
RF3 leads to a sceptical paradox in P I 201. The indication in PI 202 is that the case against 
private rule-following involves an application o f (or is a consequence o£) tlie argument of PI 
201. And as we see, the argument o f PI 201 (i.e., steps C3 to C5 o f the Sceptical-Conceptual 
argument given above) gives us a non-verificationist argument against private rule-fbllowing 
(see the Appendix to this chapter for a more general presentation o f this argument).
Furthermore, we may say that the rule-reaEst, separate from the above Ene of 
argument, is stiE in trouble on grounds of privacy. To tins end, notice the extent of privacy 
that tlie rejection o f AR** commits the reaEst to: the understanding o f a rule that comes 
from an intuition must not only be gained privately (for it is not gained through some 
pubEcly avaEable explanation for, by the rejection o f AR**, tins understanding is 
explanation-transcendent) but further that this understanding, once gained, remains private, 
i.e., incommunicable. The understanding o f the rule that I gain by an intuition is not 
conveyable to others because the possibiEty of conveying this understanding to others (fuEy, 
through pubEc means Eke explanations or instructions) is denied with tlie rejection o f AR**. 
This is a very strong claim and is more than any reaEst should Eke to admit. I f  we cannot 
effectively convey our understanding o f  a rule to others then there is no way to teE that we
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have the same understanding o f a rule as others. The only way to gain an understanding o f a 
rule is if  you have the intuition yourself. Any assurance that we understand a rule the same 
as someone else is denied when it is admitted that the understanding o f a rule transcends 
what can be effectively explained (for an explanation of my understanding is how I 
communicate my understanding to someone else and that someone else m ust effectively 
understand tliis explanation to know that my understanding is the same as his). Intuition, as 
described above, is a private understanding or source o f understanding (i.e., if  is to be 
counted as understanding at all). But this means tliat intuition provides an understanding of 
rules that does not figure into pubEc discourse. That is, the reaEst finds that explanations 
provide an unsatisfactory basis for conveying an understanding o f a rule (for by RF2, they 
cannot but underdeterinine the correct way to foUow a rule); hence, as described above, tlie 
need for an explanation-transcendent source o f understanding. But if  explanations are 
thought to provide an unsatisfactory basis for conveyEig an understanding o f a rule, then the 
same unsatisfactory basis underEes the claim that we share the same understanding of a rule 
(for tins is evinced through our explanations to each other). The understanding of a rule 
through an intuition is a private matter, privately gained and held, and provides no support 
for saying tiiat we have a shared understanding o f a rule. This appeal to intuition is 
analogous to someone who is guided by what he claims to be the voice o f Napoleon that 
only he can hear (the understanding that is yielded is private and remahis inexpEcable to 
others). AR** should not be rejected but the reaEst, as argued earEer, is committed to this 
rejection. This is a variant o f the earEer point that the epistemology of rule-foUowing in 
terms o f foEowing an intuition is a mystery (for it is unaccountably gained), but goes further
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in noting that the understanding yielded by intuition cannot enter into public discourse for it 
inexplicable to others even once gained/^
C Intuition and Instructions.
Here I want to focus on the relation between instructions and intuition. I f  instructions yield 
an underdetermined understanding and intuition is to step in to provide a determined 
understanding o f a rule, then what is the connection between the instructions and the 
intuition? I f  there is no connection, such that the intuition is by itself sufficient for 
conveying an understanding o f a rule (and this intuition is not brought on or triggered by an 
understanding o f the instructions), tlien tlie instructions are idle to following a rule. It is 
unsatisfactory for the instructions in a rule to be idle for this is clearly counter to the practice 
and phenomenology of ruie-foUowing which clearly evince a role for instructions.
As described, any set o f instructions cannot but underdetermine a rule. An intuition 
is to provide, or at least aid in gaining, an understanding of a rule in which the correct way to 
follow a rule is fully determined. But if  instructions are to have any role or do any work in 
coming to this understanding, tliey should at least be in the service o f triggering the 
appropriate intuition. But this is not an option. Formulations and instructions given for 
foEowing a rule cannot trigger a unique intuition because they cannot determine a unique 
understanding o f a rule. That is, they cannot trigger a unique intuition because any set of 
instructions can be interpreted in indefinitely many ways. But tlien it is whoEy unclear how 
we can have the appropriate intuition if it is not triggered by what can be said o f a rule by
55 Wittgenstein does not disagree witli tlie description o f (the phenomenology of) our rule-following practice as 
involving something like an intuition, ie ., as involving immediacy. Wittgenstein’s disagreement is with tlie 
appeal to intuition in justifying a way o f  following a rule. See PI 197. PI 191 and 195 also make a similar point.
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way o f explanation or instruction (it is also obviously inadequate to say that a further 
intuition serves to trigger this intuition on pain o f regress). Thus, there is a double difficulty 
here. I f  instructions do not serve to at least trigger an appropriate intuition then they are 
rendered superfluous to rule-following (which is clearly counter to the practice and 
phenomenology o f rule-following) and it is left unexplained how we do arrive at the 
appropriate intuition (for again, die understanding o f a rule that is gained through an 
intuition, by die rejection o f AR**, is beyond what we can successfully explain or instruct). 
The argument o f this section overlaps with the first one wliich argued that the appeal to 
intuition, by rejecting AR**, makes a mystery o f the epistemology o f rule-foEowing.
The above three sections (A, B, and C) argue, through separate but connected lines o f 
argument, that understanding is not explanation-transcendent (or equaEy, intuition is not a 
source o f understanding in lule-foEowing), and do so aE on epistemic grounds. Since a 
reaEst view o f rules, as explained, reveals a commitment to an explanation-transcendent 
account o f understanding, a reaEst view o f rules is not a viable option. Tlie first section 
argued that an appeal to an intuition, by denying AR**, leaves us witiiout an account o f the 
epistemology of intuition-foEowing. The third section added that intuition, by appealing to 
an instruction-transcendent understanding, renders the understanding gained from 
instructions idle in coming to understand how to foEow a rule (and this is contrary to the 
observed practice o f ruIe-foEowing). The main defense o f AR**, though, is in die second 
section (and it is this Ene o f argument that is drawn direcdy from Wittgenstein). Therein it is 
argued that the understanding o f a rule yielded by an intuition is private and so private 
language argument considerations can be brought to bear, viz., the case against private rule- 
foEowing. It is argued that this case against private rule-foEowing can be made, and is made
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by Wittgenstein, in a non-verificationist way and this involved showing that RF3 holds o f 
intuition-foUowing. Once it is shown that RF3 is tme o f following a rule by intuition, then 
^ y  the Sceptical-Conceptual Argument, and specifically steps C3 to C5) it follows that there 
is no following o f intuitions. This is a somewhat intricate argument employed but I believe, 
and have tried to show, that each step is exegeticaEy and argumentatively supported. An 
interesting point here is that the defense o f AR**, a premise o f the Sceptical-Inductive 
argument and which is crucial to the case against the reaEst view o f rules, invofyes a 
utiEsation o f (part of) the Sceptical-Conceptual argument. The latter is the argument o f PI 
201 and so it is herein that we find a crux o f the argument against reaEsm.
V. Revisiting Kripke
To remind, Kripke summarises lEs sceptical argument in this way:
Tills, tlien, is the sceptical paradox. Wlien I respond in one way radier than anodier to such a problem 
as ‘68 +  57’, I can have no justification for one response ratlier tliaii anotlier. S iice the sceptic who 
supposes that I meant quus cannot be answered, diere is no fact about me tliat distinguishes between 
my meaning plus and my meaning quus. Indeed, there is no fact about me that distinguishes between 
my meaning a definite function by ‘plus’ (wliich determines my responses in new cases) and my 
meaning notiiing at all.57
Kripke makes both an ontological and an epistemological point and his method, although 
drawing on rule-foEowing considerations from WittgensteEi, deviates from that of 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein does not venture to estabEsh that there are no meaning facts 
through a reductive analysis o f wherein meaning facts may Ee.^ ® The line of argument most 
clearly shared by WittgensteEi and Kripke is the epistemological: tliere is nothing tliat
57 Kripke [1982], p. 21.
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justifies my meaning plus father than quus because my past usage and tlie instructions I have 
been given (viewed as a set o f examples) justifies each equally. That is to say, both make use 
o f RF2 in establishing their respective sceptical arguments. Wittgenstein may not share 
Kripke’s agenda in establishing the ontological claim that there are no meaning facts, 
however, it should be clear from the analysis I offer above that Wittgenstein's sceptical 
argument does have ontological consequences; specifically, it provides an argument against a 
realist construal of rules (this is an argument against realism that proceeds primarily upon 
epistemic considerations concerning what it is to understand and follow rules). Further, it is 
interesting to note tliat both also utilise the consideration o f RF3 but to different effect.
RF3 is pivotal in the Sceptical-Conceptual argument, but Wittgenstein's eventual rejection 
that RF3 is true (as has been briefed above and will be further explained in Chapter 4,
Section V) is a rejection o f the paradoxical conclusion o f this argument. Kripke, in contrast, 
motions towards accepting RF3 when he says that there is nothing that distinguishes my 
meaning plus by ‘plus' rather than nodiing at aU (see Section III above for details).
An important difference between tlie initial sceptical argument I offer (the Sceptical- 
Inductive) and Kripke's is the presence o f AR**. There is no employment o f AR** in 
Kripke's sceptical argument while for Wittgenstein, AR** is central to the Sceptical- 
Inductive argument and to the case against the realist. As noted, both begin their arguments 
with RF2 (indefinitely many courses o f action can be made out to accord with any set of 
instructions; for Kripke, it is that indefinitely many functions can be made out to accord with 
my past behaviour and conscious recollections of past applications o f a rule). Wittgenstein 
proceeds to argue that our understanding does not transcend an understanding of the
58 "Wittgenstein does make a similat “factive” point regarding episodes in consciousness as not being tire source 
o f  meaning; for instance, he does so when he argues drat drere need be no beedes in dre box (no images or 
mental objects in mind) for me to talk meaningfiüly o f  beedes.
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instmctions available (AR**) and so our understanding o f any rule is underdetermined. 
Presuming that an underdetermined understanding requires a role for interpretation, a 
paradox ensues. Wittgenstein responds, and this wiU begin to be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter, that an underdetermined understanding does not require a role for 
interpretation. The combination o f RF2 and AR** tells us that the correct application o f a 
rule is not fully determined in the understanding (for it is underdetermined by instructions 
and training). This result is not witliout positive comparison to Kripke's general programme 
for it can be read as saying that tiiere are no determined facts about how to correctly apply a 
rule in unconsidered cases that we understand when we understand a rule (while Kripke's 
sceptical conclusion, although not quite the same, more severe, and more simply put, is that 
there are just no meaning facts).
As just noted, both Wittgenstein and Kripke make use of die rule-following 
consideration that I have labeled ‘RF2'. Both sceptical arguments o f Wittgenstein’s (the 
Sceptical-Inductive and the Sceptical-Conceptual) employ RF2, RF2, as I have formulated it 
(and drawn it from PI 185), comments on the instructions for a rule: indefinitely many 
courses o f action can be made out to accord witia any set o f instructions. But Kripke's use 
adopts a variation. Kripke uses the consideration to apply to past behaviour and mental 
history: considering these as built o f a finite number o f instances Qust as instructions are 
considered as a finite number o f examples), we see that they are compatible with different 
functions. This variation in use o f RF2 can also be put in these terms: Wittgenstein focuses 
on the source or medium of understanding, i,e., instructions in a rule, and shows that they 
underdetermine the rule. O n presumption that there is no other source o f understanding 
(i.e., AR**), Wittgenstein is able to conclude that our understanding of a rule is 
underdetermined. Alternatively, there are indefinitely many ways of proceeding fliat can be
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interpreted to be in accord with what is understood o f a rule. Thus, if understanding 
involves interpretation (i.e., if the underdetermination of our understanding requires a role 
for interpretation in our grasp o f how to follow a rule), tlien there is no rule-following 
because there is no basis for settling on an interpretation, Kripke, in contrast, focuses on the 
seat or reductive base of understanding; his argument is a reductive one. H e is out to show 
that there are no facts about meaning (and understanding) and to do this he argues that there 
are no facts about past behaviour and mental history that can settle which rule was meant 
(and again, he later adds a case against dispositions to this).^^ This is not to focus on the 
source o f understanding in the instructions given to us but on the constitutive or factual base 
o f understanding. Wittgenstein’s argument is pedagogical and epistemological and it is on 
this basis that he raises an argument against realism. Kripke’s argument, in contrast, is not 
primarily epistemological with ontological application, but both epistemological and 
ontological from the start.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have developed and, to varying extents, defended what I understand to be 
key rule-following considerations o f Wittgenstein’s, namely, R Fl, RF2, RF3 (although this is 
rejected as being true by Wittgenstein, as wUl be further explained in Chapter 4, it is an 
important consideration for the role it plays in the rule-following arguments) and AR**. I 
have shown that these considerations play important roles in two separate sceptical 
arguments: the Sceptical-Inductive and the Sceptical-Conceptual. These arguments share in
Given that Kripke argues that there are no meaning facts by eliminating possible candidates (e.g,, in 
behaviour, mental liistory, dispositions), he is susceptible to tire charge tliat not all sources o f  meaning have
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common a premise — viz., RF2 — and a paradoxical conclusion — viz., that there is no rule- 
following — but are nonetheless quite distinct for, besides other premises not in common, 
they employ markedly different methods of arguing.
Furthermore, I have shown how these considerations, and tliese arguments, are put 
in the service o f an argument against a realist view o f rule-following. As it turns out, parts of 
both arguments are brought in this service: defending AR** (which is a consideration 
employed in the first argument and is essential to the case against the realist) draws on a 
private language argument consideration and defending this latter consideration in a non- 
verificationist way in  turn involves a case utilising RF3 (a consideration employed in the 
second sceptical argument). It is observed that RF3 is true or holds in private contexts and 
therefore for intuition. As it is part o f the second sceptical argument that where RF3 holds 
true, tliere is no rule-following, it follows tiiat there is no private rule-foEowing or following 
o f intuitions. As explained, this means that our understanding of rules is not explanation- 
transcendent (i.e., in violation of AR**) and so a realist construal of what it is to understand 
and follow rules (at least insofar as this involves a commitment to an explanation- 
transcendent understanding) cannot be maintained. In sum, SI, 82 and S3 o f the Sceptical- 
Inductive argument proHde a case against rule-realism; but defending S2 o f this argument 
(i.e., AR**) draws on the line o f argument o f C3, C4 and C5 o f the Sceptical-Conceptual 
argument (which is also the argument o f PI 201). The two arguments, presented as separate 
arguments, with different premises and employing different ways o f arguing, exhibit a 
dependence when looked at more closely (for a premise o f one argument finds support in 
the other argument). In the Appendix to this chapter I provide a more general account o f 
how it is that this key private language argument consideration is supported, in a non-
been duly considered, I will discuss dûs line o f objection in the next chapter and note diat it does not apply to
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venficationist way, in the line o f argument o f the Sceptical-Conceptual argument, found in 
P/201.
In addition, I have presented Kripke's sceptical argument and, to a lesser extent, his 
sceptical solution and compared this to Wittgenstein's sceptical arguments. We have seen 
that both arguments buhd on similar considerations (especially RF2), albeit with differing 
employment, while other considerations (e.g., AR**) are not shared. Kripke's sceptical 
argument, Wittgensteinian in origin as it is, is n o t the same as either o f the two sceptical 
arguments presented as Wittgenstein's own, despite the noted similarities. This does not at 
aU dhninish the point, as I have shown, that there are sceptical arguments to be discerned 
from the rule-following remarks. Finally, it should be highlighted that Kripke's overall 
perspective o f Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks — as containing both a negative and 
positive agenda — is one that I believe to be correct and is one that I wiU continue to expose 
through the coming chapters. In  this chapter, I have focussed on the negative agenda.
Wittgenstein's sceptical arguments presented here.
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-  APPENDIX -  
Rule-Following And The Private Language Argument
In this Appendix, I make a general case o f a point made earlier. I t was earlier argued that we 
can defend AR**, using a private language argument consideration and that this can be done 
in a non-veriflcationist way. This is because the noted private language argument 
consideration is itself borne out by the argument o f PI 201 (that is, by the argument that 
claims that if  RF3 holds, then tliere is no rule-foUowin^. It is this defense o f the private 
language argument — which I submit as Wittgenstein’s defense — tliat I will attend to, in more 
general terms, here.
PI 202 states, “And hence, ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to thmk one is obeying 
a rule is no t to obey a rule. Hence it is no t possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise 
thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.” PI 202 draws two 
conclusions following on the argument o f PI 201. These are: one, rule-following is a practice 
(or involves a custom), and two (which I will express as a conditional), if  a distinction 
between what seems to be the correct way to follow a rule and what is the correct way 
cannot be made, then one cannot lay claim to following a rule correctly (i.e., following a rule 
at all). I will focus on the second conclusion.
This second conclusion is the crux o f the private language argument. I t  is criticised 
as a venficationist requirement (for rule-following, in this case) because it seems to  say that 
we must be able to verify that our claim to follow a rule correctly involves more than it just 
seeming to us that we are following it correctly. That is, we must be able to justify — to the 
extent of being able to malce the distinction — our claim to understand and follow a rule 
correctly. This is an epistemic requirement that requites that we must know something else
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(involving some correctness criterion) in virtue o f which we may say that we know, rather 
than just seem to loiow, that we follow a rule correctly. But diis is criticised as 
verificationist. Consider someone who claims to “just know” that they follow a rule 
correctly without being able to make this distinction, say in virtue of a private source o f 
understanding or an intuition. For this person any requirement that he must be able to make 
this distinction is unwarranted verificationism. It effectively begs the question against any 
claim to just know how to follow a rule from an intuition or private source o f 
understanding.^®
Notice that this person — who I will call a ‘private rule-foUower’ — does not deny that 
he cannot make this distinction (for this is characteristic o f the private case), but he does 
deny that such a distinction mustho, able to be made to follow a rule. Indeed, since the lack 
o f this distinction is characteristic o f the private case, to simply require that such a 
distinction is needed begs the question against the private ruLe-foliower. I will give a non- 
verificationist argument for why there is no private rule-following (or intuition-following). 
This argument will not contend that the private rule-foUower must be able to malce this 
distinction (as an epistemic requirement o f rule-following), but rather, any situation 
characterised by the lack of this distinction (as is the private case) is a situation in which 
there is no rule-following (and this follows as a conceptual — or perhaps transcendental — 
requirement of what it is to follow a rule).
The first point to note is that this “crux o f the private-language argument” (or what I 
describe above as the second conclusion drawn in PJ 202) is established prior to any 
consideration or discussion o f privacy. That is, this “crux” can be expressed as a conditional 
(Conditional Two below), and it is in virtue o f the antecedent o f this conditional being true
60 Foliowing Wittgenstein, I treat intuition as a private source o f  understanding. See above for details.
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of the private case that there is no rule-following in the private case (i.e., no private rule- 
following). I will argue that this “crux”, in its conditional form, holds because of its 
connection to another conditional expressed in PI 201. Hence, there are two conditionals 
under view which can be expressed as follows:
Conditional One: If any or every course of action can be made out to accord witli
a rule, then no course of action is determined by a rule (and 
hence, there is no rule-following).
Conditional Two: If a distinction between what seems to be the correct way to
follow a rule and what is the correct way cannot be made, then , 
one cannot lay claim to following a rule correctly (i.e., following 
a rule at aU).
Conditional One is familiar. The antecedent is RF3 (and thus is the same as the antecedent 
o f C3 in the Sceptical-Conceptual Argument). The consequent is in line with C4 o f the 
Sceptical-Conceptual Argument (and the conclusion in the parentheses is C5). I have already 
shown that the conclusion o f the Sceptical-Conceptual Argument (that there is no rule- 
foUowing) follows from RF3 and that it does so non-epistemicaUy (i.e., it follows as a 
conceptual result; this is a contrast between the Sceptical-Inductive Argument and the 
Sceptical-Conceptual A r g u m e n t ) H e n c e ,  it is aheady shown that Conditional One is true.*’^  
And this is to say that if RF3 holds, then there is no rule-following.
The consequents o f Conditional One and Conditional Two say much the same thing, 
viz., that there is no rule-following. Establishing that Conditional Two is true, in this 
argument, will involve making manifest the connection between the antecedents o f the two
I refer the reader to die discussion o f the Sceptical-Conceptual Argument above for details in order to avoid 
unnecessary repetition here.
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conditionals (and so in subsuming Conditional Two under Conditional One). I will argue 
tliat a situation in which a distinction between what seems to be the correct way to follow a 
rule and what is the correct way cannot be made (i.e., the antecedent o f Conditional Two) is 
a situation in which any or every course o f action can be made out to accord with a rule, or 
with the instructions for a rule (i.e., the antecedent o f Conditional One). That is, a situation 
in which this noted distinction between what seems to be and what is the correct way to 
follow a rule cannot be made is a situation in which RF3 holds. But then this means that if 
the antecedent o f Conditional Two holds, then there is no rule-following (for this is the 
consequent of Conditional One). Once again, if the antecedent o f Conditional Two holds, 
then (as I  will argue) this implies that the antecedent of Conditional One holds, and since (as 
I have already argued above) the consequent of Conditional One follows from the 
antecedent o f Conditional One, it follows that the consequent o f Conditional Two holds if 
the antecedent o f Conditional Two holds. And this is to say that tliere is no rule-following if 
a distinction between what seems to be and what is the correct way to follow a rule cannot 
be made. Since this describes the private case, it follows that there is no private rule- 
following.
Further, just as the consequent o f Conditional One follows from its antecedent in a 
non-verificationist way (as argued in the Sceptical-Conceptual Argument above; it follows as 
a conceptual result), likewise the consequent o f Conditional Two follows from its antecedent 
in a non-verificationist way. That is, what we do here, by way o f arguing for Conditional 
Two (the “crux” o f the private language argument given in ¥ l  202) by subsuming it under
In saying that Conditional One is “true” (and, for that matter, in arguing for tlie trutli o f Conditional Two), I 
only mean to say tliat if  tlie antecedent is true then die consequent is true, i.e., that die consequent follows 
from die antecedent or that the antecedent is a sufficient condition for die consequent.
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Conditional One (the argument given in P I 201), is achieve a non-verificationist defense of 
the private language argument.
The situation in which a distinction between what seems to be the correct way to 
follow a rule and what is the correct way cannot be made is a situation in which any or every 
course o f action can be made out to accord with a rule. If  an individual cannot strike a 
difference between the correct way to follow a rule and what seems to him to be the correct 
way then there is nothing determining what this person will believe to be in accord with a 
rule apart from what seems to him to be correct. To say that this distinction is lacking is to 
say that there are no independent norms that serve to guide the individual in determining the 
correct way to follow a rule. But in such a situation, any way of proceeding can be found to 
be correct (for there are no restrictions on what can seem to be correct except, perhaps, 
what is conceivable). Indeed, in this situation, if there were a restriction on what can seem 
to be correct, it would involve anotlier seeming — it would be a restriction that only seems to 
apply. But then we may say, thus starting a regress, that any way o f proceeding can seem to 
be correct to this further seeming. And so, if  correctness is just what seems to be correct, 
any way o f proceeding, conceivably, can be made out to be correct; there are no limitations 
on what can seem to be the case that are not seeming limitations. Thus, when this 
distinction cannot be made (and we are guided only by what seems to be the case), it is 
possible that any course o f action be found to accord with a rule, and this is to say that RF3 
holds. But again, according to Conditional One, if  RF3 holds (i.e., if  any course of action 
can be made out to accord with a rule or set o f instructions) then we have no rule-following 
or instruction-following.
We may make the case with an illustration: consider the scenario o f two deviant 
pupils. The first is the deviant pupil o f PI 185. His rule-following behaviour is incorrect but
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still consistent with (in the way o f being a consistent interpretation of) the instructions given 
to him. Hence, he provides an exemplification of RF2. The second pupil, upon being given 
the same instructions, proceeds to jump up and down. Let us assume that he is not jolting 
or proceeding in code or acting tins way for some other reason (i.e., that he is sincerely 
reacting to the instructions given to him). This second pupil’s behaviour, in contrast to the 
first, is no t even consistent with the underdetermining instructions. He does not exemplify 
RF2. He shows no understanding o f the instructions given whatsoever. One way o f malting 
this point is to say tliat he makes no distinction between what the instructions teU him to do 
and what he wants to do. I f  this second pupil were to respond similarly to the first in P I 185 
and say, “Yes, isn’t  it right, that was how I thought I was meant to do it”, then we should say 
that he does not appreciate the correct way to follow the rule as involving anything more 
than what seems to him to be correct. In  this second case, we should say that there are no 
instructions for this second pupil because the “instructions” we give him offer no 
instruction; they do not function as instructions for they do not guide; they do not serve to 
determine his ensuing course o f action in any way. And as Wittgenstein argues in P I 201 
. (and as has been defended earlier), if no course o f action is determined by the instructions 
for a rule, then we have no fohovving o f those instructions. More simply, if no course of 
action is determined by a rule, there is no following o f the rule.
In  the case o f the first pupil, the instructions do serve to determine — to some extent 
— the course o f action the pupil adopts (even though he proceeds incorrectly). In  this first 
case, we can say that there is a distinction at work between what seems to him to be correct 
and what is correct because the instructions serve in determining what he comes to see as 
the correct way to follow the rule; that is, even though he proceeds incorrectly, we see that 
he is guided, to some extent, by something outwith himself. In the case o f the second pupil.
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we see the antecedent o f Conditional Two in play and with it, the antecedent o f Conditional 
One. The instructions do not serve in determining the course o f action the pupil adopts at 
all. This course o f action is determined solely within the individual (i.e., without any 
influence such that his view o f what is correct is guided by or deterinined by something 
outwith himself and which would thereby serve to show a distinction in play between what 
he thinks is correct and what Is correct). This second pupil is able to find any way o f 
proceeding as in accord with tlie instructions, in this case jumping up and down, precisely 
because tlie correct way to proceed is not at all determined by the instructions but solely by 
himself; solely by what seems to him to be appropriate. This is a situation in which there is 
no distinction between what seems correct and what is correct at work (for if  there were a 
distinction at work then the rule or instructions in the rule would have some normative 
impact in determining the correct way to proceed; for the instructions to serve in 
determining the correct way to proceed requires that the correct way to follow a rule, to 
some extent, stand independent of what is thought to be the correct way). And thus, this is 
a situation in wliich any way o f proceeding can be found to be in accord with the rule or 
instructions in the rule (and therefore, there is no following of the rule or following o f the 
instructions in the rule).
In sum, a situation aptly characterized by the lack o f a seems right/is right distinction 
is a situation in which RF3 holds. This is because a situation in which this distinction is not 
available at all is a situation in which any course of action can seem to be correct; it is a 
situation in which any course of action can be made out to accord with a rule. Furthermore, 
we may add that this case is independent o f the exegetical case that Conditional Two, 
presented in PI 202, is expressed as following from the sceptical argument o f PI 201 on a 
straightforward reading o f both remarks.
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The antecedent o f Conditional Two holds in the private case (for in the private case 
one cannot establish a difference between proceeding correctly and seeming to proceed 
correctly). Again, the private rule-fbllower or intuition-follower does not deny that this 
distinction cannot be made, only that it need be made; that it is a verificationist requirement 
that it need be made. But since the antecedent o f Conditional Two holds in tlie private case, 
the consequent that there is no private rule-foUowing (or intuition-following) also holds (and 
that this is not a verificationist result). The consequent o f Conditional Two follows fiom tlie 
antecedent as a conceptual truth but this is not clear without drawing a connection between 
it and tlie Sceptical-Conceptual Argument given in PI 201. In conclusion, tWs Appendix 
defends that the crux o f the private language argument is a result o f the sceptical 
considerations found in the rule-following remarks and as a consequence, the former can be 
defended in a non-verificationist way.
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CHAPTERS
The Reductio-Reading:
A Transit-Point from Negative to Positive Programmes.
I. Introduction
Criticisms of Kripke’s sceptical argument and sceptical solution can be broadly divided, as 
one may expect, into those that focus on the argument and those that focus on the solution. 
With regard to the latter, the attempt has been to show tliat Kripke’s argument admits o f a 
straight solution. This attempt itself, as Hale describes, falls into two camps: the first,
“aimed at naturalistic solution — have been attempts to uphold some more or less 
sophisticated version o f dispositional theory, or to show that a broadly causal account of 
meaning and /or reference escapes the sceptical argument. I t has also been claimed that even 
if  Kripke’s objections are effective against a dispositional account, they do no t dispose o f the 
view that an expression’s having a certain meaning consists in its being associated with an 
appropriate capacity. Others — the second group — take issue witii what they see as a 
substantial reductionist assumption underpinning the sceptical argument, and have 
accordingly sought to defend the view that semantic facts, or closely related facts about 
intentions, need not be reducible to facts o f some other naturalistic kind.”  ^I t  should be 
observed that tliese points do not apply to the sceptical arguments, drawn directly from 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, that I developed in the Chapter 2. These 
arguments, drawn from the text, do not build on the elimination o f candidate sources o f 
meaning facts and so are not susceptible to the charge that not aU candidate sources have 
been duly considered; they do not make mention o f dispositions as a source o f meaning facts 
let alone make an argument against dispositional theories o f meaning and so are not 
susceptible to the charge that a sophisticated dispositional theory (or a theory involving 
capacities, c.f., McGinn) is not adequately represented in an argument against dispositional
i Hale [1997], p. 374.
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theories. It may be tliat, in the words o f Boghossian, “The single most important strand in 
the [i.e., Kripke’s] sceptical argument consists in tlie considerations against dispositional 
theories o f meaning.”  ^ But this strength o f Kripke’s argument is not a strength of 
Wittgenstein’s (at least directly so). In view o f this, objections to Kripke’s “considerations 
against dispositional tlieories o f meaning” are no t objections to Wittgenstein’s arguments. 
Furthermore, it is no t part o f Wittgenstein’s arguments, presented in the second chapter, that 
meaning facts, if there were to be any, must be reducible to some naturalistic kind. And so, 
Wittgenstein’s arguments are not susceptible to the (anti-reductionist) charge that there can 
be meaning facts that are not reducible to facts naturalistically construed. There is no 
reductionist assumption about what must constitute meaning facts in the arguments of the 
second chapter and so there is no such assumption tliat needs to be defended. Accordingly,
I will not address these lines of objection for they do not speak to the arguments raised in 
the second chapter. These arguments, whhe bearing some broad similarity, are different 
than Kripke’s. Some objections to Kripke’s argument hit on these differences and so fah to 
mark tliese arguments o f Chapter 2. Other objections hit on the similarities and so need to 
be addressed.^
With this in mind, the second main line o f criticism has focussed on the sceptical 
argument witli one eye on exegesis. This is the objection that, although considerations 
raised in the rule-following remarks seem to lead to a sceptical conclusion, this conclusion is 
not one that Wittgenstein endorses. This is an objection that Kripke flatiy ignores the 
second half o f PI 201, the remark wherein Kripke finds expression of his paradox, where 
Wittgenstein asserts that the tine o f reasoning that leads to the paradox rests on a
2 Bogfiossian [1989], p. 528.
3 For a fuller account o f  how tliese sceptical arguments, wliich draw closely on the text o f  Wittgenstein, differ 
from Kripke's see Section V  o f Chapter 2.
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misunderstanding. Wittgenstein herein states: “It can be seen that there is a 
misunderstanding here from the mere fact fliat in the course o f our argument we give one 
interpretation after another; as if  each one contented us at least for a moment, until we 
drought o f yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way o f grasping 
a rule which is not an interprétation  ^bu t which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” 
and “going against it” in actual cases.” (PI 201)
It is important to note that this line o f objection does not aim to be merely 
exegetical. If  it were it would no t be a philosophically interesting objection; its interest 
would end with an interest in exegesis. Indeed, since Kripke is not even claiming a direct 
and full attribution to Wittgenstein for Ins argument, if  the objection were merely exegetical 
then at best it would only establish what Kripke is already half-way admitting (when Kripke 
says that the argument he gives is not Wittgenstein’s and not Kripke’s but “Wittgenstein’s 
argument as it struck Kripke” he is admitting that his argument is not fuUy exegeticaUy 
accountable).
Rather the objection aims to be more interesting. The objection makes the point 
diat Kripke’s sceptical argument, at least somewhat sourced in Wittgenstein’s rule-foILowing 
remarks, fails to take stock o f what Wittgensteiu is trying to achieve in raising these sceptical 
considerations; he fads to see the end to which these sceptical considerations are put. That 
is, Kripke fads to see that Wittgenstein uses the sceptical considerations to argue, by reductio 
ad ahsnrdum  ^against die assumption that leads us down a sceptical path. This is the 
assumption that understanding how to foUow a rule involves an act of interpretation. And 
so the objection makes the point that Kripke fads to learn Wittgenstein’s lesson and is . 
consequently o f more than mere exegetical interest. This is an objection that should weigh 
more on the sceptical arguments presented in the second chapter (i.e., the Sceptical-
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Inductive and Sceptical-Conceptual) for these, are, after aU, claimed as Wittgenstein’s own. 
Indeed, we see in both arguments references to ‘interpretation’. For instance, RF2, a 
premise o f botii arguments, upholds that there are indefinitely many courses o f action that 
can be interpreted to be in accord with a rule; and RF3, part of the Sceptical-Conceptual 
argument, that any or every course o f action can be interpreted to be in accord. Also, it is a 
premise o f the Sceptical-Inductive argument that if  our understanding o f a rule is 
underdetermined, then we must interpret the rule in order to follow it (this is premise S4). 
Thus, the reductio-reading of Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument(s) — according to wliich 
there must be a way to grasp a rule that is not an interpretation — deserves careful 
consideration and this wül be the main preoccupation of this chapter.
In addition, it should be made clear that dissenters from Kripke’s reading, with the 
objection o f the reductio-reading in hand, are not putting in doubt that there is a sceptical 
argument to be gleaned fiom  the rule-foILowing remarks. Rather, the difference o f opinion 
lies in the use to which these sceptical considerations are put. Kripke claims that they are 
raised to argue for a sceptical conclusion; a sceptical solution is then the consolation offered. 
Dissenters contend that the sceptical argument is used to argue against the assumption 
which leads to the sceptical conclusion. This is not just a difference o f exegesis but o f the 
import and use o f the sceptical considerations. I will not deny that the reductio-reading has 
merit, for it surely does. W hat I wiU do is offer a more accurate view o f the premise that is 
to be rejected and, in doing so, note that this rejection is not dismissive o f a negative impact 
to the sceptical considerations.
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II, The Reductio-Reading
II, i. A “Misimdetstanding” in the Works
To begin with, consider the following presentations o f this objection against Kripke’s 
argument by various key authors. Fitst, in comment to Kripke, McDoweU looks to PI 201, 
where Kripke finds expression o f the sceptical paradox, and has tliis to say o f the remark 
(specifically o f the second paragraph):
This looks like a proposal, not for a “sceptical solution” to a “sceptical paradox” locked into place by an 
irrefutable argument, as in Kripke’s reading, but for a “straight solution”: a solution diat works by 
finding fault with the reasoning that leads to the paradox. Tlie paradox Wittgenstein mentions at the 
beginning o f  this passage is not something we have to accept and find a way to live with, but something 
we can expose as based on a “misunderstanding”.
Speaking to this “misunderstanding”, McDowell has this further to say.
The villain o f  die piece, Wittgenstein here suggests, is the idea that the notion o f  accord could be 
available in the way we need only by courtesy o f  an application for die notion o f  interpretation,. .If we 
can manage to follow Wittgenstein’s direction to think o f  grasp o f a rule diat is not an interpretation, 
that will ensure that we do not even start on die regress o f  interpretations.'^
Elsewhere McDowell states.
But what Wittgenstein clearly claims, in the second paragraph o f §201, is that the reasoning [that leads 
to the sceptical paradox] is vitiated by ‘a misunderstanding’. The right response to die paradox, 
Wittgenstein in effect tells us, is not to accept it but to correct die misunderstanding on which it 
depends: that is, to realise *that diere is a way o f  grasping a rule wlticli is m t an inUrpntationt^
This last claim, that there is a way o f grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, is what 
McDowell calls the ‘master thesis’. This master thesis is the point o f dissent in this line of
4 McDoweU [1998b], p. 267.
5 McDowell [1984], p. 331.
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objection to Kripke. Consider some other respondents to Kripke who draw the same point. 
With regard to the second paragraph o f PI 201, Pears has the following to say;
The first sentence o f this continuation makes it perfectly clear that the argument is a reductio and not the 
sceptical complaint that Kripke takes it to be. For the idea that is being criticised is said to be the result 
o f  a misunderstanding. The meaning o f  a sentence can never be completely determined by anotlier 
sentence which interprets it and this impossibility is misunderstood by tliose who hope to overcome it 
by interpreting tlie interpretation and continuing in this way until a complete verbal determination of 
the meaning o f  the original sentence has been achieved.^
Again, in Hire manner, Colin McGinn spealting about the second (and third paragraphs) of PI 
201, which he says Kripke “signally fails to quote, or even to heed”, says the following,
There are two things to notice about this passage which give tlie lie to Kripke’s interpretation. First, 
Wittgenstein makes it clear immediately tliat the stated paradox arises from a ‘misunderstanding’, i.e., a 
false presupposition; so he cannot really be endorsing tlie paradox, as Hume embraces his own sceptical 
claims about causation. Second, when we ask what the misunderstanding is we are told tliat it is the 
mistake o f  assuming that grasping a rule is placing an interpretation upon a sign, i.e., associating it with 
another sign — an assumption wliich Wittgenstein tliinks we are by no means compelled to make. In 
otlier words, Wittgenstein is putting forward the paradox as a reductio ad absurdum o f  the interpretational 
conception; it is tlie inevitable result o f  that particular misunderstanding about the nature o f grasp o f a 
rule.. .If there is one key oversight in Kripke’s exposition o f  Wittgenstein, it is that o f  ignoring what 
Wittgenstein says in 201 straight after stating the paradox.^
And lastly and succinctly, Baker and Hacker,
Wliat has been rejected in §201 is not the truism tliat rules guide action... Rather, what is repudiated is 
the suggestion tliat a rule determines an action as being in accord with it only in virtue o f  an 
interpretation.®
Kripke’s lapse would seem to be one o f overlooldng the obvious with regard to the 
remainder o f PI 201. Certainly, there is at least exegetical error here, I wHl now turn to 
these considerations, raised by McDowell et al, and explain their bearing on the arguments of 
the previous chapter.
G Pears [1988], p. 467.
7 McGinn [1984], p. 69.
® Baker and Hacker [1984a], p. 20.
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II. ii. The Master Thesis atid the Rejection of a Premise
To remind, there were two sceptical arguments presented in the previous chapter as 
Wittgenstein’s own: die Sceptical-Inductive and Sceptical-Conceptual. Tliey share a 
paradoxical conclusion and a common first premise: RF2, Accordingly, if  a paradoxical 
conclusion is to be taken as grounds for rejecting a premise, then RF2 should be the first 
suspect (for rejecting RF2 would allow us to deal with both arguments with a common 
motion). 1 wHl now explore this possibility (i.e., whether the “master thesis” requires a 
rejection o f RF2),
I t is clear that Wittgenstein asserts the master diesis in PI 201. However, it also 
seems clear that RF2 is promoted in the case o f the deviant pupil in P I 185. I f  RF2 is to be 
rejected then not only must PI 185 be plausibly reread but the argument presented in favour 
o f RF2 must be adequately refuted. But we need no t go to this length (which would anyway 
just rehash the exegetical and philosophical case for RF2 presented in the previous chapter) 
in order to show that RF2 is not denied with the adoption o f the master thesis. According 
to RF2, indefinitely many courses o f action mn be inteipreted to accord widi the instructions 
for a rule. Notice that this does not say that indefinitely many courses o f action an in accord 
with the instructions for a rule which, obviously, would raise a prohibiting difficulty for 
following the instructions. But if  we must interpret in order to understand the instructions 
for a rule (and so understand how to follow a rule), then we face this difficulty o f having to 
choose among indefinitely many consistent interpretations (i.e., we are led into an inductive 
problem with RF2 only if  understanding a rule involves interpretation). But this is just what 
the master thesis denies (i.e., that we must interpret a rule or its instructions in order to 
understand how to follow the rule or instructions). Thus, we see that the master thesis has
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no difficulty with RF2 (i.e., RF2 takes us to a paradox only if the master thesis is rebuffed; 
upholding the master thesis together with RF2 does not take us to a paradox or involve a 
contradiction and so treating the sceptical argument as a reductio in favour o f the master 
thesis does not present grounds for rejecting RF2). Furdier, we may add that RF3 is similar 
to RF2 in that it upholds that any or every course o f action can be interpreted to be in accord 
with a rule (and not that any or every course o f action is in accord). Hence, again we see tliat 
it is only if understanding what is in accord with a rule involves interpretation that RF3 is 
implicated in denying the master thesis; but since this is precisely what the master thesis 
rejects, RF3 does not contravene the master thesis. Thus, if  the master thesis is to be the 
basis for the rejection o f a premise, it would involve neither RF2 nor RF3. That is, the 
moral o f the sceptical argument o f PI 201 — the master thesis — is not at odds witli the key 
consideration of PI 185: RF2. The master thesis must find another premise to reject.
Let us look again to the Sceptical-Inductive argument first presented in Chapter
Two^:
SI, Instructions cannot but underdetermine a rule, [from the case for RF2]
82. The understanding of a rule does not transcend an understanding of an 
explanation of or instructions in the rule, [fiom AR**]
53. Therefore, the understanding of a rule is underdetermined,
54. An underdetermined understanding of a rule requires that the rule be 
interpreted to be understood (and followed).
55. But if a rule must be interpreted to be understood (and followed), then we 
fall prey to a sceptical paradox.
56. Therefore, we fall prey to a sceptical paradox (alternatively, there is no 
rule-following).
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SI (and with it RF2, as just described) is not a candidate for rejection. And neither is S2 (i.e., 
AR**): this premise has been defended, exegeticaUy and argumentatively, at length in the 
previous chapter (and what is more, AR** makes no mention o f ‘interpretation’ and so 
viewing the sceptical argument as a reductio against AR** would involve the added difficulty 
o f squaring this rejection with the master thesis). RP2 and AR**, or SI and S2, together teU 
us that our understanding o f a rule is underdetermined (for it is limited to an understanding 
of underdetermining instructions); and this conclusion is S3, I have earlier claimed that S4 is 
the target o f the reductio reading. Now it seems that we have no other choice.^® S4 claims 
that since our understanding o f a rule is underdetermined (firom S3), we m ust interpret the 
rule to foUow it. S4, in requiring a role for interpretation in our grasp o f a rule, contradicts 
the master thesis. Thus, S4 is the obvious and only choice.
But S4 is not simply rejected. If  our understanding of a rule is not o f it as fully 
determined, then it seems that our understanding o f a rule is incomplete; it seems that we 
cannot avoid forming hypotheses or interpretations about how to proceed in following a 
rule if we are drawing on an underdetermined understanding (for we must bridge an 
epistemic gap — with an interpretation — between an underdetermined understanding of a 
rule to a correct and unique application o f the rule). The underlying view here is that RF2 
and AR** (or SI and 82) pose an epistemic problem: given that indefinitely many courses of 
action can be interpreted to be in accord with what is given to us in the way o f explanation 
for a rule, how is it that we come to know a unique way (let alone the correct way) to 
proceed? It seems that all we can know o f a rule, given that we are constrained in our
 ^Wittgenstein’s response to die Sceptical-Conceptual argument will be dealt widi in the next chapter.
Assuming diat if  a rule must be interpreted to be understood, then we fall into a paradox (i.e., assuming 85 is 
not die target o f  die reductio). I take this point already well defended in the second chapter. This point is also 
made, borrowing from McDowell’s favoured characterisation o f  diis paradox, when it is noted that if
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understanding to an understanding o f instructions and explanations, is an interpretation of 
the rule. That is, the instructions and explanations given do not determine (can read here 
“justify”) a unique way of following the rule, and as a consequence, it seems that all we can 
do, in doing our epistemic best, is try to interpret the instructions and explanations 
according to some unique course o f action." And hence, if  we do manage to adopt the 
correct course o f action, it seems that we do so through luck rather than an act o f 
understanding (to borrow terminology fiom  Wright, we seem to “latch on” or “cotton on” 
to the correct way o f following a rule fiom  underdetermining instructions). But if it is not 
an act o f understanding that takes us to tlie correct way o f following a rule — if any informed 
choice is ultimately arbitrary — then we should not say that we “follow” the rule. O f course, 
this is again to make the case, in barely altered guise, o f the Sceptical-Inductive argument.
The master thesis does no t tell us how it is that we do not have to interpret, only that 
there must be a way to grasp a rule without interpreting. It may be that the absurdity o f the 
conclusion o f the Sceptical-Inductive argument is enough grounds for the rejection o f a 
premise, and that S4 is the only candidate, but this is not so far to say how it is that we can 
come to grasp a rule without interpreting. Again, it seems that any course o f action we 
adopt in following a rule would be arbitrary because when we turn to explain why we opted 
for that course o f action, the explanation we offer (and any explanation we could offer) wHl 
not determine that course of action to uniqueness (i.e., there will be indefinitely many ways 
o f proceeding that can be made out to be consistent with the explanation we offer — in that 
they can be interpreted to accord with that explanation — and so any explanation we offer for
understanding a rule is or involves an act o f  interpretation then we are led into a regress for this interpretation 
must also be correctly understood; see Chapter 2 for details.
The underdetermination o f  our understanding o f  a rule is the reason, or at least a reason, for finding the 
interpretative view o f  what it is to understand a rule compelling; it provides a reason for thinking tliat the 
master thesis is wrong.
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the course o f action we choose to adopt would seem to betray an arbitrariness in the choice). 
But if  our understanding o f why we follow a rule as we do is arbitrary in this way; if it is 
consistent with following the rule in indefinitely many other ways, then we should not say 
that we understand why we follow the rule in the particular way we do. The course o f action 
we adopt, it seems here, is no more than an interpretation o f die rule which we cannot 
justify over indefinitely many other interpretations. This situation, if it holds, is certainly 
dire. The master thesis tries to lead a way out: it says that because we do not have to 
interpret a rule to understand it, we do not face the possibility o f indefinitely many courses 
o f action when grasping a rule (for RF2 tells us only that indefinitely many courses o f action 
can be interpreted to accord with a rule and so, if there is a way to grasp die rule without 
interpreting, there is a way to grasp it widiout having to face or canvass through indefinitely 
many courses o f action). But so far it is not said how it is that we can just take up the master 
thesis. This is a difficult case and requires, I believe, first building Wittgenstein’s views on 
rationality (for it requires making Wittgenstein’s case that in coming to understand how to 
follow a rule, we can be successfully guided by reasons that run short of justifying a unique 
course o f action). I wiU taclde this in the next chapter. A t this point I will consider the 
response that it is in virtue of a knowledge o f the relevant custom that we know die correct 
way to follow a rule even though our understanding of the rule is underdetermined by 
instructions in the rule.
II, iii. The Master Thesis and the Appeal to Custom
The appeal to an understanding of custom or practice is thought to secure the master thesis: 
we need not interpret the instructions for a rule because we have an understanding of the
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custom fol* how such instructions are to be understood; perhaps, we may say, we have an 
understanding o f the spirit m  which the instructions are to be taken which suffices to dispel 
the indeterminacy that arises with a literal understanding of the instructions. This view o f 
securing die master thesis seems to carry two noteworthy presumptions. First, if  our 
understanding o f a rule is not of it as fuUy determined tiien the master thesis cannot be 
secured (i.e., we cannot maintain that we do not have to interpret in order to know how to 
correctly follow a rule if our understanding o f the rule is underdetermined). Second, it is an 
understanding o f the relevant custom that serves to secure a determinate understanding of 
the rule. As wih be shown, neither presumption holds. In brief, and as regards the first 
presumption, it wih be argued in the next chapter that Wittgenstein’s view that we can foUow 
a rule rationahy even if without reasons (or without sufficient reason to justify the course o f 
action taken) gives an answer to how it is that we can fohow a rule from an underdetermined 
understanding (without recourse to interpretation). With regard to the second presumption, 
again in brief, it is in conflict with AR**. According to AR**, the understanding of a rule 
does not transcend an understanding o f instructions or explanations. Hence, an 
understanding of a custom for foUowing a rule o f a certain type cannot answer how it is we 
fohow a rule from an underdetermined understanding for tlie understanding o f the relevant 
custom (a rule itself, as we wih see) is underdetermined for it is learned through media that 
cannot but underdetermine the custom (this wih be discussed just below). Advocates o f the 
master thesis who appeal to an understanding o f custom in order to secure determination in 
our understanding of a rule pursue an unsuccessful argument for the master thesis as weh as 
misplacing Wittgenstein’s dialectic. McDoweh is just such an advocate and I whl be 
discussing his views on custom and, in tlie fohowing section, more generahy on the master 
thesis and the sceptical argument.
142
The attempt to argue for the master thesis by an appeal to an understanding of 
custom or practice maintains that there are otiier sources of understanding (viz., our 
understanding o f the relevant custom) besides the understanding of the instructions for a 
rule which we bring to our understanding of a rule. However, even though we may fakly 
admit that an understanding of a rule is not limited to the understanding o f the content of 
the instructions given for the rule; that our understanding o f the custom for following rules 
o f this type contributes to our understanding o f the rule, it is another thing entirely to admit 
that the understanding of custom is not itself gained from instructions or training in the 
custom. This would violate AR**. The case for AR** was pursued to some length in the 
second chapter and so here I wH just assert that the master thesis cannot be secured through 
a rejection o f AR**; that an understanding o f custom, as this involves an understanding of a 
rule, cannot be explanation or instruction-transcendent.
Wittgenstein certainly seems to admit that an understanding o f the relevant custom, 
practice or the regular application of a rule is integral to understanding how to follow a rule 
(and to do so without interpreting).^^ Insofar as someone has an understanding o f how rules 
o f a given type are regularly followed, tiiat is, insofar as he has an understanding o f the 
custom for following rules of this type, then indefinitely many courses o f action need not 
present themselves as equally in accord with his understanding o f the rule. This 
understanding o f custom or practice is an aid to his understanding o f the instructions such 
tliat he need not interpret or form hypotheses over the instructions. An understanding of 
the relevant custom is an understanding o f how the instructions are themselves to be 
understood (it is an understanding of the norm for following instructions o f this type). It is 
thus understandable to suppose that although any set o f instructions may underdetermine a
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rule, with an understanding o f the relevant custom for following instructions o f this sort, our 
understanding of the rule need not be underdetermined. For instance, it is because I am 
familiar with the “institution” or “custom” o f pointing that when given the instruction of 
someone pointing out a direction to me I need not wonder whether he means for me to 
follow the direction o f his fingertip to wrist, or the direction o f his thumb, etc., in order to 
understand his instruction. The instructions do not strilre me as underdetermining or 
indeterminate, and so there is no need to interpret when grasping the rule from the 
instructions. likewise, what is missing for the deviant pupil o f PI 185 is an understanding of 
how such instructions, given as a finite series o f numbers to be continued, are usually 
followed. If  the pupil had this understanding, he would have been able to follow the rule 
from the instructions given to him. The course o f action o f continuing on to 1004 from 
1000 would not present itself as in accord with the instructions he received for he would 
share our understanding, an understanding o f a custom or practice, for how these series are 
normally continued from a finite set of examples.
We may readily admit that if  a person has a correct understanding o f the relevant 
custom then he will, or be in a better position to, understand how to correctly follow a rule 
upon provision o f a set o f instructions. But again, it remains to be answered how the correct 
understanding o f the custom is arrived at if  any instruction or training we receive cannot but 
underdetermine the custom. Eventually, the problem o f how we come to understand how 
to correctly follow a rule from underdetermining instructions, and do so without 
interpreting, must be answered (and answered in a way that does not make an appeal to an 
understanding o f other rules, such as those pertaining to customs).
We observe Wittgenstein, in PI 197,198,199, and elsewhere, employ tlie notions o f  custom and practice as 
involving intersubstitutable cognates.
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There are two important points regarding custom that, while already made in the 
course o f discussion, need to be made conspicuous. First, an understanding o f a custom or 
practice is itself an understanding o f a rule. I t is an understanding o f how rules o f a given 
type (rules for continuing arithmetical series say, or rules for following directions) are 
normally followed. And so, in short, what is being appealed to in the invocation of custom 
is an understanding o f a rule for following other rules. Second, diese rules are thus more 
basic rules; they are norms that govern the following of less basic rules and so must be 
understood (logically) prior to understanding the less basic rule. And so there is at least this 
hierarchy to rules. There are rules (rules o f custom, as they have been called here) .that must 
be understood in order that otlier rules be correctly grasped and foUowed.^^
Accordingly, since a custom is itself a rule (albeit a rule for following rules, a more 
basic rule), it can be brought under the bearing o f the above Sceptical-Inductive argument. 
That is, and as indicated just above, by RF2 and AR** (or 81 and 82), die understanding o f a 
custom, any custom, is underdetermined. Thus, an appeal to custom cannot solve the 
problem o f how it is that we can correctiy grasp and follow a rule despite an 
underdetermined understanding because the understanding o f a custom is also 
underdetermined. The problem is only set back a step: we now ask how it is that we can 
correctiy grasp and follow the custom despite an underdetermined understanding o f the 
custom (i.e., despite an understanding gained from underdeterntinmg instructions and 
training. And o f course this means that an appeal to custom cannot be the basis for the 
rejection of premise 84 above (for any such appeal would beg the question). Indeed, it is
I recognize that I have described tliis hierarchy as involving types. For instance, to understand the particular 
instruction o f someone pointing out a direction, you must already understand the customs that govern the 
giving o f  instructions o f  this type. But this is not to admit tliat rules find themselves in a rigid type-hierarchj^ 
that is, it is not admitted that all rules stand in a type-token relationship to one another. Nonetheless, there is
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subject to S4: S4 tells us a custom must be interpreted to be followed. And so, an appeal to 
custom cannot secure the master thesis (or at least, it cannot be the whole story). And o f 
course, an appeal to a further, more basic custom (as an appeal to an even more basic rule) 
would lead only to an unsatisfying regress.
So far we have it tliat securing the master thesis does not involve a rejection o f SI 
above (or RF2), and so an appeal to custom should not (even if it could) enable the rejection 
o f SI (or RF2). Also, securing the master thesis through an appeal to custom cannot be had 
if  it involves a rejection o f S2 above (for this would involve rejecting AR**). But an appeal 
to custom, as just shown, is also not a basis for the rejection of 84 above (the p rem ie  I have 
argued that Wittgenstein aims to reject with the master thesis). In sum, tlie master diesis is 
not secured through an appeal to custom; the appeal to custom does not provide a way out 
o f the above Sceptical-Inductive argument. Indeed, Wittgenstein, while he admits that an 
understanding of custom plays a role in our being able to understand and follow a particular 
rule without being beset by indeterminacy in the instructions for that rule, he does not 
liltewise admit that an appeal to custom plays a role in defending the master thesis. Indeed, 
the contrary seems to be the case. Wittgenstein begins PI 202 by concluding that following a 
rule is a practice (and so, it would seem, involve a custom). He says, “And hence, 'obeying a 
rule’ is a practice”. But if tliis is a conclusion (and it is so indicated by the ‘hence’) then it is a 
conclusion o f the argument o f PI 201 (i.e., o f the sceptical argument of PI 201). That is, that 
following a rule involves a practice or custom is presented as a conclusion o f the sceptical 
argument given in the first paragraph o f PI 201 and the master thesis, which is a result — by 
reductio — of this sceptical argument and given in the second paragraph o f PI 201. Hence, 
straightforwardly read, the role o f custom or practice in rule-following is not invoked as
some hierarchy to speak o f  wherein some rules are basic to the understanding o f otlier rules. At least some o f
146
grounds for accepting the master thesis but is portrayed as a consequence o f  the master 
thesis already taken as established/'^
A last further note about AR** as it bears on custom. AR**, discussed in the second 
chapter (as the second premise o f the Sceptical-Inductive argument) teUs us that our 
understanding o f a rule does not transcend an understanding of the instructions in and 
explanations o f the rule (not even I understand more o f a rule than what I can offer, by way 
o f explanation, to someone who I am training in the rule). This applies also to basic rules or 
rules for following rules. But often, there is no dkect instruction or training in basic rules; a 
custom is often grasped in the process o f coming to grasp the instructions for a specific rule 
that falls under that custom. Instruction or training in more basic rules is often inditect for 
the reason that it proceeds via direct instruction in less basic rules. For instance, an 
understanding of the custom for following the instructions regarding the continuation of 
arithmetical series is acquired, or at least may be acquired, in the process o f coming to 
understand the instructions for continuing a particular series or a set o f particular series’. 
Likewise, the misunderstanding o f a rule for following a rule is displayed in the 
misunderstanding o f a particular (i.e., the less basic) rule. For instance, the deviant pupil o f 
PI 185 displays an ignorance o f the custom for how instructions for continuing aritlunetical 
sequences are usually followed in his misunderstanding of a particular continuation (that 
pertaining to the rule add-2). And so, we may say that the provision o f instructions or 
training can fulfil a double role: it can convey the content o f a specific rule while also 
instructing or training the rule initiate in how rules o f this type are to be followed; this is to 
say that instructions can convey a general and specific understanding at once. And again, 
since tlie understanding of a custom is the understanding of a rule (albeit a basic rule or a
these rules may be characterized as customs or rules diat govern a practice.
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rule for following rules o f a certain type), it is underdetermined by the underdetermining 
training or instructions in the rule.
As a last point, we may take k  as a vktue o f treating the sceptical argument as a 
reductio ad ahsurdum argument that further reason need not be given for rejecting the culpable ’ 
premise that leads us to paradox. As I have argued, this premise is S4. However, we cannot 
leave matters there. After all, to give no other reason for the rejection o f the culpable 
premise other tlian that it leads to a paradox effectively begs the question against Kripke: 
Kripke accepts the paradoxical conclusion and offers a sceptical solution that (allegedly) 
accommodates it. We want an explanation of how it is that the rejection o f S4 is to be 
accommodated (over an above merely noting that the reductio-reading requires this 
rejection); alternatively stated, we want an explanation o f the master thesis (i.e., o f how it is 
that we can grasp a rule without interpreting. It has been pointed out that the appeal to 
custom does not account for the rejection o f S4 (it does not serve to secure the master 
thesis). In the next chapter I whl provide argument, drawing on Wittgenstein’s views on 
reasons and rationahty as they bear on rule-following, explaining how it is that we can grasp 
and fohow rules without interpreting despite an underdetermined understanding o f any rule. 
In the next section I wih consider specificahy McDoweh’s views on custom in connection to 
securing the master thesis, and tlien more generahy, his view o f the master thesis and how it 
fits into the architecture o f Wittgenstein’s rule-fohowing arguments. McDoweh has much to 
say of weight and interest on tliese points but, I beheve and wih argue, misplaces the 
structure o f Wittgenstein’s arguments in the rule-fohowing remarks. Since drawing out this 
structure is a principle objective of this thesis, paying individual attention to McDoweh’s 
position on these issues wih ahow me to indkectly pursue this objective. In the next chapter
It is not so far clear, tliough, why this should be a consequence o f the master tliesis, only tliat it is so.
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I will pick up on McDowell’s account o f sub-bedrock and bedrock as this pertains to how it 
is that we can follow a rule widiout reasons (a subject of tlie next chapter) and whl again 
conduct a critique sinular in its intent and scope.
I ll McDowell on the Master Thesis and Rule-Following Arguments 
III. i. McDowell on Customs
McDowell places much emphasis on the role o f custom or practice and contends that it 
offers grounds for securing tlie master thesis. Consider the following remarks.
We have to realise that obeying a rule is a practice if  we are to find it intelligible that there is a way o f  
grasping a rule wliich is not an interpretation.^^
How can a performance botli be nothing but a "blind' reaction to a situation, not an attempt to act on 
an interpretation...; and be a case o f going by a rule...? H ie answer is: by belonging to a custom (PI 
198), practice (PI 202), or institution (EFM W  — 31)^ ^
How does Wittgenstein’s insistence on publicity emerge? In my reading, the answer is diis: it emerges 
as a condition o f  the possibility o f  rejecting tlie assimilation o f  understanding to interpretation, wliich 
poses an intolerable dilemma.^^
In my reading, it [the requirement o f  publicity] emerges as a condition for die inteUi^bility o f  rejecting a 
premise — die assimilation o f understanding to interpretation -  that would present us with an intolerable 
düemma.^ ^
In the last two quoted passages, the “tequitement o f publicity” or “insistence o f pubhcity’ 
are meant to refer to the notions o f custom, practice, etc. Note the presumption here, 
although certainly not unwarranted, that custom, practice, etc., are to be understood as
McDowell [1984], p. 339. 
McDowell [1984], p. 342.
17 McDoweU [1984], p. 356.
18 McDowell [1984], p. 342.
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public goods or as involving a community. In opposition to Kripke, for whom the 
“requirement of pubhcity” is a facet o f his sceptical solution, McDowell sees this 
requirement as part o f a straight solution to the sceptical argument; as a way o f rejecting the 
culpable premise which begets the argument (the “culpable premise” being the contradictory 
o f the master thesis). Further, notice an ambiguity in McDowell’s treatment regarding 
whether the appeal to notions of custom and the hke is to be the grounds for the rejection o f 
tlie culpable premise or to provide an explanation o f this rejection. The first and last 
passages quoted above lend toward the latter reading; the middle two passages towards the 
former.
Tliis distinction may be important. It has been shown above that custom cannot 
take on die task of rejecting die culpable premise (i.e., S4, or for that matter, any premise of 
the Sceptical-Inductive argument; see above). A lesser role may be available to custom in the 
form of malting inteUigible the rejection o f the culpable premise (the task o f rejecting the 
culpable premise, after all, is achieved by way o f treating the sceptical argument as a reductid). 
As noted, die appeal to a custom may serve to explain how we can follow a set o f 
underdetermining instructions without need to interpret those instructions. For instance, an 
understanding of the custom of pointing may allow us to follow the pointed-to direction 
without finding it at all ambiguous. But again, this presumes that we have a correct 
understanding of the custom. The role of custom here assumes that the culpable premise 
has already been rejected (and tiius that we can already correctiy follow a rule without 
interpretation) and so neither makes intelligible this rejection nor, as already described above, 
is the basis for rejecting this premise. This is because in following a custom we are following 
a rule (a rule for following other rules o f a certain type) and so we should not assume an 
understanding of customs in giving an account of how it is that we can understand and
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follow rules without interpretation. And so McDowell fails to appreciate tliat, as customs 
are norms or rules, to presume a correct understanding of these in an account o f how we 
follow rules (and do so witliout interpreting, i.e., in an account o f the master thesis) begs the 
question.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the premise denied by the master thesis is S4. We 
may wonder, witli some cause, whether, far from rejecting S4 with an appeal to custom, 
McDoweh accepts S4. This is not stated explicitly in the above passages but seems to be 
implicit in the appeal to custom. The thought is this. An understanding o f custom is to 
enable us to follow a rule from underdetermining instructions without having to interpret 
those instructions. An understanding o f custom, in this role, seems to serve as a top-up to 
the understanding of a set o f instructions such that, witli this top-up, our understanding is 
no longer underdetermined (for if we could follow the underdeterniining instructions 
correctly, and without interpreting, then the understanding o f custom is not needed in the 
first place). The hnpHcit admission would seem to be that as long as the understanding of a 
rule remains underdetermined then the rule cannot be followed (and this is to admit that an 
underdeterrnined understanding is an understanding o f the rule as indeterminate in what it 
proscribes). But this is an acceptance o f S4: it accepts that if our understanding of a rule is 
underdetermined, then we cannot escape tlie need to interpret the rule (so as to settle the 
indeterminacy). What is required is not an account that denies that our understanding of a 
rule is underdeterrnined as seems imphcit in McDowell’s appeal to custom (for this would be 
to accept S4 and deny S3), but an account that says we can follow a rule despite this 
underdetermmation (for this is what it is to follow a rule “blindly” in an epistemic sense — 
this is to be elaborated in tlie next chapter). But admittedly, the above passages, while they
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indicate that McDowell accepts S4 in his attempt to secure the master thesis through an 
appeal to custom, do not do more than this/^
Also, notice that in the above quoted passages, McDowell speaks o f custom and 
practice as pubhc goods or institutions; that by custom Wittgenstein does not merely mean 
tlie custom of an accumulated repetition. Although McDowell does not argue for this view, 
there is certainly good exegetical basis to think this way: Wittgenstein speaks o f rule- 
following as an institution, and so presumably, something only possible in a public context. 
However, the argument that following a rule is or is part o f a public institution (in some 
sense or other) is given with a variant o f the private language argument: this is the case 
against private rule-following given in PI 202 (i.e., it is witli this argument in hand that we 
can uphold that customs are rules tliat cannot be followed privately). Hence, it is with this 
argument in hand that McDowell can appeal to custom in its public sense (and then use it to 
defend the master thesis). But as just noted, this argument is not given until PI 202. The 
master thesis is upheld in PI 201. Moreover, the argument against private rule-following is 
stated in PI 202 as a consequence or conclusion o f the argument o f PI 201.^° Hence, the 
relevant sense o f custom as a public good or institution is not available for the defense o f tiie 
master thesis since this sense is only established after the master thesis is already taken as 
estabhshed and moreover, this sense is only established ^ th e  master thesis is already 
estabhshed (for it is portrayed as a consequence o f the argument o f PI 201). The point here 
is that McDowell has the arguments out o f order: a case against private rule-following is 
required to maintain a sense o f custom (which, after all, is still a rule or norm) as public but
In the next chapter, in a discussion o f  McDowell’s views on bedrock in Section II. vii., we will see a return o f  
this line o f  thought, i.e., tliat i f  we are to be able to follow rules, especially basic or ‘"bedrock” rules, and be 
assured that we do so in step witli others, tlien our understanding o f  these rules cannot be underdeterrnined 
(for tliis, as he would say, give us at best inductive grounds for our beliefs and expectations that we proceed in 
step with others in following basic rules).
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this case is not available prior to the establishment of the master thesis in PI 201. This point 
is both exegetical (for Wittgenstein presents the case against private rule-following 
immediately after, and as a consequence of, the argument of PI 201 which is wherein the 
master tliesis is presented as established) and pliilosophical (for, as I argue in the Appendix 
to the second chapter, die case against private rule-fohowing is a product o f the sceptical 
argument o f PI 201).
III. ii. McDowell’s Dilemma
In this section I whl discuss McDowell’s view of the general structure o f the arguments 
involving die rule-fohowing considerations; specificahy, of the relation between the sceptical 
argument, the master thesis (i.e., that there must be a way to grasp a rule which is not an 
interpretation), and Wittgenstein’s argument against the realist view o f rules. According to 
McDoweh, the rule-fohowing remarks present us with a basic dhemma, indeed, an 
“intolerable” dilemma. At the tip o f the first horn is the sceptical paradox. O n the second 
hes Platonism or reahsm about rules (I wih not differentiate these positions as they apply to 
rules). Both horns arise from the common and mistaken assumption diat rule-fohowing 
involves interpretation: the sceptical paradox is described as a product o f a regress of 
interpretations and Platonism as involving a fixed interpretation. For McDoweh, both horns 
are withdrawn when we reahse that rule-fohowing does not involve an act o f interpretation. 
Accordingly, the way out o f the dilemma Hes in malting the case for die master thesis. It is 
the contention o f diis section that the “intolerable dhemma” is a misdiagnosis. I whl argue 
below that neither horn is adequately met with the master thesis and that, contrary to the
201 defend this point in Chapter 2, and more fully, in tlie Appendix to Chapter 2.
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picture offered, die horns, and so the positions they represent, are no t independent o f one 
another.
A. Against the First Horn
Firsdy, and briefly, McDowell claims that the first horn, the sceptical paradox, is avoided 
with the realisation that following a rule does not involve an act of interpretation; that 
instructions in a rule do n o t need to be interpreted to be followed. This is certainly 
exegeùcaïïy correct. The absurdity o f the paradoxical conclusion is presented as grounds for 
the rejection o f a premise and acceptance o f the master thesis (i.e., diat there is a way o f 
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation). However, this is not to account for why the 
culpable premise is rejected; that is, it is not to provide an explanation behind the rejection 
o f S4, but only to note that it must be rejected. Given that there are reasons for finding S4 
plausible (see above), these reasons go unchallenged in McDowell’s treatment and are not 
explained away. McDowell’s devices — i.e., the appeal to custom and practice — as argued 
above, do not enable the rejection o f S4 (or, for that matter, SI or 82, were we even to want 
to reject one o f these premises; see above) and so certainly cannot explain the rejection o f 
S4, AU that is managed by saying that the sceptical conclusion is avoided with a realisation 
o f the master thesis is to repeat, and not explain, Wittgenstein’s claim in PI 201 that the 
sceptical argument is to be treated as a reductio in favour o f the master thesis. Furthermore, 
we may again observe that to offer no such account in favour o f the master thesis, although 
stUl exegeticaUy in the right, does not do any damage to Kripke for whom  the sceptical 
conclusion does not force the rejection o f a premise, but rather, is to be accepted and met 
with a sceptical solution.
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B. Against Independent Horns
Secondly, according to McDowell, the Platonist view o f rule-following (which he casts as 
“ the mythology”) and the sceptical paradox are independent horns o f a single dilemma; the 
dilemma is the result of the view that rule-following involves interpretation. He states, “the 
attack on die mythology is not support for the paradox, but rather constitutes, in 
conjunction with the fact that the paradox is intolerable, an argument against the 
misunderstanding [that following a rule involves interpretation] Thus viewed, the 
argument against the Platonist view and the intolerability o f the sceptical paradox both argue 
for the master thesis (i.e., that rule-following need not involve an act o f interpretation), 
lilcewise, acceptance of the master thesis is a preventive for encountering the dhemma with 
botli its horns. However, these horns do not stand independent o f each other for one offers 
the resources o f an argument against the other. To remind, it was argued in the last chapter 
that the sceptical argument (i.e., the Sceptical-Inductive), and specifically the first two 
premises, provide for an argument against a realist view o f rules. The thought, very briefly, 
is that given that instructions cannot but underdetermine a rule (SI), and given that a realist 
understanding o f a rule is o f it as fully determined, a rule-realist is committed to an 
instruction- or explanation-transcendent understanding o f rules (i.e., he is committed to 
rejecting AR** or S2). But these — SI and S2 — are both premises o f the Sceptical-Inductive 
argument. Thus, although we may admit that the sceptical conclusion (of the Sceptical- 
Inductive argument) provides grounds for viewing the argument as a reductio, this is not to 
admit that the argument is not o f use in the case against rule-reahsm (and so is not
21 McDowell [1984], p. 332.
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independent of this case). In  the view I have developed, the absurdity o f the conclusion is 
grounds for rejecting S4 (of the Sceptical-Inductive argument) but SI through S3 (and 
specifically S2 or AR** which denies the realist an explanation or instruction-transcendent 
understanding o f a rule) provide for a case against realism.^ The considerations upon which 
the sceptical argument is built and the case against rule-reahsm do not stand independently 
o f each other. In supposing otherwise, McDowell does no t take full heed o f the resources 
employed by Wittgenstein in his argument against the reahst view o f rules.
C. Against tihe Second Horn
Thirdly, according to McDowell, rule-reahsm succumbs to the master thesis and its 
supporting argument. The thought is that the reahst is committed to a role for interpretation 
in rule-fohowing and so is also a victim o f the thesis that there is a way to fohow a rule 
which is not an interpretation. But in McDoweh’s characterisation, interpretation comes 
into play differently in the reahst view o f rules than it does in the sceptical argument. In tlie 
sceptical argument, as McDoweh describes it, an interpretation o f a rule is a substitute 
expression o f the rule (e.g., the expression “turn right” is an interpretation o f an arrow on a 
sign pointing right). I f  the understanding of a rule is a matter o f interpretation, then we are 
faced with having to understand the interpretation which just leads us into a regress; 
interpretations, on this account, only serve to supplant one expression for another and so 
understanding a rule cannot be a matter o f interpretation (again, if  it were, the need to 
interpret the interpretation would arise and tlie regress begotten).
22 See Chapter 2 for details.
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In the realist’s case, as viewed by McDoweU, what is needed is a fixed or rigid 
interpretation. McDoweU describes the second horn o f the dhemma, the “mythology”, as an 
attempt to hold on to a role for interpretation without succumbing to the sceptical paradox. 
He states, “Understanding an expression, then, must be possessing an interpretation that 
cannot be interpreted — an interpretation that precisely bridges the gap, exploited in the 
sceptical argument, between the instruction one received in learning the expression and the 
use one goes on to make o f it. The itresistible upshot o f this is that we picture following a 
rule as the operation o f a super-rigid yet (or perhaps we should say ‘hence’) ethereal 
machine,”^  We may try to explain this requirement o f rigidity, o f an interpretation that itself 
is no t open to interpretation, as due to the realist’s requicement that a rule be understood as 
fuUy determined, i.e., as fnUy laid out in advance (for tlien there should be only one 
interpretation o f the rule, or so the thought goes).
An interpretation plays the role, in McDoweU’s picture, o f an intermediate step 
between our understanding o f a rule and the rule itself (such that we must understand the 
interpretation to understand the rule). This intermediate role, in the sceptical argument 
highlighted above, leads to a regress. Carving a role for interpretation into the realist picture 
is no t as clear cut. Certainly, we should admit that the realist would lay claim to a direct 
understanding of a rule via an intuition. For instance, the realist would lay claim to an 
intuition in virtue o f which he “just knows” how to continue the series add-2; this is what it 
is to have an intuitive grasp o f the rule. So characterised, the realist’s understanding o f a rule 
is no t mediated, and so, should not involve an act o f interpretation. Intuition, allegedly, is 
the source o f understanding o f a rule and this involves direct epistemic contact with the rule. 
Intuition, thus described, is not an epistemic (or, for that matter, phenomenological)
23 McDoweU [1984], p. 332.
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intermediary and so is not or does not involve an act of interpretation (or inference). That 
is, in the realist picture, there is no epistemic intermediary between an intuition and an 
understanding o f a rule.
It should be fully available to the realist to say that, upon being given the instructions 
for a rule, an understanding o f the rule (which, for the rule-realist, is of the rule as fully 
determined; an understanding that accounts for the whole use o f the word or whole 
application o f the rule) comes to mind without an interpretation. The described 
phenomenology o f such an intuition does not, or at least need not, include an intermediary. 
Doubting the reahst on his phenomenological account seems a troubled enterprise: how do 
we deny the claim o f unmediated contact with a rule; how do we assert that the reahst 
understanding must involve interpretation, if  the experience is essentiaUy pnvate.^"^ 
Accordingly, it is difficult to see how the need for an interpretation can be pinned to tlie 
reahst. The ready to hand characterisation o f intuition as an “immediate grasp” or as 
understood “in a flash” gives he to the claim that the reahst, who places his stock in 
intuition, m ust understand via an interpretation. Our description of the phenomenology of 
intuition in these terms is of a dhect or unmediated understanding. And so, it is a mistake to 
view the master thesis as essentiaUy involved in the attack against the reahst view o f rules 
(and neglects the arsenal that Wittgenstein does deploy in this cause). The reahst does not, or 
at least need not, accept the characterisation o f a reahst understanding o f a rule in terms of 
an understanding o f an interpretation which then leads to an understanding o f a rule (rather, 
this characterisation just seems to invite a regress as per McDoweU’s take on the sceptical 
argument). In sum, the essential difficulty with the reahst picture is not an assumption 
about interpretation.
24 The point that tlie realist’s alleged intuition o f a rule would be private is a result o f  die previous chapter.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
The appeal to an understanding o f custom, by McDowell et al^  is an attempt to retain the 
I'eductio reading o f Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument by rejecting a premise. The approach of 
reading Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument as a reductio is exegeticaUy correct, bu t the appeal 
to custom fails in this charge because it cannot carry the weight o f rejecting a premise (any 
premise). It was shown above that if the appeal to custom is taken as an appeal to a means 
or source o f an understanding o f a rule different from that gained through instruction then 
this appeal violates AR** (for AR** denies explanation or instruction-transcendent 
understanding and this principle has been defended at length in Chapter 2). Thus, although 
it may be that an understanding of the relevant custom can combine with an understanding 
obtained through underdetermining instructions in a rule to yield an understanding o f the 
rule, this does not serve to answer how it is that the rule is correctiy grasped and foUowed 
despite an underdeterrnined understanding (for an understanding o f the custom is itself 
gained from underdetermining instructions, explanations and examples). Likewise, if it is 
supposed that an understanding o f a custom is not underdetermined by instruction in the 
custom, then it violates SI (i.e., tiie first premise o f the Sceptical-Inductive argument). It has 
been defended that the target o f the reductio is S4: an underdeterrnined understanding of a 
rule requires that the rule be interpreted to be understood and foUowed.^^ An appeal to 
custom fails in the rejection of this premise also. The attempt to reject S4 with an appeal to 
custom fails to recognise that an understanding o f custom is an understanding o f a rule (a
23 And the extent to which we can make tliis case against S4 is tlie extent to which we can make a case tliat 
Wittgenstein is not a “quietist” about a positive agenda of without constructive comment in response to the 
negative and sceptical considerations raised in the rule-following remarks.
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rule for foUowing rules o f a certain type) and so an appeal to custom is open to the same 
sceptical question that it is to aid in answering: how is it that we are able to correctly 
understand and foUow a custom without interpreting the custom and this despite an 
underdeterrnined understanding o f the custom? And so, the appeal to an understanding of 
custom, as pursued by McDoweU et al^  is unsuccessful as a means o f defending the master 
thesis.
AdditionaUy, the argument against custom given here, it should be observed, is quite 
general. For instance, it might be thought that communal assent can serve to render the 
underdetermining instructions unproblematic: the correct course o f action to pursue is that 
which has the consent o f one’s peers. A  difficulty with this approach is tliat the consent of 
one’s peers, as a guide to understanding a set o f instructions, is itself something to be 
understood; it is itself something that plays the role o f an instruction in a rule, for it is meant 
to be a guide to rule-foUowing behaviour, and so is simUarly open to the same sort of 
question: how do we correctly foUow the nods and winks of our peers without having to 
interpret so that we may be correctly guided in following a rule without having to interpret. 
The generality o f the argument against custom relates that whatever is to guide us in 
following a rule, insofar as it must first be understood, is itself open to the question of how 
it is to be correctly understood. In short, anything appealed to for its normative effect raises 
the sceptical question concerning how this is to be correctly recognized (and so any such 
appeal — as per die appeal to a custom — cannot answer our general rule-following problem: 
how do we correctly grasp and fohow a rule despite an underdeterrnined understanding and 
do so without interpreting. The effect o f this line of tliought seems to be that it must be 
possible to have normafivity (i.e., have the operation of normative constraints on our rule- 
fohowing behaviour) without this having to be open to epistemological account (for
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otherwise we are led to ask how these normative constraints are correctly appreciated and 
recognised, and then the sceptical question just repeats). This wih be discussed in the next 
chapter, to some extent, in the discussion o f what it is to fohow a rule “blindly” (in an 
epistemic sense) and also, to a lesser extent, in the section dealing witli McDoweh and the 
notions o f bedrock and sub-bedrock.
An upshot o f tliis chapter is that the negative programme reaches a climax with the 
insight that we cannot but attain an underdeterrnined understanding o f a rule (this is because 
our understanding of a rule, including basic rules such as those involving customs, cannot 
but be a product o f an understanding of media (instructions and training that 
underdetermine the rule). The thrust o f the positive programme wih then be to show that 
this does not commit us to a sceptical paradox; that this does not require a role for 
interpretation; alternatively, that this does not require that we view our understanding o f a 
rule as indeterminate. As shown, this cannot be buht (solely) around an appeal to custom 
and the Hke. The answer to this problem, which whl involve an account o f fohowing a rule 
“blindly”, whl be the focus o f the next chapter in its discussion of reasons, rationahty and 
bedrock.
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CHAPTER 4
Rule-FoUowing and Rationality: 
The Positive Programme
I. Introduction
For Wittgenstein, ‘rationality’ is an equivocal term. In this chapter I will present and defend 
two distinct senses in which Wittgenstein contends we are or can be rational. This 
distinction wih be put to remedy unresolved difficulties raised in the previous chapters. In 
Chapter 2, two separate sceptical arguments were presented. The first argued that our 
understanding o f any rule is underdetermined and that, insofar as this requires a role for 
interpretation in our understanding of a rule, we are led to a sceptical conclusion. The 
second argued that if a set o f instructions underdetermines a rule, then this imphes tliat they 
do not determine a rule at ah. The difficulties raised by both these arguments whl be 
attended to in this chapter through common means, viz., an employment o f the distinction 
in senses of rationality as it pertains to rule-fohowing. It is admitted that our understanding 
of any rule is underdeterrnined; that the correct way to fohow any rule is not fihly 
determined in our understanding o f the rule. Nevertheless, we are not driven to interpret a 
rule, it whl be later argued and elaborated, because the underdeterrnination o f our 
understanding need not hnply that we view a rule as indeterminate in what it proscribes. We 
may find ourselves standing in the role o f interpreter in applying most any rule, at any step — 
and so confronting the underdetermination o f our understanding — but tliere is an alternative 
mode o f rationality avahable that offers an alternative mode of response in which we do not 
stand as interpreter.
In this chapter, the question asking how it is that we can fohow a rule from an 
underdeterrnined understanding, without recourse to interpretation, whl be answered largely 
through an account o f how it is, according to Wittgenstein, that we can correctiy fohow a 
rule despite lacking a justification, fuhy fledged, for fohowing the rule as we do. That is, the
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problem o f imderdetermiiiation whl be matched to the problem of a lack o f justifying 
reasons. These problems match up. Reasons that justify a course o f action determine that 
course o f action; in contrast, if  our understanding o f how to follow a rule draws on reasons 
that do not justify or fuhy vindicate, then our understanding of how to correctly follow the 
rule is underdetermmed by those reasons. Thus, to have it said that our reasons whl always 
run out (prior to justification) is to have it said tliat our understanding o f how to correctly 
fohow a rule wih always be underdetermined. Accordingly, if it can be shown that the lack 
o f justifying reasons does not present a problem, then it should fohow that the lack of 
determination does not either. Wittgenstein makes tliis connection clear in PI 213, a remarlr 
situated within a discussion o f reasons: “ “But this initial segment o f a series obviously 
admitted o f various interpretations (e.g., by means of algebraic expressions) and so you must 
first have chosen one such interpretation.” — N ot at ah. A doubt was possible in certain 
citcumstances. But that is not to say that I did doubt, or could doubt.” Wittgenstein, in this 
remark, relates the indeterrninacy of a set o f instructions (a finite set o f examples) — the 
various interpretabhity o f the instructions — to the possibihty o f doubt. H e answers that we 
need not raise a doubt and this is to say that we need not be troubled by the indeterminacy 
o f the instructions (and to not be troubled by the indeterminacy o f the instructions is to not 
be troubled to interpret those instructions). And this is to say that a set o f instructions or a 
rule can be viewed as indeterminate (due to the rule being underdetermined by the 
instructions) but it need not be so viewed; the underdetermination need raise no obstacle to 
our coming to understand a rule. That our understanding of a rule is underdeterrnined is not 
a flaw in our understanding and this wih be shown, in this chapter, by showing that although 
our reasons wih run out in an account of why we fohow a rule as we do, this is not a flaw in 
our understanding of why we fohow a rule as we do (or an obstacle to our communicating
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this understanding to others). W hat is needed, and will be given (at least to a fair extent), is 
an account o f rationality that is at ease with reasons running out. Indeed, our reasons must 
run out for to achieve a full justification would be to betray an understanding that has been 
shown to be invariably underdeterrnined.
II. Rationality
An intuitive view of rationahty should uphold, in the least it seems, that an act o f rule- 
fohowing is rational if  underlined by reasons. Wittgenstein does not deny that fohowing a 
rule is a rational endeavour in this intuitive sense, that is, as involving a vital role for reasons. 
Wittgenstein only contends that the reasons we have to give whl run out and that they wih 
always run out short o f fuhy justifying our rule-fohowing behaviour. To presume that 
reasons only serve to justify is to presume that we can only be rational, under an intuitive 
view, if our rule-fohowing behaviour is justified. Opposed to this presumption, and upheld 
by Wittgenstein, stands die view that we can be rational even though our reasons (were we 
to consider them) fah short of justifying our actions; that justification need not be an end of 
reason-giving. With this view in hand, I wih argue that Wittgenstein presents us with two 
different standards or modes o f what it is to be rational in fohowing a rule. I hesitate to 
present his view m these terms, that is, as involving separate “standards or modes of 
rationahty” for it is quite a heavy-handed theorisation (concerning someone who avoided 
theorisation, at least in the presentation o f his views). Nevertheless, there is a distinction 
between senses o f rational accountabhity that is elucidated by drawing forth Wittgenstein’s 
views in these terms. Preparatory to a discussion o f these dual modes o f  rationahty, I wih
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draw a distinction between rationality and correctness in rule-following for tiiey are not the
same.
II. i. Correct Vs. Rational Rule-Following
A distinction is to be had between rule-following behaviour that is correct to the rule (and so 
properly rule-fohowing and rule-fohowing behaviour that is incorrect to the rule (and so not 
rule-fohowing) but sthl rational. This wih involve what I whl cah the “interpretative” mode 
or standard o f rationahty.
There is a sense in which this distinction is readily avahable and that is the ordinary 
mistake. Someone may make a mistake in applying a rule but, upon having it brought out, 
accept theit error (they see that they have fohowed the instructions incorrectly). The person 
has erred but is not irrational (a mistake does not send one to the asylum). This apphes even 
to systematic errors for even these can be corrected if pointed out. But this is not the sort o f 
case at issue: at issue is an error (or series o f errors) such that the person, upon having it 
pointed out, does not accept that tiiey have erred. The person insists that they are doing the 
same as tliey were instructed; that they have not changed course. Such a person is “deviant”. 
The contrast is made explicit by Wittgenstein: “But you surely can’t  suddenly make a 
different application o f tiie law now!” — If  my reply is: “O h yes of course, that is how I was 
applying it!” or: “Oh! Thafs how I ought to have applied it - 1”; tiien I am playing your game. 
But if  I simply reply: “Different? — But this surely isn*t different!” — what will you do? That is: 
somebody may reply lilce a rational person and yet not be playing our game.” (RFM 1115) 
The “deviant pupil” o f PI 185 is a case o f the latter sort o f reply.
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The deviant pupil follows the rule for add-2 incorrectly. And importantly, he neidier 
sees nor accepts tliat he has gone wrong when we try to point out his mistake. However, 
there is a sense in which the pupil is still behaving rationally (in respect o f the instructions 
given to him). This is because we can interpret his behaviour as in accord with another rule 
that is also consistent with the instructions and training that he has been given for the rule 
add-2. For instance, we may interpret him as instead following the rule: add 2 up to 1000, 
add 4 up to 2000, add 6 up to 3000, and so on, as Wittgenstein also offers in the same 
remark- It is this consistency with the instructions that is the basis for attributing rationality 
to the incorrect behaviour (for in a sense it seems that the instructions were still “followed” 
although the rule was not). And this “^‘consistency” is made possible by the fact that any 
instruction and training in a rule underdetermines the rule. I f  the puph (or any individual) 
interprets a set o f instructions, he may find different (indeed, indefinitely many) ways of 
proceeding as in accord with those instructions. The deviant pupü is rational, or at least, 
may be viewed as rational because his course o f action, although incorrect to the rule, is a 
consistent interpretation o f the instructions given to him. But note that he is rational only if 
it is rational to interpret the instructions in coming to understand them; i.e., insofar as it is a 
rational move to interpret when given instructions, we may find his behaviour rational for 
being a legitimate interpretation (and this will be important later).
Further notice that this attribution o f rationality to the deviant pupil involves RF2 
and not RF3. According to RF3, any or every course o f action can be made out to accord 
with a rule or instructions in a rule, but we should not likewise say that any or every course 
o f action can be deemed rational (in response to instructions in a rule). There is a principled 
difference between RF2 and RF3 and this is that the instructions in the first case license ' 
some courses o f action but not others (in the sense that some but not all courses o f action
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can be interpreted to be in accord with the instructions) and so there is still something to 
having to understand die instructions; understanding this much is grounds for an attribution 
of rationality (as witii the deviant pupü). In die latter case, instructions can be interpreted to 
license any or every course o f action but this is to say diat nothing need be understood in the 
instructions for any course of action to be adopted (and to be thought to accord with the 
instructions). This is why someone whose rule-following behaviour is characterised as 
exemplifying RF3 is not rationally responding to the instructions, even if it is admitted that it 
is rational move to interpret a set o f instructions in order to understand them.
II. ii. Two Modes of Rationality: The Interpretative and the Reactive
The deviant pupü’s behaviour, as explained, can be construed as rational but still incorrect 
(and incorrect in a way diat exemplifies a deviant understanding and not just an ordinary sort 
o f mistake — see above). This example highlights two different standards o f what it is to be 
right or correct in understanding (the instructions given for a rule). The deviant pupil is 
right in one sense for his behaviour exemplifies a consistent interpretation o f the 
instructions (and the thought is tliat he is rational to at least understand the instructions to 
this extent). H e is wrong for not following the rule and its instructions as we do and this 
points to a second sense o f what it is to be right: to conform in application or judgement. 
The deviant pupil is not rational in this sense for he does not follow the rule as we do (and 
understanding under this sense requires something different than interpreting. These two 
senses o f rightness are at the core o f the two modes or standards o f rationality.
Consider further the following famous passage: “To use an expression without 
justification does not mean to use it without right.” (PI 289) Here we see Wittgenstein
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unambiguously point to two rational standards: one in terms o f justification and the other in 
terms o f fight. The sense o f ‘right’ here is important, and will be exposed (along with 
‘justification’) as we discuss the two rational modes, but it can first be said that Wittgenstein 
does not mean for rule-following behaviour to fall into irrationality (or non-rationality) for a 
lack of justification. We can still be rational even without justification.^
I call the two modes or standards o f rationality the ‘interpretative’ and the ‘reactive’. 
Per the interpretative standard, the correct way to understand a set o f instructions is the 
interpretation that we can justify or best justify (and this may lead us to apply a rule in a way 
that does not conform with that o f others). In  this mode, the way to understand a set of 
instructions is to interpret them; it is to form a hypothesis over them. Likewise, to 
understand what someone means by an expression involves interpreting or forming a 
hypothesis over theit utterance. In contrast, conformity in application (or equivalently, 
agreement in judgement) is the standard of correctness o f the reactive mode (i.e., a set o f 
instructions is understood correctly in this mode if they are applied in conformity with 
others). Much more needs to be (and wiU be) explained but in capsule it may be said that 
these two modes dispky different ways o f dealing with the underdetermination o f our 
understanding o f a rule: the reactive mode is untroubled by the underdetermination finding 
correctness in conformity o f application while the interpretative mode is troubled, finding 
the rule to be indeterminate, and sees a need to settle this indeterminacy along some 
interpretation or other.
1 Kiipke reads the German for Swithout right’ as ‘wrongfully’ or ‘wrongly’ (Kripke [1982], p. 74); this does not 
disrepair the distinction being carved in modes o f rationality for it is still under a separate sense o f rationality 
that we do not follow a rule wrongfully even though we lack justification. Indeed, we see Wittgenstein 
translated in this way in a similar remark in the RFM: “To use the word witliout a justification does not mean 
to use it wrongfully.” (KFM V II40)
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The underdeterminatiori tliat characterises our understanding o f a rule is a product 
o f RF2 and AR** (see Chapters 2 for details). Another way of speaking o f tliis 
underdetermination is to say that tliere are indefinitely many courses o f action that can be 
interpreted to be in accord with what is understood o f a rule (i.e., instructions and 
explanations). Thus, if following a rule requires interpreting, then we are unable to follow a 
rule for reason o f being without (non-arbitrary) means o f settling on an interpretation; 
alternatively viewed, we may say that if  understanding involves interpretation, then we are 
led into a regress for the interpretation must then also be correctly understood. Avoiding a 
paradoxical result requires that there be a way o f grasping a rule that does not involve 
interpreting; as Wittgenstein famously says in P I 201: “What this shews is that there is a way 
o f grasping a rule which is not an intei'pretation  ^but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying 
the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases.” W hen Wittgensteki advises a way o f 
grasping a rule that is ^^not an intetpretatioîf^ he advises a way of coming to understand a rule 
that is not under the interpretative mode. Tliis is what I call grasping a rule under the 
‘reactive mode’. It is exhibited in actual cases o f rule-following (as Wittgenstein also says in 
PI 201) for in actual cases we see that we follow rules without interpreting; witliout need of 
full justification.
The underdetermination of our understanding o f a rule poses an insurmountable 
problem only if it requires that grasping and following a rule involve interpreting. 
Accordingly, the underdetermination o f our understanding of a rule is not problematic for 
understanding under tiie reactive mode. A way o f following a rule under the reactive mode 
may be thought o f as arbitrary if viewed fiom the interpretative mode (arbitrary because, 
from the perspective o f the interpretative mode, tliere are otlier interpretations consistent 
with that understanding). Under tlie reactive mode, though, the instructions are not seen as
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open to interpretation; that is, they are no t seen as underdeteiinining. This is a sense in 
which grasping and following a rule under tlie reactive mode is “blind”; there is a blindness 
to the apparent epistemic difficulty o f proceeding from underdeterroining instructions to a 
correct and unique application o f those instructions. We are not struck by the 
underdetermination o f our understanding o f a rule and so do not see the rule as open to 
mterpretation or in need of justification.
I t should seem that operating under the reactive mode involves a turning-away of 
sorts from indeterminacy in the instructions given for a rule that would otherwise lead us to 
interpret (i.e., to the interpretative mode). And so operating under the reactive mode, from 
the perspective o f the interpretative mode, would seem to be a contrived ignorance (an 
ostrich-lilce burying the head in the sand). But notice that there is no independent standard 
o f correctness to adjudicate between these two modes: from the interpretative mode, a way 
o f following a rule under the reactive mode may seem arbitrary or unjustified, but this is only 
a relative view; it is not seen as such from the reactive mode. Again, in this account of 
Wittgenstein, it is given that the reason why we can follow a rule from an underdetermined 
understanding and do so without having to interpret (i.e., the reason we can reject premise 
S4 of the Sceptical-Inductive argument) is that we can grasp a rule under the reactive mode.
It has been shown that the interpretative mode by itself cannot yield an 
understanding of a rule (for it leads us only to paradox; see tlie Sceptical-Inductive 
argument). I t is a result o f this argument, taken as a reductio, that there must be a way to 
grasp a rule that is not an interpretation (this is what has been called the ‘master thesis’); I am 
here saying tliat this otlier way to grasp a rule that does not involve interpretation is to grasp 
a rule under the reactive mode o f rationality. That is to say, the reductio-reading of the 
Sceptical-Inductive argument (described in Chapter 3) is herein taken as a reductio in favour
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of two different standards or modes o f rationality; and the way to grasp a rule that is not an 
interpretation is the way o f grasping a rule under the reactive mode. It may be thought that 
the reactive mode is not an alternative mode o f rationality, or an alternative way o f coming 
to grasp a rule. But to admit no other mode than tlie interpretative is to be prey to paradox; 
tliat is what I take the moral to be. Under the reactive mode, we are able to follow a rule 
from reasons that do not fuHy justify the course of action adopted; we are able to follow a 
rule from underdeterrnining instructions without being moved to interpret those 
instructions. I call this a mode of “rationality”, rather than just merely an alternative way o f 
understanding, because it speaks to the distinction Wittgenstein presses between senses of 
rightness or correctness witli which we may apply a rule (“To use a word without a 
justification does not mean to use it without right” PI 289); it speaks to a difference in the 
role o f reasons and notes that reasons that do not justify or vindicate may still be reasons 
that are successfully employed in conveying an understanding of a rule (and accommodating 
this difference requires a difference in the standards by which we measure and respond to 
reasons).^
This is so far a preliminary account of understanding under the reactive mode. A full 
account, though, is not readily furnished by Wittgenstein and so is not simply delivered. I 
believe tliere are resources in Wittgenstein’s writings for fashioning an answer, but the 
material is disparately and indkectly presented. For that reason, there is a needed managerial 
component to the task: drawing on the strengths o f seemingly separate lines o f argument or
2 Indeed, we may admit that we already accept something akin to tlie reactive and interpretative standards or 
modes o f  rationality. The rationality o f  the interpretative mode, which proceeds hypotlietico-deductively, is 
exemplified in tlie scientific method; we make hypotheses that are consistent with the observable data and tlien 
look to further evidence to narrow tlie field o f  hypotheses or pick by some other consideration. But we also 
already accept, in some respects or in some cases, that we proceed rationally if  we do as ofilers do. The 
underlying thought here is that rational behaviour must be behaviour that is intelligible to others. But, to an 
extent, behaviour that is intelligible to ofiiers is behaviour tliat is like that o f  others. Applying rules in a
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discussion to build an understanding. That is, an account o f understanding and applying 
rules under the reactive mode — and the manner in which this serves to secure agreement in 
application — will involve puUing together various threads: a careful examination o f  reasons 
and basic rules for Wittgenstein, and in relation, o f the notion o f bedrock; a look to Stroud’s 
(account o f Wittgenstein’s) distinction between conceiving clearly and conceiving as a 
possibility; and an investigation o f Wittgenstein’s understanding o f sameness and o f his 
account o f our Imowledge o f intentions (of our own and o f others’).
II. iii. Reasons Running Out
A first point to note is that an intuitive account o f rationality, according to which rule- 
following is rational if  underlined by reasons, is not damaged if those reasons are not actively 
considered in the course o f following a rule. The lack of a considered inference does not 
display the lack of a role for reasons. Indeed, this characterises most o f our rule-following 
practice: we do not act with a consideration o f reasons, but if  questioned can still give some 
reasons. We may say that this is to follow a rule with immediacy in a phenomenological 
sense (for the reasons are not present to mind in following the rule but are nonetheless, in 
some way, present for tliey are available to be given after the fact). This may be contrasted 
with following a rule with immediacy in an epistemic sense by which we mean to say more 
than that reasons are not present to mind; we mean to say that they are not present in an 
epistemic capacity.^ This should mean, if we are to make the contrast stark with the
common way — or at least, applying basic rules in a common way — is necessary for seeing otliers as intelligible 
and this thought, as we will fhrtlier see, underlies the view o f  rationality under the reactive mode.
3 I owe tliis distinction, between following a rule with immediacy in a phenomenological sense versus in an 
epistemic sense, to C. Wright. I share his view tliat by “blind” rule following, Wittgenstein has in mind the 
latter.
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phenomenological sense, that reasons are not available to be given, before or after the fact. 
But tliis would mean diat diere just are no reasons. Wittgenstein is admitting that our 
reasons run out^ but this is not to say that there are no reasons to give (or that there are 
never reasons to give). Nevertheless, we should say that when Wittgenstein speaks of 
reasons running out, he means to make a point of epistemic import (and this will require 
careful attention).
Consider the following remarks: “Well, how do I know [how to continue a pattern]? 
- I f  that means “Have I reasons?” the answer is: my reasons wül soon give out. And then I 
shall act, without reasons” (PI 211); and this: “If  I have exhausted the justifications I have 
reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I 
do”.” (PI 217). In these remarks Wittgenstein affirms that the reasons we can give in 
accounting for why we follow a rule as we do will run out; at this point we will go on 
without reasons (and we may find ourselves saying “this is simply what I do”). This is not 
just to say that we do not or need not actively consider reasons (i.e., that the reasons are 
present but just not present to mind; that we proceed without reasons in a 
phenomenological sense). Rather the point is epistemic: the reasons we can give do not 
justify the course of action we adopt. As described earlier (by RF2 and AR**), any 
explanation we give o f our understanding of a rule will run short o f determining a unique 
course o f action. A similar point is being made here: any set o f reasons we give will not 
fully justify or vindicate a unique course o f action. Hence, we cannot hope to justify a 
unique course of action in any endeavour of reason-giving. That is, we see that by the 
underdetermination o f our understanding of a rule, our reasons must give out short of 
justifying a way of following the rule. And so, in these remarks Wittgenstein is making a 
point very similar to that made in support o f RF2: the reasons we can give to account for
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our mle-foUowing behaviour, just like the instructions and explanations we can offer to 
those to whom we are trying to convey an understanding of a rule, underdetermine the rule. 
Further, Wittgenstein is here making his view clear that this is not detrimental for our 
understanding of how to follow a rule; that reasons run out does not mean that we do not 
gain an understanding of how to follow a rule from those reasons.
Continuing on, that we do not need further justification does not signal tliat we are 
undermining rationality (for rationality is denied only if justification is needed and not 
available — for Wittgenstein it is not available, bu t no t needed). Indeed, this is characteristic 
o f our rationality for Wittgenstein: we will always reach a point where our reasons run out 
when trying to justify why we follow a rule as we do. This is because our understanding of 
any rule, ultimately, is underdetermined and so we cannot fully justify (so as to remove all 
possibility o f doubt) a course o f action. Wittgenstein’s point is no t just that wo. reach a point 
where our reasons run out in trying to justify a course o f action (as an empirical claim), but 
that we mustf we will always reach a point where we say “that is simply what I do” . For 
Wittgenstein, this statement - "This is simply what I do" - is not intended as a statement of 
frustration at no t being able to dig further. It is not an admission o f ignorance regarding 
why we follow the rule in the way we do. Ratlier, it is a cue that further justification is not 
needed.
This lack of justification may be viewed in two ways. In the first, we do not feel 
unjustified in following a rule as we do even though not every possibility o f doubt has been 
addressed. This is to say that the possibility to doubt our rule-following behaviour remains 
(as it always does) but it is unconsidered and for this reason untroubhng. This is to operate 
under the reactive mode. In  the second, we do feel unjustified in following the rule as we do 
because we realise we could equally well be proceeding differently; we feel doubt or
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arbittarkiess now about out way o f proceeding and so feel a need to justify further. We have 
collected on the ever present possibility to doubt. This is to operate under the interpretative 
mode.*  ^ When we view what is correct in following a rule in terms o f what can be interpreted 
to be in accord with a rule, we require justification to settle on an interpretation.
Furthermore, if  die point that reasons run out (and we say “this is simply what I do”) is to 
count against rationality in rule-foHowing under the reactive mode then it counts against any 
rationality in rule-following (for, as just noted, we can never achieve full justification and so 
if justification is a requirement then rationality Is not attainable). Seen in this Hght, the 
reactive mode does not deny rationality in rule-following but saves it (for if we could not be 
rational without full justification then we would never be rational).
II, iv. Changes in Communal Rule-Following Practices
Suppose we adopt the view that the community is the arbiter of what constitutes correct 
rule-following. Correct rule-following just is what the community does.^ This may not be a 
palatable view but it is one often attributed to Wittgenstein as a consequence o f the rule- 
following considerations (and as we see, with the reactive mode or standard, where 
conformity in application is die correctness criterion, something like this would seem to be 
the case).^ A consequence o f the view that correct rule-foHowing practice is determined with
 ^The analogy between following a rule and obeying a command is useful here; we do not usually interpret a 
command, especially if  it is barked at us (we move to act and interpret only if  we need to). The interpretative 
mode is in use when we are trying to remove indeterminacy (for example, when we are trying to codify rules so 
as to reduce tlie occurrence o f  misunderstanding we tty to minimise scope for misinterpretation).
5 This was earlier labeled ‘Simple Communitarianism’; see Chapter 2, Section II.
 ^Tlie situation is dire if  the community decides what is the correct way to follow a rule. Again, tliis is radical 
conventionalism. Earlier, in Chapter 2, Section II, it was described that Simple Communitananism is subject to 
tlie charge o f radical conventionalism and that Kripke’s sceptical solution was a Simple Commumtarian 
solution. The possibility o f  grasping and following a rule under the interpretative mode — i.e., the possibility o f  
a role for interpretation in our grasp o f  a rule -  allows for changes in rule-foUowhig practice, such that we can
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refeience to the community is that we have a hard time understanding how it can be the case 
that an individual may have a rule right and the community wrong. We want to enable such 
a possibility but this might-makes-right view does not leave space for it.^ W hat is more, it 
does not leave space for the community to change the way it follows a rule in favour o f the 
way o f a deviant rule-foUower.
However, the distinction between the reactive and interpretative modes o f rationality 
(and the distinction and distance between rational and correct rule-foHowing that it affords) 
serves to aHeviate this difficulty. The point is simply that a way o f foHowing a rule that is 
incorrect under the reactive mode can stHl be accepted as rational if  viewed from the 
interpretative mode (for it may exempHfy a consistent interpretation o f the instructions or 
the data). This is the case with the deviant pupH o f PI 185. And so the scope o f what we 
can admit as rational rule-foHowing behaviour under the interpretative mode is broader than 
what we admit as correct under the reactive mode. Consequently, there is scope for a 
community to understand and appreciate a way o f foHowing a rule that is different than their 
own and which they hitherto viewed as incorrect. A community can come to understand a 
different way o f foHowing a rule because there are different interpretations that are 
consistent with their understanding o f the rule (i.e., their understanding o f the instructions 
and explanations o f the rule). Thus, if  they look at tliese explanations from the interpretative 
mode (which is to look at their own understanding of a rule from under the interpretative 
mode), they can find different ways o f foHowing the rule equaHy rational (if not correct).
see a way for an individual to lead a change in communal rule-foHowing practice (to be described shortly), and 
this tells us that Wittgenstein’s view is not a “simple” communitarian view. And so, if  the only mode available 
is the interpretative, then as argued by Wittgenstein and shown herein, we are led to a sceptical paradox. 
Alternatively, if  tire only mode available is the reactive, where correctness in rule-foUowing behaviour is a 
matter o f  conformity in application o f  rules, tlien it would seem tliat we are led to radical conventionalism (via 
Simple Communitariaitism), Tlie availability o f both modes, and the interaction between botli modes, in our 
grasp o f  a rule allows us to reject botli fliese ends.
 ^Blackburn raises tliis consideration in liis [1984].
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Under the interpretative mode we may come to see that our understanding o f a rule is 
indeterminate, and consequently, that our current way of following a rule is an interpretation 
that need not be correct. And so, if we remain in the interpretative mode, and so remain 
with the view that our way o f following a rule is an interpretation (equally justified as others 
and so in contest), then we will need reasons to justify our way o f following the rule (and so 
quell this indeterminacy). But if  reasons can be brought in to support our way o f following a 
rule tliey can also be brought in to justify a course o f action that is different than our way. 
Thus, a community can change its rule-following practice, and so its view o f correct rule- 
following practice, by means o f a change in rational modes. The interpretative mode of 
rationality, in contrast to the reactive mode, does no t view correctness in rule-following in 
terms o f the community’s current practice. As a result, switching to tltis m ode enables a 
community to appreciate that a rule may be followed differently than as established (and 
since no rule is understood as fully determined, it should ^ways be possible that such a 
switch be made).
Rule-following under the reactive mode enables us to follow rules as others do (and 
so should be primary in our account o f learning to follow rules fiom  training or 
instructions). Grasping a rule under the interpretative mode is the basis for changing our 
rule-foUowing practice. Presumably then, it is a basis for improving our way o f following a 
rule (an “improvement” because we are convinced o f it by further reasons). This is not a 
consideration, if correct, in favour o f finding the reactive mode to be a non-rational or sub- 
rational faculty. As argued, following a rule fiom  only under the interpretative mode is not 
possible (by pain o f paradox). And so if rule-foUowing is to be possible, there must be a way 
(a rational way) o f grasping a rule that is not “interpretative”. Hence, this is a consideration.
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rather, to find the modes complementary in an account of our understanding and following 
o f rules.
Wittgenstein’s rabbit/duck example is useful to show the different modes in play.® 
The rabbit/duck example can be seen or understood to be either a rabbit or duck under the 
reactive mode. In this case, we do not interpret what we see when we immediately see either 
a duck or a rabbit. Suppose a certain community sees the picture as a rabbit but not a duck. 
The picture is open to interpretation (for they could see the duck, or both) but tliey just do 
not interpret the picture on seeing it and so are no t open to seeing the duck. We can speak 
of their understanding o f the picture as underdetermined for it is based on a picture that is 
open to iuterpretation as either a duck or rabbit. Their coming to realise that tliere is ^so  a 
duck to be seen requires realising that their prior understanding o f the picture was 
underdetermined by the picture. And we can readily imagine that it does not take much to 
get them to view the picture from the interpretative mode and confront indeterminacy 
(perhaps all it takes is to say that there is a duck there and they wül see the picture 
differently; perhaps we move the picture a bit, or tell them to look for a face on the otlier 
side o f the figure — in doing this we are getting them to view the picture from the 
interpretative mode). Once seen as a duck we can even imagine them forgetting that there is 
a rabbit to be seen and that they need to be led again to interpret the picture (or we can 
imagine tliem as recognising that the picture is iadeterminate between the rabbit and duck 
and that they can see both at will). In  this example the data set (the picture, analogous to a 
set o f instructions) does not change and yet what was seen in one way can find itself being 
viewed differently once we move to interpret (i.e., to the interpretative mode). Lücewise, any 
set of instructions underdetermines the correct way to follow a rule. Hence, our
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understanding o f those instructions can change from what we now view as correct if  we can 
be coaxed into the interpretative mode.
O n the basis o f what has been said so far, it should seem that our view o f the correct 
application o f at^ rule is subject to revision if  we can make the move to the interpretative 
mode. Argument wiU soon be given to the effect that for some rules we do not make this 
switch even though, in some sense, we could (i.e., for basic or “bedrock” rules we just do 
not make this move). Ultimately, it is the difficulty o f this transition in certain cases (viz., 
basic cases) that is, according to Wittgenstein, the basis for our finding a way o f foUowing a 
rule to be necessary,
A comment on the epistemology o f the reactive mode, FoUowing a rule under the 
reactive mode is, as Wittgenstein describes, to foUow it “blindly”. We feel guided when we 
foUow a rule blindly and yet, if we sought fuU justification for the course o f action that we 
were guided along, we would not find it. By the very nature o f the matter, an account o f the 
epistemology o f foUowing a rule under the reactive mode is going to elude the standard of 
rationaUty of the interpretative mode (i.e., we cannot hope to understand the reactive mode 
fiom  the point o f view o f the interpretative mode). And so we cannot jtistify the feeling of 
being guided in the reactive mode. And so we should not expect an account that justifies 
but seek some other way to elucidate the epistemology of rule-foUowing under the reactive 
mode. Wittgenstein describes this sentiment as foUows: “But now notice this: while I am 
being guided everything is quite simple, I notice nothing special\ but afterwards; when I ask 
myself what it was that happened, it seems to have been something indescribable. Afierwards 
no description satisfies me. It’s as if I couldn’t beUeve that I merely looked, made such-and- 
such a face, and drew a Une. — But don’t  I remember anything else? N o,” (PI 175)
® The “rabbit/duck” example involves a drawing that can be seen either as a rabbit or a duck depending on
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There is a sense o f mystery to the epistemology of grasping rules under the reactive 
mode. Indeed, tlie very locution ‘follow a rule blindly’ indicates a concession tliat the 
epistemology o f following a rule in this mode is a mystery in some sense (even to the rule- 
foUower). But again, this is under the view of the interpretative mode; it is under the view 
that any proper account of how to follow a rule wiU proceed by justifying a course o f action. 
But it should be remembered that this is also the value o f the interpretative mode: it enables 
us to see that our understanding o f a rule is unjustified or underdetermined and so open to 
modification. With our division o f modes or standards o f rationality, we may offer tliis 
preliminary observation o f following a rule “blindly”: we should not expect an account of 
the grasp o f a rule under one mode to be readily accessible (or even seem rational) to the 
standards o f understanding under the otlier mode. This is precisely what it means to say tliat 
they are different standards or modes o f rationality,
II. V. A Nice Chess Example from Hacldng
A t this juncture, it is wortiiwhile presenting an example, taken fiom  Hacldng,^ fiom  tlie 
history o f chess which nicely serves to illustrate some o f the points so far raised. The 
example concerns the rule in chess where a draw is obtained when the same position on tlie 
board is produced three times. The historical point is that in 1924 the rule was found to be 
ambiguous: does it require that it be the (numerically) same piece or pieces or may it be die 
same type o f piece; for instance, may one black rook be interchanged with another black rook 
in obtaining the same board position? Hacldng uses this historical example to illustrate four 
different positions which are to serve, by analogy, as notewortliy features in the discussion of
how it is seen. See PHI, p. 194 for tlie passage and drawiag.
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scepticism and i*ule-foHowing. I will describe the first three positions as they are relevant to 
this discussion/®
In the first scenario, suppose that in a specific game in 1924, in the 47®’ move, the 
“same” board position is replicated three times with the black rooks switched. One player 
(and his supporters) disapprove saying tliat numerical identity must be preserved for it to be 
a draw (it must be the same tokm black rook in the same position three times). The other 
player (and his supporters) disagree: any black rook will do (after all, their functions or uses 
are the same and this is their only importance in the game). Both sides, however, see that 
the other has a legitiii^te point (i.e., they accept both as interpretations o f the rule, but 
evaluate them differently). In the second scenario, at move 47, a player [Hacldng calls him 
‘Bold] calls a draw by producing the same position with the black rooks interchanged. N o 
one disagrees or notices anything unusual. The game is drawn. In the third scenario, at 
move 47 again, a player [Hacking calls him ‘Wit’] calls a draw by producing the same position 
with the black rooks interchanged. In  this case, in contrast, the other player objects saying 
that the same position has only been produced twice and that the third time the rooks were 
interchanged. The player who called the draw admits the error and the game continues. 
Eventually, one o f the players wins. The relevant differences in the three cases is that in the 
first, the claim to draw is met with disagreement and a recognition o f ambiguity (i,e., o f 
different interpretations o f the rule). In  the second and third cases, there is no disagreement 
and no ambiguity recognized: play goes on (in one way or the other between the two cases) 
without stopping to interpret the rule or without there even seeming to be cause to interpret.
In the fiirst case. Hacking notes that a ‘^ distinguishing' and “Hmpncedented' situation is 
achieved; distinguishing for the reason that the rule was seen to apply in two ways and
® Who takes it himself fiom  Littlewood [1953].
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unprecedented for the reason that the ambiguity had never been noticed before. In the 
second and third cases, neither o f these descriptions apply for no ambiguity is even noticed; 
participants continue as ever before without taldng note o f having to apply the rule (in the 
thicd case it is noted that the person who calls the draw does not follow the rule, but the 
ambiguity in the rule never comes up for the player who calls the draw admits his error). O f 
the second and third cases, Hacldng has tins to say:
It is in fact misleading to speak o f  applying a rule. When a competent player makes a move, he does 
not ‘apply a rule’. He moves. A  novice may ask, “Was that in accordance with tlie rule for castling?’ 
‘Yes’, is die answer, but the question does not arise for competent players. One m oves.. .Yet by 
hypothesis, before the 1924 game began nothing existed in the language behaviour (and, I am inclined to 
say, brains) o f  Wit and liis community tliat he would proceed as [he does in the second case]..., rather 
[dian] as Bok in [die first case]
Hacldng goes on to say:
At any rate, we are now in a position to state die sceptical doctrine about rules. We observe diat in ... 
[the second and third scenarios] people make moves in what they talre to be routine ways, aldiough a 
novice could ask, ‘Is that player following such and such a rule?’ Since, when asked, we reply ‘Yes’, 
perhaps with explanation, we may say diat die players were following die rules. But it was possible for 
move 47 to create a situation diat was unprecedented and distinguisliing. The sceptic says, likewise -  
die sceptical ‘likewise’ — an unprecedented but distinguisliing situation could arise in any application o f  
any rule. There is never anydiing in the rules themselves that precludes diat. We do ‘go on’, but it is 
not the rules diat make us do that. It is less in the nature o f  die rules than o f  ourselves that we go on.*^
In the scenarios, the playets move blindly (at least in the phenomenological sense) tathet 
than consciously applying a rule. Furthef, the mle, as stated, is indeterminate with regard to 
its correct application but the players in the second and third scenarios do not see this. They 
could have if the situation had turned out as it did in the jSrst scenario. Their course of 
action at move 47 and on settles the ambiguity (it is not the case that the ambiguity was 
decided one way or another or that justifying reasons settled it one way rather than another — 
there was only theic moves which went in conformity). Theit understanding o f the rule is
10 See Hacking [1985b], pp. 115-116.
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perfectly in order prior to the 1924 game, and in the second and third cases, remains 
perfectly in order after even though the ambiguity in the rule never occurred to tliem.
Hacldng notes that, prior to the 1924 game, there was no difference in the linguistic 
behaviour o f tlie players o f the second and third cases, versus that o f the players in the first 
scenario tliat would indicate tlieit course o f action at move 47. Hacldng is also inclined to 
say that there is no difference in their “brains” prior to move 47. I say, in similar fashion on 
behalf o f Wittgenstein, that there was no difference in their understanding (for the 
understanding o f a rule is evidenced in the application and in the explanations we give o f the 
rule, which are ex hypothesi indifferent in the three scenarios prior to move 47 o f the 1924 
game). The rule (concerning draws in chess) was indeterminate. However, this need not 
imply that the indeterminacy is recognized. The indeterminacy need not arise in the 
application of a rule as it did not in the second and third cases. In the second and third cases 
we see that the players do not see the indeterminacy and so feel no need to interpret. They 
do not see the rule from the interpretative mode. They follow the rule under the reactive 
mode where they find themselves understanding the rule the same in each case (but 
differently between the two cases). But the possibility of the first case tells us that they could 
have stopped to interpret. They could have seen the rule as indeterminate at any point, or in 
any game prior or hence. But to say that they could notice the indeterminacy at any point 
does no t imply that they will (and so does not imply that they wH see their current 
understanding as at all deficient). It is not determined in our present understanding of a rule 
how we win apply it in future and unconsidered cases. This point is made by Wright in an 
off-quoted passage; “there is in our understanding of a concept no rigid, advance
Hacking [1985b], p. 118.
12 Hacking [1985b], pp. 118-119.
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determination of what is to count as its correct application.” ®^ The point is made by 
Hacking when he says that an “unprecedented and distinguished” situation may arise at any 
step for any rule (and that this is not marked in our present understanding o f the rule). The 
point to add here is that we are not any worse the wear for this lack o f determination in our 
understanding. Our application can (and usually does) go the way o f the second and third 
cases. This is to say that the lack of determination in our understanding o f a rule need not 
give cause for an interpretation (which, if  always did, would lead us to a sceptical end). It 
sounds unconvincing and unspectacular to avoid the sceptical paradox by saying that we 
could face the need to interpret at any stage (so as to deal with the underdetermination in 
our understanding of a rule) but we usually do not. And that we manage to agree in our 
application o f a rule (as in the second and third cases) by just going on with the game (for 
this just seems to jump over the issue o f the lack o f determination in our understanding o f a 
rule). And so more should be said to explain following a rule under the reactive mode.
II. vi. Bedrock - Reasons Running Out Part II
The point that our reasons must come to an end in our account o f a rule is made in the very 
first remark o f the Investigations (although Wittgenstein speaks o f explanations coming to an 
end). The point is made there that an understanding (of a rule for the use o f the word ‘five’ 
or ‘red’) which leaves no room for further questioning or doubt (i.e., a fully justified 
understanding o f a rule) is not required for us to follow a rule. Further questions can be 
raised but that need not matter; Wittgenstein notes, in the same remark, “N o such thing was 
in question here.” (PI 1)
" Wright [1980], p. 21.
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The point at which we m n out o f reasons in justifying an application o f a rule is 
described by Wittgenstein famously as ‘bedrock’. He says, “If  I have exliausted the 
justifications I  have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 
“This is simply what I do.” (PI 217), This description o f bedrock, as the point where 
justification is exhausted, offers a touching-point between the reactive and interpretative 
modes o f rationality. I f  justification is exhausted when we reach bedrock then our attempts 
to understand in the interpretative mode finds its end here. The inclination, at this same 
point, to say “This is simply what I do” is thereby a tell-tale marker of operating under the 
reactive mode; diat is, the expression is not idle: it signals that the required mode of 
understanding, under which the rule-following behaviour wH make sense, is the reactive. 
And so, we cannot understand why the agent follows the rule as he does (when he gets to 
the point where he runs out o f reasons and says “this is simply what I do”) fiom  the 
interpretative mode (for under diis mode the behaviour wiU. continue to seem 
underdetermined, unjustified and arbitrary). Thus, if the expression “this is simply what I 
do” is not sufficient to quell the enquiry, then the questioner fads to make the switch in 
modes and so fails to adequately grasp the rule.
There has been discussion in this thesis, beginning in Chapter 2, o f basic rules.
Some rules are required for an understanding o f other rules and are thereby relatively basic 
(e.g., an understanding o f counting is required for an understanding o f addition). This view 
presumes a hierarchy o f some sort where basic rules underlie others (which themselves may 
be basic to otlier rules less basic than themselves). Granting that this liierarchy cannot 
continue downward infinitely, to ever more basic rules or levels o f rules, we arrive at the
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point o f a collection o f rules that are truly basic. An understanding o f these does not 
depend on an understanding o f still more basic rules,^ "^
This view o f basic rules has found a ready home in the notion o f “bedrock”. 
Tedrock’ has come to signify a repository o f sorts o f basic rules (indeed the word itself 
suggests the imagery o f having dug as deep as can go). Justification is exhausted at bedrock 
because there are no more levels o f rules to draw on in accounting for our understanding of 
basic rules.^® And so basic rules are the rules o f bedrock; and in tlie literature the term 
bedrock’ has been used in this way. Certainly, McDowell has tliis view o f bedrock in mind 
when he argues that there are norms at bedrock which cannot be accounted for in terms of 
physical “contingencies” that lie underneath bedrock (see the next sub-section). However, 
this view o f bedrock should not be taken for granted for Wittgenstein does not talk explicitly 
o f bedrock in diese terms. I will invest some effort into getting clearer on Wittgenstein’s use 
of the term for there is scope to tliinlc that it has been misappropriated. For Wittgenstein, 
the term bedrock’ is simply the point at which justification is exhausted. There would seem 
to be no indication that the term bedrock’ is to apply singularly to a to a base level o f rules 
lying underneath all language use. Indeed, the indication is otherwise: bedrock, the point 
where justification ends, can be arrived at different points for different rules in different 
language games. Our ability to give reasons, in the way o f justification, can find its end at 
any point when explaining our rule-foUowing practice. We naay find ourselves saying “that is 
simply what I do” at different points for different rules (and differently for different
Note, we may admit Üiat we reach a level o f basic rules whose understanding does not presuppose a further 
level o f rules, and so stem a regress, while stül also admit a circularity in our understanding o f  basic rules (a 
circularity at the base level). That is, Wittgenstein seems to uphold the view that to learn any rule we must 
already have some facility with rule-following and so no rule is learned independently in die first instance. 
Perhaps, basic rules must be learned collectively to some degree — or perhaps already be given or present 
collectively in some way — if  diey are to be understood at all.
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individuals) and this need not make reference to a fundamental level o f basic rules. And so 
tliere is an arbitrariness to where bedrock wiU be encountered for a given rule iti a given 
situation and this belies the view o f bedrock as a fundamental level.
Nevertheless, a good case is available that Wittgenstein uses bedrock’ in this 
fundamental sense. Aside from the imagery that the term evokes is the distinction 
Wittgenstein makes between language games and language (as in “the language”). This 
distinction pairs up with the distinction between forms o f life and the form o f life (i.e. the 
human form o f life). There is debate in the Hterature^^ as to whether Wittgenstein intends 
for there to be many forms o f life or one (for he discusses it in both ways, even given the 
lack o f remarks where the term is explicitly mentioned). I do not believe this to be an 
inconsistency on Wittgenstein’s part for I think that he intends for both senses to have play 
(i.e., there is one human form o f life and different forms o f life we humans can take part in). 
The association o f form(s) o f life with language game(s) makes it clearer that Wittgenstein 
intends for the term to apply in both senses. Consider the following remark where he first 
defines language game’ in the PI:
We can. also tliiiik o f  the whole piocess o f using words in (2) [the first “slab” language game remark in 
die PI\ as one o f  those games by means o f wliich children learn their native language. I will call these 
games “language-games” and wiU sometimes speak o f  a primitive language as a language game.
And die processes o f naming die stones and o f repeating words after someone might also be 
called language-games. Think o f  much o f  the use o f  words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.
I shall also call the whole, consisting o f  language and the actions into which it is woven, the 
“language game”. (PIT)
Tliis remark not only brings out the distinction between the language game and the language 
games which comprise it but also the association between language and form(s) o f life (for
Again, we may admit that an understanding o f  any particular basic rule requkes an understanding o f odier 
basic rules — and so admit a holistic view o f  basic rules -  witiiout impljting a fiudier level o f  basic rules. See 
above note.
See Garver [1994], Ch. 15 especially.
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the language game consists o f language and tlie actions into which it is woven i.e., and the 
foim(s) o f life into which it is woven). A similar point is also made by Wittgenstein in an 
analogy between language and a city: language games compare to parts o f a city (some 
newer, some older) while the city is the language: “Our language can be seen as an ancient 
city: a maze of little streets and squares, o f old and new houses, and of houses with additions 
from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude o f new boroughs with straight 
regular streets and uniform houses.” (P J18) And so there are different language games (and 
different forms o f life) that can be all be understood (in principle) for they are all part of the 
language (and the form of life). Creatures that do not partake of our language or form o f life 
(in this grander sense) are beyond our comprehension (e.g., “If  a lion could talk, we could 
not understand him” says Wittgenstein [PI II p. 223]). This thought is also behind 
Wittgenstein’s remark (PJ 250) that a dog cannot simulate pain to us: to thinlc o f him as 
simulating para is already to interpret his behaviour in terms o f the human form of life or 
language.
Seen in this light, there is a bedrock for any given language game (i.e., a point at 
which we run out o f reasons to justify why we follow a rule as we do) and a bedrock, in the 
sense o f a fundamental repository o f basic rules, that underlies our understanding of 
language in general. In this latter sense, the basic rules need not be rules for any possible 
language but rather, any possible language that we can come to understand.^^ And so 
bedrock’ would seem to have a use in its fundamental sense that is not unfaithful to the text 
(even tliough this is not indicated in the famous remark (PJ 217) quoted at the start of this
I.e., a language o f  tlie human fom i o f life — after all, if  a lion were to have a language we could not 
understand him, says Wittgenstein, and so we should not be able to say what are rules for a language outside o f  
our form o f life.
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section). The purpose o f this exegetical aside was to confirm just this point (for this is the 
view o f bedrock I will also work with).
W hen we hit bedrock, and exhaust justification, then if we remain in the 
interpretative mode, we will have to interpret (for the reasons given do not determine/justify 
a course of action). But this is no t going to help us to follow a rule for, by the definition o f 
bedrock, we have run out o f reasons that can enter to support an interpretation. To follow a 
rule when bedrock is hit requires that we must novr proceed blindly for there are no more 
justifying reasons even were we to consider them. But if all we had is the interpretative 
mode at this point then our rule-foEowing behaviour at tlie point o f bedrock would not be 
rational (for, by the definition o f bedrock, justification ends and therefore so does our ability 
to understand under the interpretative mode). But we will always hit bedrock in our attempts 
to justify our rule-following behaviour and so we will always hit a point where our rule- 
following behaviour may come to seem arbitrary (and this can be taken as an admission that 
we are no longer following rules, for to act arbitrarily is to not be guided).^® To repeat a 
point made above, if there is to be rationality at all in rule-following then there must be 
another mode or standard o f rationality other than the interpretative.^^ Two further points 
are available here. First, since justification is exhausted at bedrock, an understanding of 
bedrock rules or basic rules is the sole propriety of the reactive mode. Second, 
understanding under the reactive mode is prior in our language learning. The second point 
follows from the first. Initial language learning proceeds under the reactive mode for initial 
language learning must involve a learning o f basic rules (for they are presupposed in our 
understanding o f otlier rules). Wittgenstein supports just this when, for example, he says
The general point here, o f  course, is the sceptical one that rule-following strictly under tlie interpretative 
mode leads to paradox.
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that ostensive définitions, used in the instruction o f basic concepts, can be ‘Variously 
interpreted in every case” (PJ 28) for this argues that we cannot leam the meaning of a word 
through an ostensive definition under the interpretative mode. The language initiate must be 
able to understand from under the reactive mode if he is to learn language from ostensive 
definitions or to leam language at all/®
Wittgenstein’s contention that learning the meaning of any one word (say through an 
ostensive definition) presupposes a certain mastery o f language should not be read as saying 
tliat learning a language presupposes that we already have a language (which, o f course, 
would be a circular account o f language learning. This reading is prey to the Augustinian 
conception which assumes that the language initiate is already vested with linguistic skill such 
that he can learn from ostensive definitions as a simple matter o f picking up vocabulary. 
Wittgenstein affirms, “Augustine describes the learning o f human language as if  tlie child 
came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if 
it already had a language, only not this one. O r again: as if the child could already think, 
only not yet speak. And “think” would here mean something lilie “talk to itself’.” (PJ 32) 
Rather, the proper way o f reading Wittgenstein’s contention that we must have a certain 
linguistic mastery or proficiency to leam from an ostensive definition is that we must have a 
“mastery” o f what it is to follow or understand a rule under the reactive mode, Ostensive 
definitions are open to interpretation (see PJ 28) and so understanding under the 
interpretative mode cannot settle on the correct way to understand an ostensive definition.
Wittgenstein recommends that we need not be under tlie interpretative mode to “feel” rational if  we could 
just “recognize the ground diat lies before us as the ground.” (RFM V I 31)
20 Tliere is a common, but perhaps not putative, view that rules o f  logical inference are the rules o f  reason and 
consequently, rational behaviour is ultimately defined in terms o f following tliese rules (these logical rules 
underline rationality). It is worth pointing out that the positions defended in, tliis chapter do not clash with the 
view diat logical rules hold this special place. At issue here is what it is to follow such rules: do we interpret 
diese rules and dieir instructions or do we follow them in some other way (as per the reactive mode). Tlie
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It is in virtue of being able to grasp a rule “reactively” or “blindly” that we are able to grasp 
an ostensive definition witliout falling victim to deviant interpretations/^
Grasping a rule in the reactive mode has been described as grasping a rule in a way 
that does not involve interpreting. I t is a way of grasping and following a rule characterised 
as no t requiring an appeal to reasons, or at least, if  reasons are involved in the consideration 
of how to follow the rule, those reasons will give out short of justifying the course o f action 
adopted. And hence, following a rule under the reactive mode would seem to involve an 
epistemic leap from reasons that underdetermine the correct way to follow a rule to an 
understanding o f the correct way to follow a rule. I t  is the involvement o f this epistemic 
leap that is the basis for calling this *%lind” rule-foEowing in an epistemic sense. BHnd rule- 
following, which is to follow a rule under the reactive mode, seems epistemicaUy arbitrary 
and unjustified from the perspective where the correct way to follow a rule must be seen to 
be correct against all other consistent interpretations; fi:om this perspective, to follow a rule 
blindly is not to proceed rationally. But again, if  we could not respond in a rational manner 
to underdetermining reasons and instructions, and so come to understand how to follow a 
rule from these reasons and instructions without interpreting, then by work o f the sceptical 
argument (i.e., the Sceptical-Inductive argument), there would be no rule-following. One 
and the same rule, as in the chess illustration above, can come to be seen as indeterminate — 
and so incapable o f being followed until the indeterminacy is settled along some 
interpretation — or it can be seen with ignorance o f any indeterminacy — and so followed
answer given for basic rules (which should surely include inference rules) is that they are grasped under die 
reactive mode.
The reading o f Wittgenstein, as arguing that we must have a language to learn a language, is upheld by Fodor 
who finds it supportive o f  his language o f  thought’ hypodiesis. See Fodor [1975].
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without need o f interpretation. Depending on how the rule is seen (i.e., as indeterminate or 
not), different rational responses will be in order.^
Whüe blind rule-following behaviour, by its very blindness in the epistemic sense, 
escapes full justification, we can nevertheless speak o f proceeding rightly rather than wrongly 
in following a rule blindly. That is to say, there are two rational standards or modes 
operative here: one by which we admit that we cannot fully justify or vindicate blind rule- 
following practice and anotlier by which we can still speak of proceeding rightly rather than 
wrongly in following a rule blindly. We may add tliat, were we to be without means to 
distinguish between proceeding rightly rather tlian wrongly when we lack justification for 
following a rule as we do when we follow a rule blindly, then we would be unable to save 
blind rule-following fcom the criticism levelled in Chapter 2 against following a rule by 
intuition. That is, it was there argued that in cases o f following an intuition, we cannot 
distinguish between proceeding rightly versus it just seeming to us tliat we do so (and so 
intuition-following is likened to private rule-following — see Chapter 2 for details o f this 
argument); further, as the criticism continues, there can be no intuition-foUowing (or private 
rule-following) where this distinction is lacking. This is a private language argument style 
objection. The availability o f this distinction (and so the deflection o f this sort o f objection) 
in the blind rule-following case (where, admittedly, justification — and so the sense of 
rightness o f being justified — is not on offer) is made possible by an appreciation o f a sense 
o f righmess, different than that involved witii justification, that is characteristic o f what I 
have chosen to call the ‘reactive mode or standard o f rationality’. This alternative sense of
22 And o f  course, to not “see” this indeterminacy is to be **bUnd” to it. Tliis is to say tliat aldiough our 
understanding is underdetermined, this does not manifest as an understanding o f  the rule as indeterminate.
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rightness in rule-following enables us to maintain a distinction with epistemic import 
between blind rule-following and following a rule by intuition.^
II. vii. McDowell and Bedrock/Sub-Bediock
A t this point, I wiU present a discussion o f the bearing of basic human physical and 
psychological propensities and other non-normative considerations on our common 
application of rules at bedrock. McDowell labels the collection o f these common 
propensities (“a web o f facts about behaviour and ‘inner’ episodes, describable without the 
notion o f meaning” "^^) as ‘sub-bedrock’. I wÜl work with an understanding o f sub-bedrock 
that is likely more broad than, albeit still largely inclusive of, what McDowell has in mind 
and this is for reason o f working with a more clearly formed notion. This does not 
undermine an attempt to criticise McDowell’s position for reason that the understanding 
remains common in its essentials: basic non-normative and contingent facts about human 
beings. I will talce sub-bedrock to be the collection of basic non-normative facts tiiat human 
beings share in virtue o f living in similar environments, societies, and sharing similar bodies 
with similar propensities and needs and similar perceptual apparatus. In  other words, sub­
bedrock is the region o f  investigation o f the natural and social sciences as it bears on human 
beings.^^ This account leaves us better placed for a clearer discussion o f whether bedrock 
can be understood in terms o f sub-bedrock. McDowell contends that the commonalities of 
bedrock (that we uniformly apply basic rules) are not amenable to a description in terms of
23 Blind ivle-foUowiag and intuition-foUowing bear a certain affinity: tiiey are, or at least may be, both cases of 
blind rule-foUowing in a phenomenological sense (i.e., as involving an immediacy where reasons are not 
considered in die course o f  foUowing a rule). Hence, any difference we seek to strike must be in epistemic 
ground and it is die recognition o f  proceeding righdy radier than wrongly under the reactive mode diat aUows 
us to strike dûs difference.
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sub-bedrock cotntnonalities/^ The basic thought is that an account o f bedrock in terms of 
sub-bedrock propensities to act does not provide us with a sufficient basis for our 
expectations that the application of rules by others will be in step with ours (i.e., that we wiU 
agree in judgement); my understanding of others and how they apply rules would be on a 
“precarious” inductive footing insufficient to justify my judgements that we proceed in step 
and understand each other. McDowell affirms, “coming to see the contingencies of 
resemblances, at this level [i.e., at sub-bedrock], on which meanings rests is supposed to 
induce appreciation that Imowledge o f another person’s pattern could at best be inductive.”^^  
According to McDowell, bedrock is ineliminably normative: rules and rule-fbUowing 
are o f the essence o f bedrock. Bedrock is “the deepest level at which we may sensibly 
contemplate the place of language in the world.” ®^ McDoweU borrows the following 
quotation from Wittgenstein to malce his point: “following according to the rule is 
FUNDAMENTAL to our language game.”^^  (RFM  V I 28) The thought here is in line with 
the view o f bedrock I have established as signifying a level of basic rules (a repository o f 
sorts of basic rules). Sub-bedrock, in contrast, is no t normative. McDoweU elaborates the 
point when he describes the commonalities o f sub-bedrock as continent. There is no 
guarantee that a contingent event will happen and so there is no guarantee that we will 
commonly apply rules at bedrock if this is based on contingently obtaining happenings at
24 McDowell [1984], p. 348.
25 Facts about our human form o f  life, in other words.
2<> I do agree witli the importance placed on the notion o f common application o f rules at bedrock. We see 
Wittgenstein lùghlight the importance o f  this notion, which he characterizes as ‘agreement in judgement’, in PI 
242 where he describes it as necessary for tlie possibility o f  linguistic communication. I will conduct a fairly 
sustained elaboration and discussion o f  this notion tlirough Sections IV to VI o f this chapter (and explain how 
rule-following in the reactive mode serves to achieve agreement in judgement). In this section I disagree witli 
McDoweU that sub-bedrock commonalties are not o f  use in an account o f agreement in judgement in basic 
rules.
27 McDoweU [1984], p. 349.
28 McDoweU [1984], p. 341.
29 In McDoweU [1984], p. 350.
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sub-bedrock. But, to press McDowell’s view here, this is a guarantee that we need if we are 
to be assured that we proceed iii step with others in applying basic or bedrock rules. A t best, 
the obtaining o f commonalities at sub-bedrock gives us inductive grounds for our belief that 
we proceed in step; however, as McDowell indicates (in the passage in the paragraph just 
above), inductive grounds is no grounds in this case.
The characterisation, by McDowell, o f sub-bedrock as contingent and as offering 
only an inductive footing draws out one side o f the contrast between sub-bedrock and 
bedrock that McDowell seeks to make. The other side, that which characterises bedrock, is 
the sense that we operate under shared constraints when we follow rules at bedrock. That is, 
the crucial difference between the two levels is expressed by McDowell in terms of “the idea 
that mutual understanding is mutual knowledge o f shared commitments.” ®^ The noimativity 
o f bedrock involves this sense o f shared commitments. We have a shared understanding of 
how rules, especially basic or bedrock rules, are to be applied and this is the underpinning of 
linguistic interaction. But according to McDowell, this sense of shared commitments 
between individuals, at the basic level, is not sufficiently accounted for by the happenings in 
individual psyches or the propensities and dispositions o f individual’s bodies, i.e., the 
“contingencies”, that may lie underneath this basic level in any individual. Thus, McDowell 
concludes, sub-bedrock commonalities cannot provide a sufficient underpinning for 
linguistic interaction (these commonalities need not obtain, and so — it is argued — they 
cannot account for the sense o f operating under a shared constraint at bedrock, for if we felt 
that we need not be following a rule as we do at bedrock, or that others may not be 
following rules as we do at bedrock, then the sense o f shared constraint at bedrock would 
dematerialise). Hence, McDowell insists that a sharp distinction be upheld between bedrock
30 McDowell [1984], p. 349.
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and sub-bedtock if the normativity o f bedrock is to be maintained (and a natural way to 
thinlt o f this sharp distinction is as a resistance to a programme of reduction).
The attempt to account for bedrock from sub-bedrock is, as McDowell describes, a 
“leaching out o f norms from our picture o f ‘bedrock’.”^^  In his view, this attempt conflicts 
expressly with Wittgenstein’s warning not to tty to dig below bedrock; to “recognize the 
ground that lies before us as the ground.” (RFM VI 31) This is an attempt that McDowell 
ascribes to Wright and he describes this as follows:
The pictute Wright offers is, at the basic level, a picture o f  human beings vocalising in certain ways in 
response to objects, with this behaviour (no doubt) accompanied by such ‘inner’ phenomena as feelings 
o f  constraint, or convictions o f  tlie rightness o f what they are saying.. ..But at tiiis basic level there is no 
question o f  shared commitments — o f tire behaviour, and the associated aspects o f  the streams o f  
consciousness, being subject to the autliority o f  anytliing outside themselves. (‘For the community 
itself there is no authority, so no standard to meet’: Wright [1980], p. 220). How then can we be 
entitled to view tlie behaviour as involving, say, calling tliis ‘yellow’, rather tlian a mere brute sounding 
of£?32
Leaving aside the question o f whether McDowell has Wright’s position exegetically on the 
bone, there is a sense in which McDowell is right: the sense of shared commitments, as he 
sees ity is not sufficiently accounted for by the “brute” goings on at sub-bedrock. But there 
are difficulties in his formulation o f the problematic. The matter can be traced to a disregard 
o f the underdetermination o f our understanding o f a rule and may be seen more clearly by 
bringing into context the reactive and interpretative modes of rationality. McDowell’s 
insistence on the separation o f levels can be taken as an insistence that our sense o f 
operating under the reactive mode (wlrich leads us to apply rules commonly) is not 
susceptible to an account in sub-bedrock terms. But this sense o f shared commitment, as 
present when operating under the reactive mode, does not have the stability that McDowell
34 McDowell [1984], p. 341. 
32 McDowell [1984], p. 336.
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affords it for it remains a possibility that we may switch to the interpretative mode for our 
understanding o f a rule/^
To elaborate, McDowell, in his sustained criticism of the role o f interpretation in 
rule-following, neglects tliat interpretation does have a role. McDowell reads passages lilre 
“A doubt was possible in certain circumstances. But that is not to say that I did doubt, or 
even could doubt.” (PI 213) and “there is a way o f grasping a rule which is m f an 
interpretatiorl^ (PI 201) in a single-minded way. That is, he neglects that these passages leave 
open a role for interpretation and doubt in our rule-following practice. Further to this 
exegetical point is the philosophical point that this role for interpretation is a facet of the 
underdetermination o f our understanding o f a rule (for this underdetermination tells us that 
indefinitely many courses of action can be interpreted to be in accord with what we 
understand o f a rule — i,e., instructions and explanations). The underdetermination of our 
understanding is a reason for finding the interpretative view of what it is to understand a rule 
compelling, and so to deny any role for interpretation in our grasp and following of rules is 
to deny the weight of this reason.^"  ^ What is needed is not an account that denies a role for 
interpretation but one that — and this is clearly to be in line with the maxim espoused by 
Wittgenstein in PI 201 — nevertheless admits that “there is a way o f grasping a rule which is 
not an intejpntationP That is, to say that there is a way o f grasping a rule that is not an 
interpretation does not deny that that there is a way of grasping a rule that is an 
interpretation (it only denies that this is the only way). But if  interpretation can have a role 
in our grasp of rules, including basic or bedrock rules, then our grasp o f these rules is not 
beyond the possibility o f doubt (for we may feel that these rules can be interpreted and
33 The tule for sameness excepted. See Section V. below for details.
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followed differently); but this means that the sense o f shared commitment at bedrock is not 
as stable or secured as it is made out to be. The possibility of doubt or interpretation 
remains due to the underdetermination o f our understanding of a rule. The fact that we 
nevertheless do not doubt or interpret — again, especially in basic cases — is due to our being 
able to follow a rule despite this underdetermination, and this is a matter o f our being able to 
follow a rule blindly or reactively. Being able to follow a rule blindly or reactively does not 
require determination in our understanding o f a rule; to die contrary, it involves our being 
able to follow a rule despite this lack o f determination.^^
According to McDowell, die normadvity at bedrock — the sense o f shared 
commitment that ensures that we commonly apply basic rules — is plainly no t secured by the 
indeterminacy and contingency diat characterises the happenings at sub-bedrock.
However, any account, any explanation, we can give for why we follow a rule as we do — 
basic or not — cannot determine a particular course o f action to uniqueness (this is a facet of 
the underdetermination o f our understanding o f a rule) and so we should no t take it as a 
failing o f any sub-bedrock account that it also cannot offer a determinative account of why 
we follow rules as we do at bedrock (i.e., an account that discounts the possibility of 
someone deviating hke the deviant pupil). We do not cast off insttuctions and explanations
34 The reductio reading o f the sceptical paradox does not deny a role for interpretation in our understanding of 
a rule, but only an exclusive role, and so does not deny that the underdetermination o f  our understanding 
remains as a reason for finding the interpretative view compelling.
35 In McDowell’s view, it would seem, blind rule-following should not be possible because it faces the inductive 
threat (and presumes that we can make tlie epistemic leap) o f proceeding from an understanding o f  
underdetermining instructions — tliat can be interpreted in indefinitely many ways — to an understanding o f  a 
correct and unique way o f  following a rule. Recall that McDowell criticizes sub-bedrock accounts for the 
reason tliat they give us at best an inductive footing for the belief that we proceed in step in our application o f  
basic rules. But we see diat, due to the underdetermination o f our understanding, it would appear diat we have 
at best an inductive footing for our grasp o f any rule. I f  die direat o f an inductive footing is grounds for 
denying normativity, then normadvity is lost as soon as we admit diat our understanding o f  any rule does not 
transcend an understanding o f underdetermining instructions. Thus, McDowell does not save rule-following 
(and the normativity o f  bedrock) by denying the legitimacy o f  sub-bedrock accounts o f  our common 
application o f basic rules; radier, he avoids providing die account — o f  blind rule-fbUowing — that would serve 
to explain how we are able to follow rules despite diese looming inductive direats.
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as ktelevatit to our common midetstanding and application o f bedrock rules for reason that 
they cannot provide a fully determined understanding (and so account for the sense of 
shared commitment at bedrock in this way). That is to say, our following a common set o f 
instructions in a rule can serve to e3q>lain why we commonly apply that rule even though 
these instructions underdetermine the rule (even though someone may come to “follow” 
those instructions as the deviant pupil followed the instructions given to him for add-2), 
lilcewise, we should not cast off sub-bedrock accounts o f bedrock for reason that the 
“contingency” that characterises happenings at sub-bedrock cannot offer a determinative 
view — one that discounts the possibility o f deviation — o f the conformity o f application that 
characterises rule-following at bedrock.^*^
At any rate, we may make two points about determination (or the lack thereof) in 
connection to bedrock and sub-bedrock. First, bedrock does not have the stability (with 
regard to our common understanding o f basic rules) that McDowell would grant if^ and 
second, and in consequence, it is not a failure o f any sub-bedrock account o f our rule- 
following practices that it cannot account for this stability (i.e., that it cannot provide for the 
determination in our understanding o f basic rules). That is, since our understanding of any 
rule is not of it as fully detemuned, a sub-bedrock account need not aspire to a determinative 
account o f our rule-following practices in the first place (for this would seek what is not
We may describe tlie diffeience between McDowell and tlie account given herein, in a nutshell, as one o f  
paying due respect to sceptical considerations (viz., the underdetermination o f  our understanding o f  a rule), and 
trying to show that rule-foUowing is nevertlieless not undermined, and denying any import to diese sceptical 
considerations (and tliereby showing that rule-foUowing is not undermined).
37 Tlie underdetermination o f our understanding o f  any rule places our understanding o f  any rule — including 
basic or bedrock rules — under inductive threat. Thus, our expectation that we proceed in step in applying 
bedrock rules remains under die tiireat o f an “inductive footing” whether or not we turn to a sub-bedrock 
account (i.e., whetiier or not we seek an account o f  bedrock in terms o f the “contingencies” o f  happenings at 
sub-bedrock). Again, what is needed is an account — o f  foUowing a rule blindly — that does not seek to 
abrogate tliis inductive threat (for we would not seem to proceed “blindly” i f  this threat was, in the least, not 
apparent) but aUows for rule-foUowing, even at tlie base level, in spite o f  this tlireat. McDoweU seems to have 
shut himself o ff from such an account.
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there to be found); something less is in order and this is an explanation o f these practices. I 
will elaborate the latter point. Consider die over-worked deviant pupd o f PI 185. A sub­
bedrock account o f the pupil’s understanding of the rule add-2 does not determine that the 
pupil WÜ1 deviate (or that we do not). But this is because there is no determination in die 
understanding (either in the pupil’s or ours) as to whether there will be a deviant application. 
And so, a determinative account o f our understanding of rules should not be the objective 
nor a criterion o f success. Rather, we should accept that a sub-bedrock account should serve 
to explain why we apply rules commonly at bedrock. The possibility o f deviation need not 
indicate a failure o f die explanation for explanations do not endeavour towards being 
determinative accounts.
This point may be expressed differendy. Given our definition o f bedrock (as the 
point in the course o f justification where reasons run out), we have no justification for why 
we follow rules as we do at bedrock. As I have read it, this is to say that we cannot offer a 
deterrninative account for why we follow rules as we do at bedrock (i.e., an account that can 
determine an interpretation to the exclusion o f others). This is what we should expect if  we 
accept the point that our understanding of any rule is underdetermined (for we cannot have 
an account that shows the full application o f a rule to be determined in our understanding 
because it is not). McDowell accepts this definition o f bedrock while he also accepts that a 
sub-bedrock account does not justify (i.e., offer a determinative account of) our belief that 
we commonly understand how to apply a rule at bedrock. But a sub-bedrock account 
cannot justify this belief or understanding, no t merely because it appeals to “contingent” 
facts about ourselves, but because no account can take on the task o f justification. 
McDowell does not give due weight to the point that the understanding o f any rule is 
underdetermined, and so he does not reahse that this serves to explain why attempts to
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justify the understanding of a rule do not succeed, i.e., why reasons run out at bedrock. 
Consequently, he lays too much on the shoulders o f normative constraints and senses o f 
social commitments to muscle our understanding into being determinative o f our application 
o f a rule.
An appeal to sub-bedrock considerations, for instance, an appeal to considerations 
o f human biology or o f human evolution, can serve to explain why we apply rules commonly. 
For example. Baker and Hacker note tliat “cats do not look in the direction we point, but at 
the hand; we humans look in the direction o f the pointing hand.” ®^ Presumably, there is 
some measure of biological or evolutionary explanation for tliis but it clearly would not 
aspire to say that it is determined that we will follow the rule for pointing in this way. We 
see Wittgenstein make similar points. For instance, he directs us to facts about our natural 
history as explanatory o f our form of life (i.e., as explaining why we understand and apply 
basic rules as we do). W hen he contrasts a human form of hfe to a lion’s (so as to say that if 
a lion could tallr we would not be able to understand him) he makes a point that a different 
biological system (with different needs, which operates in different environmental 
conditions) is grounds for claiming that there is no common basis for an understanding of 
basic rules. But this is to bring in sub-bedrock considerations into our explanation o f our 
common application o f bedrock rules. Further, Wittgenstein affirms that even 
psychoanalysis, among otlier psychological accounts, can serve in an (of course non­
determinative) account of our intentional behaviour (c.£, P I II p. 215). More pointedly, 
Wittgenstein notes that if we want to understand how it is that we could apply basic rules 
differently than we do, we need only imagine that basic facts about ourselves or our 
environments were different. He states, “If  anyone believes that certain concepts are
Baker and Hacker [1985], p. 233,
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absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing 
something that we aU realize — then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be 
different from what we are used to, and the formation o f concepts different from the usual 
ones WÜl become intelligible to him.” (PI II, p. 230) Indeed, Wittgenstein’s different 
illustrations of language games can be taken as an exercise o f just this prescribed 
methodology. And so, once we see that sub-bedrock considerations need only explain then 
there is no reason not to turn to these considerations to gain some understanding of why we 
commonly apply basic rules. An explanation o f bedrock from sub-bedrock does not destroy 
die difference in levels (nor leach bedrock o f its norms) for explanation does not aim at 
reduction or determination. Indeed, we should find it a wealmess o f Wittgenstein’s views if  
naturalistic, psychoanalytic, and otlier sub-bedrock explanations were of no aid in 
understanding why we apply rules as we do (we are only barred from upholding that they 
determine that we apply rules as we do).^^
III. Stroud’s Distinction
Stroud, in his reading o f Wittgenstein (wherein he defends Wittgenstein against Dummett’s 
charge o f radical conventionalism), makes the point that we can posit and conceive o f
39 As noted, I have offered a slightly different view o f  sub-bedrock “contingencies” tlian does McDowell for he 
speaks o f  mental episodes and ideolectic landscapes as also part o f  sub-bedrock contingencies whereas I have 
focussed on a view o f  sub-bedrock as accountable under tlie physical or social sciences. In doing so I have 
opened up sub-bedrock to investigation and description which would not be so easy were we to think o f sub­
bedrock strictly in terms o f  private goings-on in the minds o f  individuals. I tliink that this is fair for the point 
to make, and that is made, is tliat basic non-normative considerations about ourselves do serve to explain (and 
need not determine) our common application o f rules at bedrock. It is also to come to grips wiüi tlie notion o f  
sub-bedrock which, especially in its reference to manifestations unavailable to all but the individual, is at once 
too quixotically described by McDowell and largely unmotivated in the text as Vdttgenstein’s own view of sub­
bedrock. Wittgenstein plainly affirms that non-normative considerations about human beings (facts abpiit the 
human form o f life if  you would) can explain (but not determine) die conformity in our rule-following . ^
behaviour. A  view o f  sub-bedrock that can serve to deny diis point dismisses a sense o f sub-bedrock that 
Wittgenstein would endorse in favour o f  one that he would not.
203
alternative logico-mathematical systems — alternative systems to those employed in our own 
way o f seeing the world — but this is not to say that we can freely adopt, decide upon, or 
even clearly comprehend these systems. These alternative systems, depicted in some of 
Wittgenstein’s examples o f alternative language games, do not involve contradictions and so 
pose no immediate threat to tlietr being possible systems; it is just that they are so foreign to 
our own ways o f doing tilings and our ways o f reasoning that we can have no clear concept 
o f them. Wittgenstein supports such a reading in the following quotation:
So much is clear: when, someone says: “I f  you follow the it «?w/be like this”, he has not any dear
concept o f  what experience would correspond to the opposite.
Or again: he has not any clear concept o f  what it would be like for it to be otherwise. And dûs is 
very important. (RFM IV 29)
Wittgenstein points out that when something strikes us as logically necessary we cannot 
clearly conceive o f its not being the case. We may think that we understand what it is to 
proceed differently (though we think it incorrect), but on closer inspection we find that we 
lack a clear concept. Alternatively, we may state the view this way: when something stdlœs 
us as logically necessary we do not view it as open to interpretation (and so we do not enter 
into the interpretative mode to understand it). This is one part o f Stroud’s reading of 
Wittgenstein as upholding a distinction between being able to have some (less than clear) 
concept and having a clear concept. This distinction lies at the heart o f Stroud’s defense of 
Wittgenstein against the charge o f radical conventionalism: we can conceive — as 
possibilities — different logical systems, different ways of representing the world (different 
forms o f  Hfe if  you would). But we can only entertain these possibiHties to an extent. We 
cannot fully envisage what it would be Hke to employ or inhabit these alternative systems; ' 
this is to lack a clear concept o f what it would be to adopt these different systems in 
actuaHty. This is a distinction between conceiving o f something as a possibility and
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conceiving of something ckary which demands that we be able to see ourselves as enacting 
this possibility. Thus, conceiving o f something clearly requires something in tlie order of 
empathy. And so Stroud’s defense against the charge o f radical conventionalism comes 
down to this: we cannot come to employ an alternative system o f logic, or an alternative 
understanding o f basic rules, for lack o f a clear conception. And tlie reason we lack a clear 
conception is tliat our current logico-mathematical system, and our current understanding of 
other basic rules, restricts what we can clearly conceive; we view these rules as necessary and 
so do not have a clear view o f  following them differently,
Stroud uses the example o f the wood-seUers to make his case. The wood-seUers are 
a community tliat measure a volume of wood by the land-surface area it occupies (and so 
two lots o f wood püed to different heights, if  they cover the same land area, are equivalent in 
volume). The wood-sellers, in contrast to the deviant pupil, present a case in which a whole 
community deviates from our normal practice in foUowiug a rule. O f them  Wittgenstein 
says.
How could I show them that — as I should say — you don’t really buy more wood i f  you buy a pile 
covering a bigger area? — I should, for instance, take a pile wliich was small by their ideas and, by laying 
the logs around, change it into a “big” one. This might convince them -  but perhaps they would say; 
“Yes, now it’s a lot o f wood and costs more” — and that would be the end o f  the matter. (RFM 1 149)
The wood-sellers, in this passage, are not convinced by Wittgenstein’s manoeuvre to 
redistribute the same volume o f wood. We would say that we could always swindle these 
people, e.g., buy a lot of wood piled high and then sell the same lot o f wood back, piled 
lower and wider and therefore covering a larger surface area, for a higher price.^® But this 
just invites the response: “So what. So they can always be swindled”. That is not to say that
40 A  similar point can also be made regarding the deviant pupil. We can imagine setting up a system o f  
exchange where he can always be swindled (e.g., we give laim $1000 plus $2 and he always returns $1004 
thinldng diat it gives the same tally).
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there cannot be such people, it is only to say that they do not act as we do. As Stroud 
observes, “surely it is not logically impossible for there to be such people: the example does 
not contain a hidden contradiction.”'^ ^
According to Stroud, the wood-sellers are a community that seems plausible to us at 
first, but on further scrutiny we come to see that they have a way o f representing the world 
that is beyond our clear conception. The wood-sellers serve to exemplify this distinction 
between conceiving of something as possible or in principle and conceiving o f something 
clearly or as possible for ourselves in fact (i.e., where we can empathise with then way o f 
seeing the world). Stroud relates:
Surely tliey would have to believe that a oue-by-six-inch board aU o f  a sudden increased in size or 
quantity when it was turned from resting on its one-inch edge to resting on its six-inch edge. And what 
would the relation between quantity and weight possibly be for such people? A  man could buy as much 
wood as he could possibly lift, only to find, upon dropping it, tliat he had just lifted more wood tlian he 
could possibly lift.. .And do these people think o f  fliemselves as shrinking when they shift from 
standing on both feet to standing on one?.. .And so on. Problems involved in understanding what it 
would be like to sell wood in this way can be multiplied indefinitely.42
It might sound a little grand to say that the wood-sellers inhabit a different form of life, but 
it is certainly the case that, as we ramify the consequences o f their beliefs about volumes o f 
wood, we see that we would not be able to share a large measure o f their beliefs about the 
world; we could not understand what it would be like to see die world as they do. There is 
an obvious bearing here on rationality. We grant a measure o f rationality to the wood-sellers 
when we find their rule-foUowing behaviour conceivable in principle or as a possibility but 
deny them another measure when we cannot find their ways clmrjy conceivable.
This connects to our dual modes o f rationality. If  a certain way o f foUowing a rule is 
taken as necessary, then, as explained earUer, we do not view it as open to interpretation —
41 Stroud [1966], p. 484.
42 Stroud [1966], p. 488.
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we do not view it as itideternrinate — and so do not understand it from under the 
interpretative mode. Thus, rules we deem as necessary are rules understood under the 
reactive mode. However, if  we are to try to rationalise someone’s deviant application o f a 
necessary rule, we cannot do so from the reactive mode (for under this mode any deviance 
in application is precisely not correct or rational). We must view die deviant behaviour from 
the interpretative m ode if  we are to understand it but, concurrendy, not view our own 
understanding from the interpretative mode. But this means that we do not obtain a clear 
conception o f the deviant behaviour for we are not looking at it as something that we could 
ourselves accept (the rule is taken as necessary and so deviance is not open to a clear 
conception). Thus, any success in understanding the deviant application will no t involve a 
clear conception. It wiU involve, at best, a conception o f the deviant act as possible in 
principle (it is not very clear what this means, but then, this is very much the point). For 
instance, we see diat we cannot clearly understand the wood-seUer’s practice for measuring 
volumes o f wood (and that this only becomes clear to us when we draw out the 
consequences of this practice for their other beliefs, as Stroud does above). But this is not 
to say that we do not or did not have any understanding o f their practice. Initially, when the 
case was presented, the system o f the wood-seHers did seem understandable although also 
peculiar and naïve. As long as we remain with this view, which does not involve a clear 
conception, we can find the wood-sellers rational (but also incorrect) in dieir application of 
the rule (i.e., as long as we do not try to establish what it would be to adopt diis pattern of 
application for ourselves — which would be to try and form a clear conception). Finding 
someone rational who applies a necessary rule differently requires viewing theit application 
under the interpretative mode but also not doing so for our own understanding o f the rule;
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that is, it requites being able to have some conception o f fheic application that is not a clear 
conception.
There is an uneasiness in the distinction that is not without its due. The distinction 
between conceiving clearly and conceiving as a principled possibility is no t stable when 
applied to rules that we uphold as necessary. Once we see that we cannot forge a clear 
conception we may feel that we have no conception of what it is to deviate in the application 
o f a necessary rule. O n an initial view, the deviant application may seem rational; but when 
the turn is made to conceive clearly, our initial conception falls away with the failure to 
conceive clearly. For instance, after Stroud points out the extent o f deviation tha t must be 
involved in the case o f the wood-seUers, we should realise that we cannot find these people 
understandable at all. A t first rational but quirlcy, they are later viewed as beyond rational 
circumspection. But now, with the failure o f a clear conception, the distinction has fallen 
away: we have no conception o f what it is to deviate in this way. It is with necessary rules 
that we cannot clearly conceive o f a deviant application, and so it is with necessary rules that 
the noted distinction dissolves when the attempt is made to conceive clearly. But notice, 
prior to the attempt to conceive clearly, we did hold some conception o f the deviant 
application (we did not yet think o f it as an interpretation we could adopt, and so did not 
think o f what this would involve, but we did think o f it as a rational albeit incorrect 
interpretation o f the rule'^fy Thus, the distinction is still present in the case o f necessary 
rules — it is just that it is no t stable (we cannot hold both ends).
The point here may be made with the case o f the deviant pupil as it is with the 
wood-sellers. A t first, it seems that the deviant pupTs behaviour in following tlie rule add-2, 
although incorrect, is rational for reason that his behaviour is consistent with the instructions
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and training we gave him (his behaviour exemplifies a consistent interpretation of the 
instructions). O n closer scrutiny, we find that we do no t have a clear conception of his 
deviance. Indeed, on closer inspection, his deviance seems much more egregious than it first 
seemed. The reason is that he also differs, in virtue o f his deviance in applying the rule add- 
2, in his understanding of what it is to do the same or go on the same. As Stroud describes 
it, adding 2 is about as paradigmatic a case o f going on the same as we are likely to come by 
and so deviance in this case should indicate a deviant understanding o f what it is to do the 
same (the pupil, after ah, is presented as believing he went on in the same way in the 
remark).^ And this is a deviance o f which we can have no clear conception.'^^ Stroud malces 
his point as foUows:
But in the case o f wiiting “1002” tight after “1000” there appear to be no alternatives open to us. It 
seems impossible to understand how we could "adopt die convention” diat writing “998,1000,1004,
. . .” is going on in the same way, or taking steps o f  the same size. Surely if  writing “998,1000,1002,...’ 
is not taking steps o f  die same size, then nodiing is.^ ^
As noted earlier, since we do not have a clear conception o f what it is to deviate in 
the application of a necessary rule, we do not view our own understanding o f the rule as 
open to interpretation. This is the impediment with finding deviant behaviour, in rules we 
take to be necessary, to be rational: we do not view the rule as open to interpretation and so 
should no t find any deviant application to be a legitimate interpretation o f the rule (and so 
ultimately cannot ascribe rationality to the pupil’s behaviour on grounds tliat it is a legitimate 
interpretation o f the rule, i.e., rational as viewed under the interpretative mode). Since the 
. behaviour is not rational as viewed under the reactive mode (since it differs in its application
43 See section 11.1. above for an explanation o f  how we can hold an item o f rule-following behaviour to be both 
rational and incorrect under the interpretative mode.
44 If application is a criterion o f understanding tiien misapplication in a paradigmatic case must be a criterion o f  
a general misunderstanding.
45 See Section V  below on sameness for detail.
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from us), it is not to be viewed as rational at all. But now we see that we take back what we 
first granted to the deviant pupil: an attribution of rationality. The grounds for taking diis 
back is that we realise that we cannot have a clear conception and this is because the 
deviance is more egregious and with wider consequence than it first seemed (for instance, it 
involves a different application o f the rule îo t going on the same)\ it is a deviance we cannot see 
ourselves as exemplifying. PI 185 ultimately presents an example beyond our clear 
conception. The marvel o f it (and the wood-sellers example) is that it does not seem beyond 
our conception at first; it finds a way to wedge an unstable distinction between conceiving in 
principle or as a possibility and conceiving clearly.
I f  we have a clear conception o f a different way of following a rule then we see this 
different way as something we can adopt ourselves (we are open to understanding the rule 
under die interpretative mode). This means that we are not wedded to our way o f following 
the rule as necessary. This would be the case with rules we readily accept as conventional 
(e.g., traffic rules). Stroud’s defense against the charge o f radical conventionalism (which 
requires showing that logico-mathematical rules, and other basic rules of representation, are 
different from this obviously conventional variety) requires making the point that we cannot 
have a clear concept o f deviance in such basic cases.fThe illustrations, involving the wood- 
sellers and the deviant pupd, are meant to show just this: our understanding of the deviance 
in these cases is limited to an unclear conception; once we move to understand clearly 
(which involves looldng more closely, to the ramifications o f this deviant rule-following 
behaviour for other basic beliefs, or more generally, to see if we could accept this deviant 
rule-following behaviour for ourselves), we see that we cannot do so. That is, these 
scenarios illustrate to us this distinction between conceiving (in some way less than clearly)
45 Stroud [1966], pp. 484-5.
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and conceiving clearly for, at best, we can do the former but not the latter (for basic rules or 
rules we take to be necessary).
Given the underdetermination o f our understanding of a rule, it may seem that we 
should always be able to turn to the interpretative mode in our understanding o f a rule (and 
thus, it would seem, it is always open to interpret a rule along indefinitely many lines). But 
this admits that we can always come to doubt our current way o f following a rule. However, 
it has been expressed by Wittgenstein that altliough we can doubt, in some sense, that does 
no t mean that we do doubt or will doubt; tliat especially for basic or bedrock rules (which 
would include rules that we take to be necessary that they be followed in a certain way) we 
do no t doubt (for these are rules grasped under the reactive mode). But still, there evidently 
remains a modal tension here (and perhaps, less charitably, a contradiction) when it is 
admitted that it is nevertheless possible that rules we take to be necessary can, in some sense, 
be open to doubt or interpretation. This tension is explicit in this remark: “A doubt was 
possible in certain ckcumstances. But that is not to say that I did doubt, or even could 
doubt.” (PI 213). Here we have a view to Wittgenstein’s (conventionalist sounding position 
on necessity in an enigmatic nutshell: it is possible that we could doubt a rule, even a rule we 
take to be necessary, but that does not mean that we do doubt or even could doubt. The 
modal tension lies between admitting that doubt is “possible” in some sense (or in “certain 
circumstances”), but that this is not to say that we “could” doubt. To escape contradiction 
we should say that there is an equivocation between the senses o f ‘possible’ and ‘could’ here. 
The necessity o f a rule lies in the sense o f ‘could’ according to which the rule could not be 
doubted or variously interpreted; the conventionality or contingency in this view o f necessity 
Ues in the sense o f ‘possible’ according to which, in some sense, it is still possible to come to 
doubt or interpret the rule. I wül proceed to briefly describe, and hopefully to an extent
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explain, Wittgenstein’s thinking behind this apparent modal tension, drawing on the different 
modes o f rationality in doing so (while accepting that the account falls short o f an argument 
or defense o f this conventionalist or contingent view of necessity, which is a much more 
difficult charge). We see Stroud, with his distinction, offer a start.
Rules taken as necessary that they be followed in a certain way are rules for which we 
have no clear conception o f following differently. But still, per Stroud’s distinction, we can 
have some conception. This is illustrated with the cases o f the wood-seUers and the deviant 
pupil. In  both cases, as was described, we can entertain and rationalise the deviance, to an 
extent (for it may be a consistent interpretation o f the instructions given for the rule, as was 
the case with the deviant pupil), but once we reahse the extent o f deviation involved, we 
reahse that we cannot have a clear conception. The language games try to do by illustration 
what we should say we cannot do: take a rule we deem necessary and come to understand 
that it may be apphed differently. But again, once we reahse this, we find that we cannot 
hold a clear conception o f the wayward apphcation as an apphcation o f the rule. Stroud’s 
elaboration o f Wittgenstein’s view on necessity, and so his defense o f Wittgenstein against 
radical conventionahsm, winds up being inadequate for reason that it weighs too much on 
this distinction. That is, that we can have an unclear conception o f applying a necessary rule 
differently does not serve as an argument (or should not be taken as an argument) that the 
rule could be apphed differently, or could have been apphed differently (if only our current 
view o f the rule in question did not prohibit us from a clear conception o f the deviant 
apphcation). This lays too important a point on the back of the possibhity that we may have 
some hazy conception of applying a necessary rule differently (and further, a conception that 
falls away when we reahse that we do not have a clear conception o f applying a necessary 
rule differently).
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However, the distinction in modes o f rationality allows us to press the account at 
least a little further. O n the one hand, it should seem that it is always possible to doubt our 
current understanding o f a rule because our understanding o f any rule is underdeterrnined 
(due to underdetermining instructions). That is, from the perspective o f the interpretative 
mode, where our understanding is seen as underdetermined, there is scope for interpretation 
or doubt (a way of following a rule is seen as arbitrary for it is in contest with other 
consistent interpretations). O n the other hand, our ability to follow a rule reactively is an 
ability to follow a rule without being troubled by this underdetermination (i.e., we move 
from underdetermining instructions to an understanding o f the correct way o f following a 
rule; there is no need to interpret because the underdetermination o f our understanding 
raises no epistemic difficulty that would lead us to see a need to interpret). And so, in the 
availability o f both modes we can make sense o f how there can be a possibility for doubt but 
still a denial that there is scope for doubt. Given a set o f instructions (from which we gain 
our understanding o f a rule), under the interpretative mode, indefinitely many courses of 
action can be interpreted to be in accord (and this for reason that the instructions 
underdetermine tlie correct way to follow a rule). In contrast, the correct way to follow a 
rule can be grasped from the instructions if we are operating under the reactive mode (and 
this despite the fact that the instructions underdetermine the correct way), Tliis involves 
what is called following a rule ‘bhndly’ because we are blind to tlie epistemic difficulty that 
would seem to come with underdetermination. The modal tension, expressed in PI 213 
(quoted above), points to our being able to understand under these two modes. A doubt is 
possible because understanding under the interpretative mode is a legitimate mode under 
which we may come to grasp a rule (i.e., the “certain circumstance” under which a doubt is 
possible is the circumstance o f understanding under the interpretative mode). To say, in the
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same breath, that this does not mean tliat we could doubt reflects that the reactive mode is 
also a legitimate mode under which we may come to grasp a rule and, under the perspective 
o f this mode, a doubt is not conceivable/^
A t any rate, we can have no clear conception of applying a rule we take to be 
necessary differently. We may, though, find that we have some (unclear) conception of 
applying a necessary rule differently as long as we have not yet tried to form  a clear 
conception o f the deviance. This distinction, which I have called ‘Stroud’s distinction’, for 
reason that he lays emphasis on it in his reading of Wittgenstein, is exemplified in the cases 
o f tiie deviant pupd and the wood-sellers. In  both cases, we seem to have some 
understanding of their deviance but are denied any clear understanding (and it is in our 
failure to clearly understand the deviance that our commitment to the rule as necessary is 
displayed). Rules that are necessary, as with rules I have also described as ‘basic’ or ‘bedrock’ 
rules, are rules that are understood in the reactive mode; we do not move to the 
interpretative mode and this is to say that we do not understand them as open to 
interpretation. But we can have some (unclear) conception that is the extent o f  our 
understanding o f those who apply basic rules deviaiitly.'^ This requires understanding the 
(deviant) application o f others from under the interpretative mode but not to understand our
47 And since these ate different rational modes, we cannot hold in mind that a rule can be doubted and cannot 
be doubted at once; i.e., we cannot see a rule in both tliese ways at once since this would involve understanding 
under different rational modes at once. In addition, I will explain in Section V below that tlie rule pertaining to 
sameness or accordance cannot be understood at all from under tlie interpretative mode, despite the 
underdetermination o f our understanding, and that the same should hold o f basic or bedrock rules taken 
generally (and so not without the possibility o f  exception),
48 At some point we may feel diat our inability to clearly conceive o f an individual’s or community’s linguistic 
practices has extended to tiieir practices taken as a whole or to some large measure. In diis case, we may want 
to say diat they are o f  a different form o f life. I take this, in this usage, as somediing o f  a term o f  art for there 
does not seem to be a clear marker where deviant ways, o f  wliich we can have no clear conception, translate 
into a different form o f  life; or whether there is any set number o f  basic rules that must be so violated before 
diis characterisation is applicable. What can be said, diough, is diat ‘form o f  life’ does have a use, for 
Wittgenstein, as marking o ff  what we cannot find rational as described in terms o f  what we cannot come to 
clearly conceive. We can come to hold some conception o f alternative forms o f  life, as Wittgenstein’s examples 
try to show, but no clear conception.
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own application in this way (but, o f course, this is at least a step towards viewing our own 
understanding of the rule from the interpretative mode, and so possibly a step towards a 
revision in our understanding of the rule). A t any rate, Stroud’s distinction allows us to 
farther characterise basic or bedrock rules, along with necessary rules (and as opposed to 
rules that are not basic or necessary), as rules for which we lack a clear conception of 
applying them differently; and that this is another way o f portraying the thought that we do 
not notice the underdeterinination in our understanding o f basic or bedrock rules, Tliat is, 
we do not turn to interpret when we apply a basic rule, despite the underdetermination in 
our understanding, because we can form no clear conception of doing differently in regard 
to tlie rule/^
IV. P I  242; A Transcendental Argument Against Rule-Following Scepticism?
A key characteristic of the reactive mode o f rationality is tlie emphasis placed on agreement 
in judgement or application o f a rule (for instance, a correctness criterion for understanding 
under this mode is achieving agreement in judgement with others). In this section, I will 
investigate a strategically placed remark of Wittgenstein’s to see if it offers a transcendental 
argument to the effect that agreement in judgement or application is a transcendental 
requirement for rule-following. The reason for supposing that there is a transcendental 
argument to be had is broadly two-fold: first, the remark fits the form o f  a transcendental 
argument ratlier well and second, the remark speaks to the possibility o f rule-foHowiug in
49 Tlie play o f  Stioud’s distinction (L e-, Stroud’s description o f  Wittgenstein’s distinction) bears close 
connection to the play or movement o f  hinge propositions as discussed by Wittgenstein in 0 «  Certain^. Here 
we find propositions that stand as necessary, for we do not doubt them and can have no clear conception of  
doubting tiiem (and these propositions serve as basic or bedrock rules that underlie our use o f  other rules), but
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light of sceptical considerations raised (i,e., it seems to give an answer to the sceptic). In the 
course o f this investigation, the important notion o f agreement in judgement, and its role in 
tlie sceptical dialectic, will be further elucidated.
IV. i. The General Form
The general form of a transcendental argument is essentially that of modusponens. One thing, 
S, is an enabling condition for another thing, X, such that S is a necessary condition for the 
possibility o f X. X  is our starting point. I t  is a given. Hence, any necessary conditions o f X  
must obtain. And so S obtains. We may symbolise this as follows: D (X  —>■ S), X  I- S.
The connection between X  and S is often described as a metaphysical necessity (and 
it is in this way that transcendental arguments are thought to have conclusions that are 
synthetic apriorh by way o f reflection on our starting point, we deduce a substantial enabling 
condition). A simple example; existence is a necessary condition for thought.
A main historical feature o f transcendental arguments is that they are used to argue 
against a sceptic. They are presumed ideal for this because they take something to which 
even the sceptic agrees (e.g., that there are thoughts, or language) — an uncontroversial given 
— and by the strong necessary connection derive a consequence the sceptic would otherwise 
not agree to but to which he is now committed. Because o f this strong necessary or 
metaphysical connection, the enabling condition has tlie same surety as our starting 
condition. The necessary connection need not be a single step but can involve a chain o f 
necessary connections (but, o f course, the chain is only as strong as its weakest link).
tliey ate not in principle beyond doubt (i.e., we can conceive as a possibility that the hinge ptoposirions did not
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IV. ü. A Wittgensteiman Ttanscendental Atgument?
The remark to be scrutinised is PI 242 (the putative end, and so a conclusion in at least this 
sense, o f the rule-following remarks in the Investigation '^.
I f  language is to be a means o f  communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also 
(queer as this may sound) in judgements. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. -  It is one 
thing to describe methods o f  measurement, and another to obtain and state results o f  measurement 
But what we call “measuring” is partly determined by a certain constancy in tlie results o f  measurement. 
(PI 242)
That this remark is given as the last o f tlie cluster on rule-following invites contrasting views 
as to its reading. We may treat it as a ‘‘conclusion” that merely summarises the preceding 
argument and makes no important contribution to the dialectic by itself, or, tliat it is the 
concluding argument — the dénouement — of the rule-foUowing remarks and thereby makes a 
key contribution to the dialectic o f the rule-following considerations. Settling the status o f 
this remark, along these lines, is the thematic objective o f this section.
In this remark, the given, X, is language.^® The enabling condition, S, in this case is 
two: agreement in definitions and agreement in judgements (we may call the f o r m e r a n d  
the la tte r‘S**’ respectively). The necessary connection is as follows: if  language is to be 
possible, then there musth& agreement in definitions and agreement in judgements [ [](X —> 
(S* + S**)) ]. Since there are two enabling conditions we may treat this argument, if  so 
desited, as two transcendental arguments with two necessary connections: if  language is to 
be possible, then there must be agreement in definitions [ Q(X ->  S*) ]; and, if  a language is
hold).
50 Wittgenstein states, “What has to be accepted, the given, is — so one could say —fomis of lif i\ (Pf II, p. 226). 
For reasons given earlier, I do not distinguish an important difference between saying tliat forms o f  life are 
given and saying that language or language-games are given.
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to be possible, then there must be agreement in judgements [ Q(X —> S**) ]. Thus, talcing 
language as a given we can conclude both S* and
Now, a reminder note on scepticism. A sceptical argument with a paradoxical 
conclusion (a conclusion that claims that there is no rule-following and so no possibility of 
linguistic communication) is common to readings o f the rule-following remarks (but of 
course, there are differences among commentators as to whether Wittgenstein accepts the 
conclusion but offers an accommodation (e.g., Kripke) or whether he treats the argument as 
a redncâo against the devastating assumption that grasping a rule involves an interpretation 
(e.g., McDowell, Baker and Hacker); both these lines o f response accept that there is a 
sceptical argument though they differ as to its role — see Chapter 3 for details). Taking this in 
view, we have further basis for reading PI 242 as offering a transcendental argument for it 
would be an argument against the view o f rule-following scepticism developed and described 
in preceding remarks. That is, we have here two key reasons for finding a transcendental 
argument in PI 242: tlie form of a transcendental argument and an enabling condition that 
runs against rule-foUowing scepticism (and o f course, since the sceptical line is developed in 
the rule-foUowing remarks preceding PI 242 it is also fitting in this regard tliat the latter be 
viewed as a response to the former).
However, if we take PI 242 as offering a transcendental argument against the sceptic 
then we run into an immediate difficulty: our starting point or the given — language — begs 
the question in a very obvious way. It assumes what the sceptic denies: the possibility o f 
linguistic communication. Therefore, a charitable reading should lead us to say that
And given the metaphysical necessity, we can so conclude in any situation.
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Wittgenstein is not putting forth an argument against the sceptic in P I 242,^^ After all, the 
sceptical conclusion is rejected by treating the sceptical argument as a reductio (and this tells 
us that there is a way to grasp a rule that is no t an interpretation, despite the fact that our 
understanding o f the rule is underdetermined by instructions and explanations o f the rule). 
However, this may be short-sighted. A charitable and proper exegesis need not suppose that 
P I 242 does not present a transcendental argument simply for the reason that it begs a 
question for the same accusation can be made against other historical examples o f 
transcendental arguments. Indeed, Stroud, in an influential article on transcendental 
arguments^^ (since followed by other articles on the same topic), argues that all 
transcendental arguments beg a question against the sceptic; that they all make verificationist 
assumptions in their starting condition that need not be accepted by the sceptic. Hence, it 
should not be surprising if  PI 242 makes a question begging argument; it is only surprising 
that it should lie so open to view. '^^
I will put this issue aside for the time being and suppose that we do have a 
transcendental argument (or at least a transcendental or necessary connection). I will now 
attend to an elaboration o f the enabling conditions, specifically o f tlie notion o f agreement in 
judgement. In  saying that we must have agreement in definitions, Wittgenstein is saying that 
we must agree on the instructions or explanations we give for a rule. In  contrast, agreement 
in judgement refers to the agreement in our application o f a rule; it is agreement witli otliers 
in results (as noted, agreement in judgement stands as a correctness criterion o f following a 
rule under the reactive mode; and so a proper understanding o f this intriguingly-placed
52 And if  there is no argument against the sceptic here then there is no argument at all for, as we wiU see, it is 
the sceptical position tlrat is denied in the conclusion o f  the argument, i.e., that there must be agreement in 
judgement.
53 Stroud [1999], p. 255.
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remark should be o f consequence for a proper understanding o f what it is to grasp and 
follow a rule under the reactive mode).
On a first pass, PI 242 seems uninformative. We agree tliat to use language effectively 
to communicate with each other, we must agree on the meanings o f our terms, in how we 
teach these meanings (agreement in definitions), and that we must apply these meanings in 
the same way (agreement in judgement). The point is uncontroversial because we presume 
that our common application is determined in our common understanding o f the rules. But 
for Wittgenstein, our understanding of any rule is underdetermined. The definitions and 
explanations we give underdetermine a rule (from the case for RF2), and since our 
understanding does not transcend an understanding o f these explanations (AR**), our 
understanding is likewise underdetermined. And so, we may agree on these definitions, we 
may all say that we are following the same instructions and explanations, and still deviate in 
our application. The underdetermination in our understanding of a rule undermines the 
point that a common application (agreement in judgement) is secured by or determined in 
our common understanding of the definition or explanation o f the rule.^^ There is wide 
scope for acting under a consistent interpretation o f the explanations or definitions given for 
a rule and not achieving agreement in application. This is tlie predicament highlighted by 
the case o f tlie deviant pupil in PI 185.
54 Stroud’s general criticism o f  transcendental arguments is interesting and I had drought to present diem; but 
since PI 242 seems to fall prey to diis criticism so quickly, a discussion o f  Stroud, in diis regard, to make diis 
point would not be bear its investment.
55 Note, a likely rejoinder tliat we then cannot be understanding die definitions in the same way if  we apply the 
rule differendy, given diat correct application is the criterion o f  imderstanding, is circular. Apart from our 
application, our only means o f  expressing our understanding is in our expressions o f definitions and 
explanations (and this is die source o f  our understanding o f  a rule, by AR.**). Indeed, Wittgenstein goes 
further to say our ability to explain our understanding, in addition to how we apply it, is criterial for our 
understandiog it; “For when do I say that I see the rule — or a rule — hi this sequence? When, for example, I 
can talk to myself about dtis sequence in a particular way. But surely also when I simply can continue it? N o, I 
give myself or someone else a general explanation o f  how it is to be continued.” (RFAf VI 27) The sceptical 
point, at base, is dien that we may all agree on these definitions and explanations and still deviate in application.
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But then, on this second pass, P I 242 seems to say no more than what we discern from 
PI 185/"  ^ Let us consider tliis connection further. Both the deviant pupil o f P I 185 and the 
community/teacher attest agreement on the instructions for following the rule add-2. The 
pupd says he is following the instructions (and his behaviour is certainly consistent with an 
interpretation of the instructions) and yet he deviates in his application (he goes on to 1004 
from 1000). I f  this deviance were commonplace i.e., if we could all agree on the instructions 
but differ in how we apply any given rule, then the use o f language for communication 
would be impossible (we would all differ in the application of terms). Agreement in 
application is required for language but is in no way guaranteed by an (attested) agreement 
between individuals in the meanings of the terms or rules with which they start. Hence tlie 
difficulty. W hen any definition or set o f instructions is open to various interpretations (such 
that we may all claim to be following the same instructions), it is not determined in an 
understanding o f those instructions that we wiU commonly apply those definitions and 
instructions. So, the question is, if any set o f instructions underdetermines a rule, how is it 
that we aU come to understand and apply a rule in the same way starting from an 
understanding gained from those instructions? We want to say that something must be 
missing but this just states die obvious fliought.^^
In P I 242, Wittgenstein says “This seems to abolish logic, bu t does not do so.”
Logic seems to be abolished because it does not carry us from an agreement in the 
definitions o f rules to an agreement in their applications. If  my future application o f a rule is
55 This is exegetically interesting by itself for the reason that while PI 242 falls at the end o f the rule-following 
remarks, PI 185 is the first o f  a sustained treatment on rule-following (remarks PI 143-184 notwithstanding. 
Tliis is cause for us to find no surprise in the similarity between PI 242 and PI 185, dialectically speaking, for a 
conclusion often summarizes or crystallizes points that are first set up or delineated in an introduction. Tiiis 
suggests, or so I wiU argue, drat PI 242 does not offer a new argument but a summary o f  an argument already 
made.
57 Answers are obviously undertaken in the otlier sections but I do not enter these here so as to not interfere 
with the elaboration underway o f PI 242.
221
not determined in my present understanding o f a rule then, a common future application is 
not determined in a common understanding of a rule (i.e., in an agreement in the 
explanations and definitions o f the rule). Logic, employed here in a wider sense by 
Wittgenstein, should serve to guide us in an application of a rule; it should take us from an 
understanding o f the instructions and definitions to an application. However, if  tlie correct 
application o f a rule is not determined in our understanding o f a rule, then it seems tliat logic 
has no role to play in guiding us fiom  an understanding of a rule to a correct and unique 
application. That is, if  we cannot speak of a correct application as determined, then it seems 
we cannot spealc o f being compelled to a correct application by logic. Thus, if  a common 
correct application o f a rule is made, it would seem to be no more than a result o f luck or 
decision.^®
To continue, logic is thrown into doubt when an agreement in definitions o f rules, 
including rules o f inference, does not compel us to an agreement in an application of those 
rules. A t this point, it is a mystery how we arrive at a common application. I t is worthwhile 
to note that a tiireat to logic is arrived at one step earlier. That is, we now say that our arrival 
at a common application is not a matter of logical inference starting from an agreement on 
terms and definitions (for, as with the deviant pupil, we may agree on these definitions and 
still apply the rule differently). Logic does not do the work of carrying us from agreed upon 
premises and axioms to an agreed upon conclusion (and tiiis is because our understanding of 
the premises and axioms is underdetermined and so can be applied according to different 
interpretations). But logic is already under threat when we say that any rule is 
underdetermined by its instructions. O ur understanding of any rule (which is constrained by
5® Agreement in application by decision is radical conventionalism. When Wittgenstein states that “This seems 
to abolish logic, but does not do so” he is saying that although diis seems to commit us to radical
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an understanding of instructions — AR**) is underdetermined, and this includes rules of 
inference. But an underdetermined understanding is consistent -  that is, can be interpreted 
as consistent -  with different patterns o f application or ways of following the rule. Thus, 
once we admit that we may each apply a rule o f logic as the deviant pupil does for addition, 
although we may each expressly agree on the definitions of these logical rules, then logic 
seems lost (in the way that addition should seem lost if we admit that we may each apply the 
rule for addition as does the deviant p u p il) .H e n c e , one sense o f the loss o f logic (the sense 
just described) is shown in the deviance admitted, even for rules of logic, by the 
underdetermination in our understanding o f a rule. A second sense o f the loss o f logic is 
shown in the agreement in application that results in the face o f an underdetermined 
understanding of rules (there is no reason to expect an underdetermined understanding to 
lead us to a common application even were we to use inference rules uniformly and correctly 
— hence, if  there is a common application, we are not led there, let alone compelled, by 
logical inference).
A t any rate, on this second pass, PI 242 seems to say no more than what we already 
knew from a discerning reading of PI 185: if language is to work, we cannot all be Hke the 
deviant pupü (i.e., the deviant pupd must be deviant). The first pass reading o f PI 242 
ignored the sceptical concerns brought out in the rule-following remarks. In tlie second pass 
reading, nothing seems to be added to these sceptical considerations.
conventionalism, it does not do so. Thus, we may take the case that logic is not abolished, altiiough it may 
seem to be, as an argument against radical conventionalism (despite its lurking presence).
59 Given a view o f  arithmetic as logic, the deviance o f  the pupil o f  PI 185 already shows that rules o f logic are 
subject to sceptical doubt.
223
IV, iii. Ati Analogy with Measuring
I will now turn to an elaboration o f the analogy with measuring pointed to in PI 242/° 
Wittgenstein tells us that “what we call “measuring” is pardy determined by a certain 
constancy in results measured.” (PI 242) The case o f measuring is held to be analogous to 
(and shed light on) the notion o f agreement in judgement in a language. That is, we are told 
that in order to have language as a means of communication there must be agreement in 
definitions (of rules) and agreement in judgement (applications o f those rules). Lücewise, 
following the analogy, in order to have the “game” o f measuring, there must be agreement in 
(descriptions oi^ methods o f measuring and agreement in the results obtained. Let us 
suppose we are measuring distances.
Again, on a first pass, the point seems unproblematic. I f  we are to enjoin in the 
practice o f measuring, then we must agree on our methods of measuring (e.g., to use rigid 
metric system rulers) and we must get the same results for the same distance measured. 
Getting the same results, though, is supposed to be guaranteed by our using the same 
methods o f measuring to measure the same distance (on assumption that the world has not 
changed in any relevant respect). Lilcewise with rules, if we agree on the definition o f a rule 
(e.g., add 2) we are supposed to get the same results when we apply the rule. But, as noted 
above, rule-following considerations show us, inter alia, that we may agree on definitions but 
differ in application; our common application is not determined in our respective 
understandings o f the definitions. Whatever we say about a rule will no t determine its 
correct future application and so our obtaining the same results in applying a rule is not 
determined tiirough our agreement about what it means. The analogy is to hold widi
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measuring (even though it becomes, if  anything, intuitively less plausible). We may agree on 
the stated methods o f measuring but arrive at different results. But we should say tins is not 
possible. We feel someone must have made a mistake. If someone obtains a different result 
in measuring a distance tlian the rest o f us we will say to the person that he has made a 
mistake in applying his method of measuring. Suppose he responds by saying that he has 
not made an error and repeats his measurement and obtains the same deviant result. We 
may then say that there is something different in his method of measuring than ours. He 
responds that his method is the same as ours and describes it as such (i.e., describes it as we 
describe ours). This now seems to us an impossible state of affairs but it is essentially 
analogous to the case of the deviant pupil o f PI 185 (and lilcewise with this case, despite 
attestations o f agreement in descriptions o f methods o f measuring, we say that the deviant 
measurer does not understand what it is to measure; his deviance in application is the 
criterion by which we say that he does not understand the game of measuring)
The game of measuring requires it that we get the same results if it is to be intelligible 
to others. This is agreed. But the logic o f measuring, if we may speak o f such a thing, seems 
abolished if we suppose that the uniformity of results is not determined by our agreement in 
methods o f measuring and our applying those methods (on assumption that the world does 
not change in any relevant way while we measure in turn). There is no measuring as we 
know it if we simply decide to agree on our results in measuring some distance. The point 
that is difficult to admit is that our agreement in results is not determined in our applying 
methods o f measuring that we expressly agree as being the same (for there is no difference
50 Measimng is a favoured source o f  analogy for Wittgenstein in discussions where his views aheady seem 
conventionalist and so serve to reinforce tliis characterisation.
54 The matter may run tlie reverse course: if  two individuals get die same results but have different and 
clashing descriptions o f  their methods (e.g., one says that he lays down his rulers end-edge to end-edge but tlie
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in the definitions or descriptions of our methods). But, b y  analogy with the case o f rules 
taken generally, this is a point already established (it is not for nothing that this view is 
thought to lead to a sceptical paradox, and so its incredibility in the case o f measuring should 
not be a surprise).
Wittgenstein’s response in PI 242, by analogy, involves the claim that die “logic of 
measuring” is not abolished even though it seems to be. The feeling is that this should be 
instructive. I f  die logic o f measuring is no t abolished then it must serve to take us to an 
agreement in our results given an agreement in methods o f measuring (again, assuming 
changes in the world do not interfere in the interval). But, in keeping with the analogy, our 
understanding of any method o f measuring is underdetermined by a description of (or our 
instruction in) the method. The analogy with iule-foMowing tells us that this description is 
open to interpretation. Someone may say he understands tiiis description (such tiiat he 
measures in a manner strictiy consistent with the description) and yet deviate in his 
application. We would say that he has not understood correctly. In  a sense this is readily 
agreed. But what is it that guarantees our common understanding o f a description o f a 
method o f measuring (evidenced in our common application) if the description is always 
open to interpretation?^^ We do have an understanding of measuring distances, as given in 
our practice, but this understanding is underdetermined. To say that logic is not abolished is 
to say that our arriving at a common application from an underdetermined understanding is 
not a matter o f luck or express decision; it is to say that there is guidance in, or method to, 
our commonly applying a rule. However, the nature or source o f this guidance or method, 
in this remark, has not been elucidated.
other says that he leaves space — say die width o f  his hand — between the ends o f  the rulers), dien we say that at 
least one could not have appHed or understood his method correcdy.
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IV. iv. Conclusions
And so we notice that we are no further along with this remark. We Imew aheady that we 
were in want o f an answer explaining how we achieve conformity in application from a 
discerning reading o f PI 185. PI 242 may serve to differently express and perhaps nicely 
crystallise the problematic, and so clarify the dialectic, but it does not push the dialectic 
further. This is not to admit that answers are not available (the rest o f this chapter attempts 
just this), it is just to say that PI 242 does no t make an independent case for any. And so we 
get no further than the second-pass reading. The measuring analogy serves to place the 
problem(s) in a different context. This aids in understanding what we are up against. But 
the analogy is not a spur to our intuition in coming to a solution (rather, it seems to spur our 
intuition so that we understand the problem correctly). Moreover, the point about logic 
(that logic seems abolished but is not) seems at first to offer a key to unlocking our problem 
(perhaps due to its enigmatic presentation). But it merely identifies and reinforces that we 
do have a problem; i.e., that we do not arrive at a common solution by means o f an arbitrary 
decision or luck, that we are indeed “led”, in some way ^Ikened to a use o f logic) in virtue of 
which we apply rules commonly. But we are not given an answer explaining how we are so 
led. In other words, we are not taken further than is available in a careful reading of P J 185. 
The point that logic is, in fact, not abolished only seems to tell us that Wittgenstein does not 
intend for a solution in terms of radical conventionalism (where we decide to conform in 
our application). This is o f exegetical interest for our reading of Wittgenstein but does not
52 O f course, this is to point us to a way o f  grasping a rule, or a method o f measuring, that does not involve an 
interpretation. This is to grasp a rule under the reactive mode, as discussed in above sections.
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answer the philosophical question of how it is that logic is not abolished (and so how it is 
that radical conventionalism is avoided).
A clarified understanding of the problem is surely to step closer to a solution. The 
point here is that we take no step closer than what is already there to be clearly understood 
in PI 185. Perhaps I miss some mysterious turn o f argument in P I 242. But I do not think, 
and this is independent o f the case I have made here, that one should approach reading 
Wittgenstein in terms of solving mysterious passages. There is surely some temptation to 
see the matter in these terms, for Wittgenstein often seems to present himself enigmatically, 
but I think that it is a disservice to view his philosophy in these terms. Rather, a very careful 
reading, with an eye to argument and intention, should bare ah (or at least very much). Ah 
signs point to P I 242, as a conclusion o f the rule-fohowing remarks, as a crystallisation o f its 
main problematic. I think it does very weh at that. It is not a conclusion in the sense o f a 
climax in the argument. And so, my reading serves to deflate the importance o f PI 242. The 
notion o f agreement in judgement and how it is achieved in hght o f sceptical considerations 
raised is very important phhosophicahy but PI 242 does not answer this question; however, it 
does serve to clarify the notion and help us to see its importance (for ah o f language use 
depends on it).
There is a transcendental argument in PI 242 in terms of its form. However, this is 
not to admit that PI 242 makes a transcendental argument (or any argument). As contended 
at the outset of this section, it does not argue against the sceptic (and not just that it does so 
very badly). We are now in a position to say more. The remark only makes sense in terms 
of scepticism (or at least, under the threat o f scepticism). That is, PI 242 identifies 
conformity of apphcation o f a rule as a problem of note. However, it is only a problem in 
hght of the sceptical considerations raised. Alternatively stated, PI 242 does not deny tliat
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we have underdetermined understandiags o f rules, but rather, expresses what is needed for 
language to work in light o f this admission; i.e., we need agreement in judgement for this is 
under threat if  our understanding o f a rule is underdetermined. More pointedly in this 
regard, the remark tells us that achieving conformity o f application may seem to abolish logic 
but does not do so. But the appearance o f an abolishment of logic only makes sense in the 
sceptical context. After all, on the first pass, where scepticism was not an issue, neither was 
the abolishment o f logic (indeed, this is why the first pass is unproblematic; but it is also 
thereby an incorrect account o f PI 242). That is, if the sceptical considerations did not hold, 
then an agreement in judgement is secured in an agreement in definitions (i.e., an agreement 
in application is determined in our common understanding of a rule). Logic is not abolished 
and, more importantly here, does not even seem to be. This is the first pass reading. Once 
we take on the sceptical considerations, but nevertheless insist on a conformity of 
application, then it seems that logic is abolished for it does not seem to be in the service of 
achieving that conformity o f application (this is described above; if  it is achieved it is not 
with a use o f logic it seems, but perhaps, by a decision to conform); thh  threat to logic is a 
facet o f a sceptical reading o f PI 185. But this means that PI 242 does not argue against 
scepticism (it does not, for instance, argue for the situation as given in the first pass reading, 
ratlier, it clarifies what is needed under the presumption of those sceptical considerations. 
And so we have here, at the conclusion o f the rule-following remarks, an exegetical case for 
a sceptical reading o f the those remarks (and especially o f PI 185). Far fiom  2Lpnma fade 
argument against scepticism, we finish with exegetical support for placing importance on the 
sceptical considerations (i.e., that scepticism is a threat). And once again, this means that the 
second pass reading o f PI 242 is the correct one. Thus, although we can readily admit that 
the sceptical argument is to be read as a reductio, this does not diininish the thought that
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Wittgenstein takes die sceptical considerations as serious and deserving o f response; that we 
are still charged with the task o f explaining how it is that a rule can be grasped in a way that 
is not an interpretation and this despite being underdetermined by instructions and 
explanations. An underdetermined understanding, as explained, threatens any agreement in 
application or judgement. With die importance placed on agreement in judgement in this 
remark, Wittgenstein reinforces the view that there is a way to correcdy follow a rule from 
an underdetermined understanding; that we are not led to a sceptical conclusion because of 
it. But again, this message only makes sense if scepticism is still considered threatening.
As a closing note, I wish to note that I do not deny diat there is a transcendental 
connection promoted in PI 242. That is, agreement in judgement is held up as a necessary 
condition for the possibility o f linguistic communication. This is a point upheld for any 
possible language and so it seems a littie bit out o f character to hear o f Wittgenstein speak in 
these terms (it is certainly not a conventionalist position to lay down a condition for any 
possible language; we should not be able to understand a lion’s language, says Wittgenstein, 
but we can now nevertheless lay down a necessary condition for it). However, this is a point 
that is, in principle, available from PI 185 and its discussion o f the deviant pupil: the 
possibility o f linguistic communication requires the general impossibility o f our being like the 
deviant pupil (i.e., it requires agreement in judgement). It may not be apparent, from PI 
185, that agreement in judgement is a requirement for any possible language and not just 
ours, but this is just to say that PI 242 clarifies and states concisely points raised in PI 185.
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V. Sameness
V. i. Resolving RF3
There are two related objectives in this section. The first is to resolve difficulties raised in 
Chapter 2 concerning RF3. It was argued that RF2 implies RF3 if RF2 is true o f very basic 
cases o f rules (and specifically o f the rule pertaining to sameness, i.e., if  indefinitely many 
courses o f action can be interpreted to accord with this rule or the instructions for this rule). 
I will argue here that RF2 is not true o f the rule for sameness (and in a related fashion, of 
basic rules taken generally). That is, RF3 does not hold because (at least) the rule for 
sameness cannot be understood as open to interpretation; it must be understood fiom  under 
the reactive mode only. This wdl allow us to avert the sceptical conclusion o f the Sceptical- 
Conceptual argument first presented in Chapter 2. The second objective, and the main, is to 
conduct an investigation into Wittgenstein’s understanding of the notion o f sameness. This 
win be put to the service o f the first objective bu t wiU also draw connections with the main 
preoccupations o f tiiis chapter (viz., to add to our understanding o f what it is to achieve 
agreement in judgement or application and hence, to our understanding o f foUowing a rule 
under the reactive mode).
According to RF2, indefinitely many courses o f action can be interpreted to accord 
with a rule. Accordingly, if  understanding a rule involves interpreting, then foUowing a rule 
requires facing and choosing among indefinitely many courses o f action. The Sceptical- 
Inductive argument works by arguing for a role, for interpretation; that the 
underdetermination in our understanding o f a rule or set o f instructions requires a role for 
interpretation. In  contrast to RF2, according to RF3 any or every course o f action can be
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interpreted to accord with a rule. As described in Chapter 2, if RF3 holds, then by the 
working o f tlie Sceptical-Conceptual argument, tliere is no rule following. And as also 
described in Chapter 2, if RF2 is true o f very basic cases o f rules, and specifically of the rule 
pertaining to sameness, then RF2 implies RF3. ^
I t may be thought, as per the master thesis, that if  there is a way o f grasping a rule 
that is not an interpretation (which is what I have called grasping a rule under the reactive 
mode), then this is enough to reject a sceptical conclusion as following from RF3 (for RF3 
claims not that any or every course o f action is in accord with a rule but can be interpnteà to be 
in accord). Thus, it would seem, as long as there is a way to understand a rule that does not 
involve interpretation, we do not face the result that any or every course o f action can strike 
us as in accord with a rule (and so it should not matter whether RF3 is true or not as long as 
there is a way to grasp rules without interpreting.
531 have described, in Chapter 2, that we approach RF3 as we move to ever more basic rules and find tliem 
open to interpretation along indefinitely many lines (we approach RP3 because tlie rules which presuppose an 
understanding o f  tliese basic rules are opened to a wider range o f  consistent interpretations if  the presupposed 
understanding o f the basic rules is also open to interpretation). Tlie diought dien is that when we get to the 
most basic o f  rules, a correct understanding o f  which is presupposed in an understanding o f  all odier rules, and 
find diis or diese open to interpretation along indefinitely many lines (i.e., i f  RF2 is true for tiiese rules) dien we 
hit RF3 (or at least, RF3 is true for every rule diat presupposes these most basic rules).
And, separately, I have made the point explicitiy for sameness or accordance, arguing that if  tiiis rule 
is opened to interpretation, dien any or every course o f action can be made out to accord with any rule given 
the right notion o f  sameness or accordance. E.g., jumping o ff a cliff can be made out to accord with die rule, 
or instructions, for add-2; in which case, we should say, there is no rule or instructions for tiiere is no rule or 
instructions being followed — a rule must guide to be a rule, instructions must instruct (even if  ambiguously) to 
be instructions (and notice that this admits that instructions may not be instructions for me if  I do not find 
diem at all instructive but may be for someone else who does find them instructive; this is a view o f die 
standing — daresay ontology — o f rules or instructions as dependent on their use). There can be no rule, or no 
instructions in a rule, if  they delimit no course o f  action as in accord or out o f  accord (and the point here is tiiat 
if  accordance or sameness is opened to interpretation, then what is in accord versus what is not in accord is not 
set by the rule, or its instructions, but by die interpretation o f  accordance).
But notice, wlule I made die point that as we approach die most basic o f rules and find them open to 
interpretation, we approach RF3, and die point that if  the notion o f  accordance is opened to interpretation, 
then we get RF3,1 refrained from saying, or at least forcefully and blundy, diat die most basic o f  rules is the 
rule for accordance or sameness. I will make tills case, for Wittgenstein, in the next two sub-sections o f this 
section, first exegetically and then phdosopliically.
54 This is to treat EP3 similarly to RF2.
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For instance, it has been argued that we cannot correcdy grasp basic or bedrock rules 
from only under the interpretative mode. These are rules that must be grasped blindly if 
they are to be grasped at all (for reasons come to an end at bedrock; basic or bedrock rules 
must be grasped in a way that does no t involve interpretation for there are no further 
reasons to draw in support o f an interpretation — see Sections II. iii. and II. vi. above). In a 
related way this point is also made early in the P I in connection with the Augustinian picture 
o f language. Therein it is argued that our initial language learning through ostensive 
definitions — which would surely include a learning o f basic rules since an understanding of 
these is presupposed in an understanding of less basic rules — cannot proceed via 
interpretation (for reason that we would already have to have a prior conceptual repertoire — 
a “mastery o f language” as Wittgenstein puts it — in order to guide our interpretation; in 
order to Imow where the word being learned is “posted” or “stationed” , as Wittgenstein 
says).
However, tliese lines o f argument contend that basic rules, if  to be correcdy grasped, 
cannot be grasped solely in a way that involves interpretation. These cases, thus, argue for 
the master thesis: there must be a way to grasp these rules that does not involve interpreting 
for otherwise they would not be correcdy grasped; alternatively, that there must be a way of 
grasping rules under the reactive mode (and since giving an account o f following a rule 
under the reactive mode is the main objective o f this chapter, these are certainly worthy 
points). But to support the master thesis is not quite to make a case against the Sceptical- 
Conceptual argument (rather, it is to make a case against the Sceptical-Inductive argument). 
The master thesis, which upholds that there must be a way to grasp a rule that does not 
involve interpreting, does not deny that we can come to understand a rule in a way that does 
involve interpreting. Likewise, that we can grasp a rule under the reactive mode does not
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deny that the interpretative mode is a legitimate mode under which we can also come to 
understand a rule and its requitements. Admittedly, we will not gain a correct grasp o f basic 
rules if  we come to understand them, and their instructions, only from under the 
interpretative mode (for the sorts o f reasons given just above); this is why it is necessary that 
there be a way o f grasping a rule that does not involve interpreting. But this does not deny 
that we can come to view any rule, and gain our understanding o f any rule (even if this be 
incorrect), from under the interpretative mode. I t  is not yet denied that it is still a rational 
alternative to interpret a set o f instructions in trying to understand them (after aU, given tiiat 
any set o f instructions cannot but underdetermine a rule, it should remain a rational 
alternative, so it would seem, to interpret those instructions in coming to understand how to 
follow them). It is only denied that we will be successful in our grasp if  we are grasping the 
rule, or its instructions, solely fiom  under the interpretative mode.
However, if  we do turn to the interpretative mode in coming to understand a basic 
rule then we turn to see this rule (or its instructions) as open to interpretation along 
indefinitely many lines (and this is to admit that RF2 is true for basic rules for it admits that 
indefinitely many courses o f action can — in virtue o f our being able to make the turn to 
understand any rule or set of instructions fiom  the interpretative mode — be interpreted to 
accord with a basic rule or set o f basic rule instructions). And since RF2 implies RF3 if RF2 
is true in very basic cases, we are led RF3. That is, we are led to RF3 by our admission that 
the interpretative mode is a legitimate mode under which we may come to understand even 
very basic rules or basic rule instructions (and o f course, once we admit RF3 as true, we are 
led to a sceptical conclusion). Hence, to avoid being led down this sceptical path, we want 
to say that it is not a legitimate and rational move, in coming to understand basic rules (or at 
least the rule for sameness), to turn to the interpretative mode. It is already admitted that
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turning solely to the interpretative mode for our understanding of a basic rule will not be 
successful (and this point was used to argue for the master thesis). I t is now added that, at 
least in some cases — particularly sameness — it is required that we obtain a correct grasp (and 
so turning to the interpretative mode is not an option, at all). There is no room  or scope for 
doubt; there is no room  for viewing the instructions or training in these rules as variously 
interpretable (for these are rules tliat must be grasped successfully, i,e., understood as 
understood by others). And this is to say that these are rules tiiat must be understood under 
the reactive mode (i.e., at least for the rule for sameness, there is only one rational mode 
under which we can come to understand tiie rule). With this point in hand, we can say that 
at least for these basic rules, it is not the case that indefinitely many courses o f action can be 
interpreted to accord with the instructions for these rules (which is to deny that RF2 is true 
for at least these rules, and since the implication from RF2 to RF3 requires that RF2 be true 
o f the most basic cases o f rules, RF3 is not true). This case will follow in the next sub­
section but one, after the remarks concerning sameness have been introduced.
But prior to this, and most effectively, we may avoid being led to the conclusion of 
the Sceptical-Conceptual arguinent by treating the argument as a reductio.^^ That is, it has 
been argued that if  RF2 is true for the most basic rules (such that indefinitely many courses 
o f action can be made out to accord with these rules), then RP3 is true (at least for all the 
rules that presuppose an understanding o f these basic rules). Given that this leads us down a 
sceptical path, we may take tlie resultant sceptical conclusion as (further) grounds for saying 
that RF2 is not true o f the most basic rules (and again, sameness is in mind here); that it is 
no t the case that indefinitely many courses of action can be made out to accord with these
55 Tliis should not be taken as an ad hoc or illegitimate means o f rejecting the conclusion o f  die Sceptical- 
Conceptual argument, at least as a reading o f Wittgenstein, for we see diis given as a means o f  dealing with die
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rules; that these rules cannot be understood, at all, from under the interpretative mode or be
seen as open to interpretation 66
V. ii. An Understanding of Sameness — The Remarks
As described (in Section IV above) , agreement in application or judgement is a necessary 
condition for the possibility o f linguistic communication. A similar point will be made, in 
the course o f the following discussion, concerning sameness: an understanding o f sameness 
is set apart from — and indeed is foundational for — our understanding o f any other concept 
or rule. Indeed, we will find a close connection (an apparently circular connection) between 
the notion o f agreement in judgement and the rule for accordance or sameness. 
Appropriately, the discussion of the rule for sameness wül lead to a better understanding of 
the notion o f agreement in judgement and how it is achieved.
Wittgenstein’s views on sameness, at least in one regard, stayed much the “same” 
from the early to later periods. He makes it clear that he does not think that our common 
understanding o f sameness or identity rests on our recognition o f the universal or self- 
evident truth o f an object’s being self-identical; he has had an aversion to this view from the 
Tractatiis to the Investigations (see TLP 5.5303 and PI 216). The concept o f self-identity is 
meaningless or useless for Wittgenstein: it is a wheel on which nothing can turn and is not 
the basis for a common understanding of sameness. But at least part o f the root o f the
Sceptical-Inductive argument (for it is argued, by reductio ad ahsttrdum, that there must be a way to grasp a rule 
that is not an interpretation — die master diesis — for otiierwise we are led to a sceptical paradox),
55 Notice that the point here is a litde different, in diat it is stronger, than that made with die master thesis. 
Therein it is asserted diat diere must be a way to grasp a rule, basic or not, diat is not an interpretation; that 
interpretation does not have an exclusive role in our grasp o f  a rule. Herein it is asserted, considering only the 
most basic rules (and again, die rule for sameness is in mind here), not merely diat a correct grasp requires that 
we be able to grasp in a way diat does not involve interpreting, but that our understanding involves no role for
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tejection o f self-identity as a basis fot* oui* common understanding of sameness, at least in 
Wittgenstein’s later view, is that there is no criterion by which we understand sameness (i.e., 
a criterion is not needed and so, a fortiori, a universally appreciated criterion is not needed) 
Nevertheless, a common understanding and application o f sameness is necessary for 
Wittgenstein if linguistic communication is to be possible. We would not have common 
rule-following practices if we did no t agree on what it is to apply a rule again. These points 
will be taken up below. But first, two related points of foreshadowing. Notice first the 
transcendental ring to the argument here: a common understanding o f sameness is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of linguistic communication. Notice second, and in 
related fashion, we cannot commonly apply any rule unless we also hold a common 
understanding of sameness; i.e., to apply a rule in die same way as others requires that we 
have the same understanding o f applying a rule in the same way from step to step. There are 
thus two senses o f sameness here: the sameness of applying a rule the same way from step to 
step and the sameness o f applying a rule the same way as others. As we will see, these are 
intertwined notions. The deviant pupil had an understanding of what it is to apply a rule in 
the same way, i.e., to repeat an apphcation, but this was not the “same” understanding as 
ours. Hence, an understanding of “sameness” in apphcation is only good for language if it 
involves an understanding that we are proceeding in the same way as others (and I wih also 
discuss the citcularlty of this view below). I f  this understanding is no t held then enjoining in 
a pubhc language is not possible.
hiteipietation; that we cannot come to see tliese rules as open interpretation. The modal force o f these 
conclusioiis-by-reductio is different.
57 This is not to say that an understanding o f sameness is witliout criterion in tlie sense that we have no 
criterion by wliich to tell if  someone else correctly understands sameness; correct application o f tlie concept fits 
this bill. Ratlier, the point is tliat there is nothing specific tliat need be understood, no particular rule, as a 
required condition for an understanding o f  sameness.
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Notice that it should not be correct to say that an understanding o f sameness derives 
from an understanding of agreement in application with others for the recognition of the 
latter presupposes an understanding o f sameness. Wittgenstein drives a similar point in the 
following passage:
And does this mean e.g. that the definition o f “same” would be tliis: same is what all or most human 
beings witli one voice take for the same? O f course n ot
For o f  course I don’t make use o f  tlie agreement o f  human beings to affirm identity. Wliat 
criterion do you use, tlien? None at all. (RFM V II40)
Wittgenstein here states that our understanding of sameness is not sourced in a recognition 
o f human agreement in applying a rule (as noted above, this would beg the question anyway). 
Rather, our understanding o f sameness is without criterion (in the sense noted above, i.e., an 
epistemic criterion). It is a littie odd to see Wittgenstein affirm that there is no epistemic 
criterion for an understanding o f sameness for it sets it apart from our understanding o f 
other rules. The implication o f this should be that our understanding o f sameness, in some 
way, is a primitive or given. Wittgenstein seems to give it just this status in the following 
remarks:
Tlie word “agreemeat” and the word “rule” are related to one anotlier, they are cousins. I f  I teach 
anyone die use o f tlie one word, he learns the use o f the otlier witli it. (PI 224)
The use o f  die word “rule” and die use o f die word “same” are interwoven. (PI 225) 5®
These remarks draw out that an understanding of a rule, any rule, involves an understanding 
o f sameness. The following remark makes a point, claimed as “o f the greatest importance”, 
tiiat deviance in the application of our understanding of sameness “hardly” occurs and.
5® Passages from bodi RFAf VII 54 and RFM V II59 malce similar points expressed very similarly; (RFM VII 
56) also makes a similar point but expressed differendy.
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further, that the lack o f this deviance in our understanding and application o f sameness is a 
“framework” condition o f language use/^
It is o f  die greatest importance that a dispute hardly ever arises between people about wliedier die 
colour o f diis object is die same as die colour o f  that, die length o f  diis rod die same as that, etc. Tliis 
peaceful agreement is die characteristic surrounding o f  the use o f  die word “same”.
And one must say something analogous about proceeding according to a rule.
N o dispute breaks out over the question whedier a proceeding was according to die rule or 
not. It doesn’t come to blows, for example.
H iis belongs to the framework, out o f wlticli language works (for example, gives a 
description). (RFM VI 21)
The next temaik is, in part, the same as the first quoted remark o f this sub-section (which is 
also from the RFM) but I quote it not simply for emphasis. Rather, two additional points 
are o f note in the following remark. First, Wittgenstein relates that we can train someone in 
the use o f the concept o f sameness (he makes this point also in PI 208, but in this case I will 
avoid repetition). This is interesting because if we are to presume that an understanding of 
sameness is without an epistemic criterion then we might imagine that it is no t something 
taught (and perhaps tiiat it is innate). Wittgenstein shows that he does not uphold this here. 
This rule can be taught, but still it is not conditional on understanding some other rule. In 
this way, it would seem, an understanding o f sameness is first (in the order o f learning): it is 
not conditional on understanding any otiier particular rule but understanding any otlier 
particular rule is conditional on understanding it. Second, immediately after tiie point is 
made that our understanding o f sameness is without epistemic criterion, the passage ends 
with the point that we may use a word rightly (or at least not wrongfully) even without 
justification. The latter is the now familiar point that we do not, or at least need not, use a 
word wrongfully when our reasons run out (i.e., when we are at bedrock); that is, we may
59 The uniformity o f  tiiis understanding, such that we do not differ nor doubt each otiier’s understanding o f  
sameness, is quite effectively expressed here: “ “But I know what ‘same’ means!” — I have no doubt o f  tiiat; I 
know it too.” (RFM VII 59)
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know that we follow a rule correctly even though the reasons we can give to justify our 
course of action in following the rule run out prior to vindicating that course o f action over 
other consistent interpretations. The same trend is observed in the Investigations', a discussion 
o f sameness or identity is followed with this point about justification and bedrock. The 
indication, then, is that this latter point applies especially to our understanding of sameness: 
it is especially this understanding that is beyond justification. This is o f course quite similar 
to the point that it is understood without epistemic criterion (except that now we not only 
say that it is learned without having to understand any otiier particular rule, we cannot justify 
this understanding through an appeal to an understanding o f other rules).
A language-game: to bring something else; to bring tlie same. Now, we can imagine how it is played. -  
But how can I explain it to anyone? I can give liim this training. — But tlien how does he know what he 
is to bring die next time as ‘the same’ — widi what justice can I say that he has brought the right tiling or 
tlie wrong tiring? — O f course I know very well tliat in certain cases people would turn on me with signs 
o f  opposition.
And does this mean e.g. tliat tlie definition o f  “same” would be this: same is what all or most 
human beings with one voice take for tlie same? O f course not.
For o f  course I don’t make use o f  die agreement o f  human beings to affirm identity. Wliat 
criterion do you use, dien? None at all.
To use die word without justification does not mean to use it wrongfully, (RFM V II40)
Lastiy in this train of remarks, the following seems to affirm that AR** (the understanding of 
a rule does not transcend an understanding o f an explanation of or instructions in the rule) 
applies especially to sameness. Our understanding o f sameness, if anything is to be, is gained 
from a consideration o f a finite set o f examples and further, there is not anything more to be 
understood than can be understood in the consideration o f these examples. Since the 
understanding o f any rule presupposes an understanding o f sameness, this shows that the 
understanding o f any rule presupposes an understanding derived from a finite set o f 
examples (this is a key point defended in Chapter 2, but made a littie differently here for the 
focus on sameness; an understanding of sameness is presupposed in the understanding of
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any other rule, and since an understanding o f sameness is underdetermined by the training 
and instruction in the rule, our understanding o f any rule is underdetermined).™
How can I explain die word “same”? -  Well, by means o f  examples. -  But is tiiat aU? Isn’t tiiere a still 
deeper explanation; or must not tiie understanding o f  the explanation be deeper? — Well, have I myself a 
deeper understanding? Have I more tiian I give in tiie explanation? (RFM VII 59)
These remarks draw out die special status afforded to sameness. I t is a rule, Hire any otlier, 
that can be taught and learned. However, an understanding of the rule for sameness does 
not require an understanding o f some other particular rule, but rather, an understanding of 
what is a rule qua rule (the concepts of rule and sameness are intertwined, according to 
Wittgenstein). It is, in this way, without epistemic criterion. In contrast, an understanding 
of any otlier rule presupposes an understanding o f sameness (for we must understand that 
we apply the rule in the same way from step to step, occasion to occasion, if we are to say 
that we understand any rule) to the effect that there is no rule-foUowing without an 
understanding o f sameness. It does not seem that this can be said o f any other rule. An 
understanding of sameness is fundamental to language use for Wittgenstein.
V. iii. An Understanding of Sameness -  The Arguments
An understanding of sameness is an understanding under the reactive mode. It should seem 
that we could not, rather than merely do not, move to the interpretative mode in our 
understanding o f i t  That is, we could not conceive what it would be to understand the
70 Note, ail undeistanding o f  sameness would have to be conveyed, indirectly, through examples that share a 
common property or aspect: e.g., sameness o f  tiie colour o f objects in a group, or sameness o f  number 
between groups o f  objects. There is no sameness tiiat is not a sameness in some respect — even in tiie case o f  
self-identity — and so sameness cannot be referred to independently. But again, this is not to admit that an 
understanding o f some otiier particular rule must precede an understanding o f  sameness (an understanding o f  
sameness is logically prior, if  not chronologically prior, to the understanding o f  any other rule).
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concept of sameness differently than we now do; an understanding o f sameness is 
fundamental to language use and so we should not be able to coherently frame a doubt. 
Notice that this is a consideration against our being able to conceive of a different 
application of sameness ckar^ (recall Stroud’s distinction between conceiving as possible or 
in principle — i.e., in some way less than clearly — and conceiving clearly). Wittgenstein 
seems to present us an example in which we can conceive (in principle or as a possibility but 
not clearly) a different understanding o f sameness with the deviant pupil. The pupil does 
not apply the rule add 2 as we do, but since this is a paradigm case o f doing the same, it 
would seem that he also displays a deviant understanding o f sameness. But once the 
example is viewed in these terms, and we realise we cannot have a clear conception o f 
deviating in paradigm case o f doing-the-same, we lose any understanding o f what it is to 
deviate in this manner. We do not doubt an understanding o f sameness, either for ourselves 
or others. To the extent that we could entertain such doubts, we realise on closer inspection 
tliat we cannot do so clearly
If  we cannot turn to the interpretative mode for our understanding o f sameness, 
then we should say that RF2 is not true o f the rule for sameness. That is, it is no t true that 
indefinitely many courses of action can be interpreted to be in accord with the training and 
instructions for the rule for sameness. To say otherwise presumes tliat the instructions can
III a tatlier obidous way it seems tliat out vmderstaiidiiig o f  sameness cannot be held up to doubt or open to 
interpretation. Interpretation is not a language game witliout sophistication and so should carry the 
presumption tliat we know what is a consistent interpretation (over a set o f data or instructions) and what is 
not. But this presumes an understanding o f  sameness. Likewise, it does not seem that we can coherently 
frame a doubt about our understanding o f  sameness. To question whether any two tilings are tlie same or 
different, or to question whetlier one application o f  a rule proceeds the same as another, presupposes an 
understanding o f  sameness. But what, then, would it be to question our understanding o f  sameness? How do 
we frame this question? The outcome o f  considerations such as these seems to be that questioning an 
understanding o f sameness cannot be done coherently. But again, tliis just means that we can have no ckar 
conception o f  what it is to understand sameness differendy, not tliat we can have no conception (as per 
Stroud’s distinction). Still though, the impossibility o f  having a clear conception o f  understanding sameness 
differently teUs us that sameness is a concept or rule tliat cannot be grasped under the interpretative mode.
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be viewed as open to intetpretation. But what of the point that the instructions and training 
for the rule for sameness, as with for any rule, underdetermine the rule? That is, the rule is 
understood upon the consideration of a finite number o f examples or cases illustrating the 
rule. And so, just as any finite set o f examples can be continued in indefinitely many ways 
(i.e,, there are indefinitely many ways of continuing a finite series, some o f which conflict, 
that are consistent with the examples given), we should say that there are indefinitely many 
interpretations of the instructions given for the rule for sameness that can be considered. 
Someone may just latch on to a way o f following the instructions — consistent with the 
examples given — that is different than our way of following the instructions (although, to be 
precise, we should not say he is ‘‘following” the instructions if he proceeds incorrectly). But 
if  someone latches on to a different way o f understanding the instructions or training given 
for the rule for sameness, and so comes to understand the rule differently than we do (and 
so incorrectly), tlien we should say that since a correct understanding o f this rule is 
presupposed in an understanding o f any other rule, this person fails to become a rule- 
foUower. Such a person, who fads to grasp a rule fundamental to an understanding o f any 
other rule is a person who we could not find intelHgible (for if the person does not share our 
understanding o f sameness, then this person will no t share our understanding o f any rule). 
Such a person fads to become a member o f our linguistic community or alternatively, we 
may say, fads to make it into the human form o f life.^  ^ Sameness is a rule that must be 
understood under the reactive mode if it is to be grasped at ad (a point made for basic rules 
in general), and further, it must be understood in the same way as others for otherwise the 
person does not become a fedow rule-fodower or member of our linguistic community
Tills is not, so far, to deny the possibility tliat tliere may be a different form o f  life, with an understanding o f  
what it is to do tlie same that is different tiian ours; but it is to admit that any such form o f  life, and witli it any
243
(taken at large). Thus, RF2 is not true of the rule for sameness, despite the fact that the 
instructions underdetermine the rule (for a different interpretation o f this rule or its 
instructions would point to a different form of Hfe, a different linguistic community, that we 
could not understand for we would no t share that essential understanding — o f sameness — 
presupposed in the understanding of any rule).^^ And once more, since EP2 is not true o f at 
least this rule, we can again make the point that RF3 does not obtain.^"^
As noted earlier, there is an apparent circularity in our understanding o f the concept 
o f sameness. Agreement in application o f a rule would seem to presuppose an 
understanding of sameness (after all, we have to understand what it is to apply a rule in the 
same way from step to step if we are to understand that our application agrees with that of 
others). But there is no correct understanding o f sameness that is not a commonly held
such community fitting tiiis account, is one we could not find intelligible. And so, lestfictmg ourselves to what 
we can find intelligible, a different understanding o f  sameness is impossible.
This restriction on RF2, tliat it does not hold o f tlie rule for sameness, is a restriction to what we can find 
intelligible or understandable, and in this sense, is a restriction in our concern to our linguistic community 
(taken at large) or to our form o f life. That is, we cannot intelligibly consider a different understanding or 
interpretation o f what it is to do tlie same (and it is in tliis way that a different understanding o f  sameness 
would point to a different form o f  life). We cannot find someone witii a deviant understanding o f  sameness 
intelligible; we should rather say that such a person is mistaken in some other way (e.g., with the deviant pupil, 
we may say tliat he has mistaken the instructions for add-2 as instructions for tlie rule add 2 up to 1000, add 4 
up to 2000, etc., as Wittgenstein offers, rather tlian say that it is a mistaken understanding o f  what it is to go on 
the same that leads liim astray in applying die rule add-2). We may make the point that a common 
understanding o f sameness is a transcendental requirement for it is necessary for the possibility o f  linguistic 
communication (for, as an understanding o f  sameness is necessary for an understanding o f  any rule, a common 
understanding o f sameness is necessary for a common understanding o f  any rule, and as argued earlier, we 
must be able to expect that others have a common understanding o f basic or bedrock rules if  there is to be 
linguistic interaction, I will have a little more to say about tltis tliought below).
74 We may also note, and this was said above, that a common understanding o f  basic rules — a shared 
understanding o f  the commitments at bedrock, as McDowell might say — is necessary for linguistic 
communication with others (for otherwise we may all understand and come to apply basic rules as tlie deviant 
pupil does addition wliich would make linguistic communication impossible). And so, it would seem, RF2 
cannot be true o f  basic or bedrock rules either for these must be grasped as grasped by others for tliere to be 
linguistic communication; hence, they must be grasped under the reactive mode. But tlie point here is a littie 
different than that made witli sameness for, presumably, someone may not grasp a particular basic rule 
correctly, i.e., grasp it differently tlian others, and still be intelligible to others. That is, uhülre sameness, it 
would seem that someone may grasp anotlier particular basic rule differently witliout thereby becoming 
generally unintelligible to otliers. And hence, tlie point here is taken to hold generally: basic rules, in general or 
at large, must be commonly understood if  there is to be linguistic communication with others. To hold an 
understanding o f  basic rules, taken generally, that is different from tliat o f  others is to be unintelligible to others 
— it is to be beyond the range o f rational chcumspection o f  others — and on these grounds we may affirm that
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understanding o f sameness (i.e., there is no correct understanding o f a rule that stands 
independent ftom how it is understood by others for Wittgenstein). And so an 
understandiug of sameness in application (i.e., an understanding that we apply a rule the 
same from step to step) seems to presuppose an understandiug of sameness as understood by 
others. If  this were not the case then we could all be hke the deviant pupü: have an 
understanding of what it is to do the same in applying a rule tliat is different from that of 
others (in which case we would not have conformity in application and the practice o f rule- 
following would break down). There are two notions o f sameness or agreement here: the 
sameness o f applying a rule in the same ivcy at each step and the sameness o f applying it the 
same as other people, and these notions seem to run a tight ckcle. The seas o f language run high 
in this discussion o f sameness.
Language is a given for Wittgenstein.^^ Since an understanding o f sameness is a 
necessary condition of language use (since it is necessary for the understanding o f any rule), 
it stands that an understanding o f sameness carries this sense o f being a given (and the 
passages quoted certainly seem to indicate this; notice this presents a transcendental 
connection fiom the givenness of language to the givenness of an understanding of 
sameness). Indeed, the above noted circularity may be taken as indication that the only way 
we are going to get an understanding o f sameness o f application is if  it is given. However, 
contrary to this thought, the circularity runs right against the above passages (where 
Wittgenstein indicates that our understanding o f sameness is without criterion). Forming a 
ckcle, an understanding o f applying a rule the same way presupposes and is presupposed by 
an understanding that we apply it in the same way as others. As a ckcle, though, our
basic rules, again taken generally or at large, cannot be grasped differently; they must be grasped under tlie 
reactive mode and camiot be viewed as open to interpretation.
73 This thought is explained in Section IV above.
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understanding o f sameness is shown to be criterial (the criteria form a ckcle but they are 
nonetheless criteria; one must be understood for the other to be understood). But 
Wittgenstein, in the passages above, is clear to say that our understanding of sameness is not 
criterial, and certainly does not turn on an understanding that we are proceeding the same as 
others. The forced curve in the ckcle is the assumption that agreement in judgement or 
application is something we must understand as an item separate o f our understanding o f a 
rule.
I t is stated that agreement in judgement is a necessary condition for following a 
rule.^  ^ This is not to state that an understanding o f agreement in judgement is a necessary 
condition for following a rule. This position leads us only to problems. To have to know 
how others apply a rule in order to apply a rule is to have to know how others apply a rule at 
a particular step to apply the rule at that step. That is, we would have to know how others 
apply a rule for any given step as a necessary condition for our own understanding of the 
rule. This is logisticaUy impracticable. It would rule out applying a rule for steps that no one 
else has applied yet; e.g., we would no t be able to count to a number that no one has 
counted to yet for we could not know if our application o f the rule for counting at that step 
agreed with that of other people. And more damning, such a view invites the abolishment 
of logic^^: if we akeady know what is to constitute the correct application o f a rule at any 
given step (in vktue o f an understanding of how others apply a rule at tiiose steps), then 
there is no need, and presumably no role, for a further act of understanding of the rule to 
take us to its correct application (the understanding o f how others apply a rule at any step is 
all we need to apply the rule correctly); a fortion, there is no need or role for logic in our 
understanding of a rule so as to guide (or compel) us to its correct application. And so.
73 See PI 242 and the treatment o f  this remark in Section IV above.
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agreement in application or judgement is a necessary condition o f rule-foUowing but it 
cannot be an epistemic condition/^
Notice that this is the stance maintained by the reactive view: under this mode, a rule 
is understood correctly, and applied correctly, if  it is applied in conformity witli others (i.e., 
we understand a rule correctly if we achieve agreement in judgement but we do not 
understand a rule in virtue o f an understanding of what is the agreement in judgement). 
Agreement in judgement is no t an epistemic condition for following a rule under this view, 
rather, it is a condition o f correctness or rationality under the reactive mode. The difference 
here is perhaps not yet clear for it is no t yet fully clear how understanding under the reactive 
mode results in an agreement in judgement (I will say in the next section, further in the way 
o f an answer, that it iuvolves understanding a rule as intended). W hat is clear is that there are 
not two acts o f understanding here: an understanding o f the instructions and an 
understanding o f how others apply the instructions such that the latter conditions or directs 
the former (after all, as noted, if we already know how others apply the instructions, then we 
need have no further understanding o f the rule to apply them as do others). The view that 
agreement in judgement is an epistemic condition is a view under the interpretative mode: it 
presumes that the instructions present themselves as something open to interpretation and 
so in need o f some further item o f understanding to settle the correct interpretation (and an 
understanding o f how others apply the rule serves tiiis end). Rather, under die reactive 
mode, we come to grasp a rule such that our grasp conforms in application with that of 
others. But again, we have the point diat this seems to involve an epistemic jump. The
77 Also discussed in Section IV above.
78 Tliis is tlie difference between saying tliat agreement in application is a criterion by wliich we can teU tliat 
someone understands a rule and saying that someone understands a rule in virtue o f an understanding o f what 
behaviour would achieve agreement in application. Agreement in application is a criterion o f  understanding in 
tlie former sense but not the latter.
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question survives as to how we achieve agreement in application or judgement in our 
following o f rules without a separate act o f understanding (of the applications o f others).
The next main section on knowledge o f intentions provides the framework for, and takes 
steps towards, the answer to this question.
V. iv. An Understanding of Sameness - The Private Language Argument
Prior to that, a few more comments on tlie issue o f sameness. Wittgenstein tells us that our 
understanding of sameness does not borrow from nor budd on an understanding o f other 
rules or an understanding o f how others commonly apply those rules. It is in thk way that 
an understanding of sameness is without (epistemic) criterion. An understanding of 
sameness is a necessary condition for language because we must understand how to apply a 
rule the same fiom  step to step in order to follow a rule. Further, agreement in application 
or judgement, as it is for any rule, is a necessary condition for a correct grasp o f sameness 
(which, as just noted, is itself a necessary condition for following a rule). But as stressed, we 
do not understand sameness in virtue o f a recognition or understanding o f an agreement in 
application. Such a view is circular and is problematic in its own right (see the account given 
above). We must achieve an agreement in application but it is not achieved through a 
separate act of understanding about what this agreement consists in. This indicates a public 
dimension to our grasp of a rule and that it is not grasped independendy o f our grasp o f tlie 
rule. It is in this way said that agreement in application or judgement is a necessary but non- 
epistemic condition for rule-following. The full consequence o f this point (and of the 
discussion o f sameness in large) is not yet entirely clear to me, but it does seem to me to be 
profound in an understanding of Wittgeiisteiu’s later philosophy. To illustrate this
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sentiment, I will draw out the bearing of the point on the private language argument for I 
think that it is crucial for a correct reading.
The standard view (and despite varying interpretations, this much seems in common) 
upholds tliat the argument is, in its essentials, epistemic. The private linguist cannot follow a 
rule (or meaningfully use a term) because he cannot knoiv that he is applying it tlie same each 
time. The private linguist cannot distinguish between thinldng he is apply a rule the same 
and doing so. And this is because a correctness criterion is lacking in tlie private case that 
would enable the private linguist to know that he is applying a rule the same. Tliis 
correctness condition, it is supposed, operates as an epistemic condition: it is in virtue o f a 
Imowledge o f this condition that we know that we use a term the same. For instance, this 
correctness condition is commonly viewed in terms o f communal approbation or 
disapprobation and that recognition o f this enables one to know tiiat one is applying a rule 
the same and not just think that one is doing so. And so, we need to know something non­
private in order to know that we apply a rule the same (and therefore, we cannot privately 
loiow that we apply a rule the same and so cannot private apply or follow a rule). There are 
two epistemic moves here (and these are analogous to the two senses o f sameness described 
above): we must know that we apply a rule the same from step to step and this requites a 
Imowledge of a public standard of correctness. And a Imowledge o f this public standard of 
correctness is ultimately a knowledge or recognition o f how others apply the rule (for it is 
the common application that gets common approbation).
However, it is precisely denied above that an understanding o f sameness in applying 
a rule (the same from step to step) requires an understandingoihxm others apply the rule (i.e., 
o f agreement in application or judgement); indeed, it is denied above that an understanding 
o f sameness is with any epistemic criterion at all. Agreement in judgement is described
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above as a correctness criterion and necessary condition o f an understanding o f sameness 
suck that we must achieve agreement in judgement if we understand the rule. But this does 
not mean that agreement in judgement or application is itself something to be understood in 
order that we may understand and correctly apply the rule for sameness (see above for the 
difficulties this would present).
Wittgenstein is clear to affirm that our understanding of sameness is without an 
epistemic criterion (and especially not that o f an understanding of how others commonly 
apply a rule). But if  so, it should not be a consistent criticism of the private linguist that he 
lacks an epistemic criterion for liis understanding and application o f sameness. The private 
language argument has been criticised as verificationist for presuming that an external and 
public correctness criterion must be Imown in order to successfully apply a rule. I made a 
case in Chapter 2 — elaborated in the Appendix to that chapter — that Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument is not verificationist. I buttress this reading here. It is admittedly not 
very clear how agreement in judgement is to serve as a correctness criterion without also 
being an epistemic criterion; but this is a question as to tlie workings o f the reactive mode 
(and I hope tliat the next section will further help here). But I do think tliat it is established 
here that agreement in judgement cannot work, either exegetically or philosophically, as an 
epistemic criterion.
In any event, we may take the basic point from the discussion of tliis section that sameness 
must be understood under the reactive mode; it cannot be viewed as open to interpretation 
or grasped from under the interpretative mode. This is a basis for saying that RF2 is not 
true o f the rule (or instructions) for sameness (and as a consequence, as explained, RF3 is 
not true). This allows us to evade the conclusion o f the Sceptical-Conceptual argument.
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And o f course, the simplest way evading the conclusion o f the Sceptical-Conceptual 
argument is to treat it as a reductio. This gives us further means to make the point, by 
reductio that is, that RF2 is n o t true of the most basic of rules; specifically concerning the 
rule (or instructions) for sameness, it is not true that indefinitely many courses o f action can 
be made out to accord with this rule (or these instructions). Thus, although it is true that 
our understanding o f any rule is underdetermined by the instructions and training in the rule, 
it is no t the case that we can come to view any rule or set o f instructions as open to 
interpretation (or latch on to a different interpretation in acquiring an understanding of the 
rule).
VI. Knowledge Of Intentions
The question with which we began tliis chapter asked how it is possible to follow a rule from 
an underdetermined understanding without coming to interpret the rule. The approach to 
answering this question has been to first re-describe it as a question o f rationality in rule- 
following. The question o f how we follow a rule from an underdetermined understanding 
was seen to be the same as how we follow a rule with a lack of reasons (whether actively 
considered or not) that justify or vindicate our adopted course of action. The answer to this 
latter question, for Wittgenstein, reveals two modes or standards o f rationality: the 
iuterpretative and tlie reactive. I t  is by grasping a rule under this latter mode tliat we are able 
to grasp it from underdetermining or unjustifying reasons (and that this involves grasping a 
rule “blindly”). As described, agreement in judgement is under threat from sceptical 
considerations: if  our understanding of a rule is underdetermined by the instructions and 
explanations given, how is it tliat we achieve agreement in judgement or application; why it is
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that we do not all end up applying rules as the deviant pupil does for add-2; what it is that 
draws us to conform in application?^^ But again, it is by being able to grasp a rule under the 
reactive mode, or so it is claimed, that we are able to achieve agreement in judgement. That 
is, if underdetermining instructions or reasons do not present an obstacle to grasping a rule 
under the reactive mode, then they should not present an obstacle for achieving agreement 
in judgement (for presumably, others are able to successfully grasp a rule from under the 
reactive mode). Nevertheless, the account is surely not complete. This section will continue 
to build a response to how we achieve conformity in application or agreement in judgement 
by drawing out Wittgenstein’s view that we can have non-inferential and non-interpretative 
knowledge of the intentions o f others. This will begin with a look at Wright’s discussion of 
Wittgenstein on intentions for this presents us an intuitive picture of non-inferential 
understanding that we may apply to our question o f agreement in judgement.
VI. i. Wright’s Intuitive Proposal
Wright relates that Wittgenstein presents an example o f non-inferential understanding in our 
knowledge o f our own intentions. This is taken as intuitively correct. O ur knowledge o f our 
intentions is furtiier characterised as involving “a special authority and whose epistemology 
is first/third-personal asymmetric.”^^  An understanding of our intentions, insofar as this is a 
non-inferential understanding, is properly characterised as an understanding under the 
reactive mode. W hen we grasp a rule from under the reactive mode we grasp it “blindly”. 
This is described in saying that we grasp a rule without reasons, or at least, without justifying
7^  As discussed in Section IV above, sceptical considerations convey that an agreement in judgement is not 
secured in an agreement in definitions.
80Wtight[2001£J,p. 125.
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reasons. Thus, grasping a rule non-inferentiaUy — which is grasping it in a way that does not 
involve inferring ftom some reason or other — involves grasping it blindly.
Further, we may make an explicit connection between grasping a rule non- 
inferentially and grasping a rule without interpreting for both involve proceeding with 
immediacy, in an epistemic sense (as opposed to a phenomenological sense) when grasping a 
rule. To uphold a role for inference in our grasp o f a rule is to uphold that our 
understanding is mediated; that there is a reasoned step or epistemic gap bridged by an 
inference. Likewise, interpretation, we may say, involves (or better perhaps, is) an inference 
o f a sort for grasping a rule in this way also involves (epistemic) mediation; for instance, an 
interpretation may serve to take us from a set o f underdetermming (and seemingly 
indeterminate) instructions to a unique understanding of how to proceed in following a rule 
from those instructions (and we may characterise this as involving an inference on those 
underdetermining instructions). A t any rate, if  it is denied that our understanding o f how to 
follow a rule is mediated (as it is when it is claimed that our understanding is non- 
inferential), then it stands that our understanding does not involve a role for interpretation. 
Thus, both non-inferential understanding and non-interpretative understanding are 
characteristic o f grasping a rule in the reactive mode (i.e., blindly) and I will treat them so in 
this section.
An understanding of our own intentions does not involve an act o f inference or 
interpretation under this intuitive view (i.e,, we do not, or usually do not, come to know of 
our own intentions by an interpretation or inference on our psychological states or 
dispositions or bodily behaviour). Wright states: “Knowledge of one’s own intentions, in 
the cases which interest us, is based on inference neither from one’s behaviour nor firom
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other occurrent aspects o f one’s mental life.”®^ However, turning to use these considerations 
to explain and defend understanding under the reactive mode meets an immediate difficulty. 
Knowledge o f our intentions is not the basis for an understanding o f what it is to 
understand under the reactive mode unless all our understanding under the reactive mode 
could be likened to an understanding of our intentions. At best, it seems, knowledge o f our 
intentions can give us a special case o f reactive understanding tiiat cannot be generalised. 
There is an assumption here that there is a crucial first/third-person asymmetry in virtue o f 
which we can have non-inferential and non-interpretative (i.e., reactive) Imowledge o f our 
own intentions but can only have inferential or interpretative knowledge o f the intentions of 
others. Once this asymmetry o f self-lmowledge is denied, it stands that the special privilege 
it seems to afford (e.g., non-inferential and non-interpretative understanding) is lost. This is 
an assumption that, I will argue, does not fully hold for Wittgenstein (and without loss of 
this “special privilege”).
The Cartesian view has it that tiie asymmetry is a product o f my privileged access to 
the contents o f my conscious mental states. Wright explains the inapplicability o f this view 
for understanding Wittgenstein on intentions. He states:
Wliat is sttiking is that Cartesianism, whatever other difficulties it may encounter, is not even o f  prima 
facie service to us here. Cartesianism would view the authority as having the same kind o f basis which 
it finds for a subject’s authority concerning liis or her occurrent sensations. H ie  subject has privileged 
access to tlie state, is immediately aware o f  it in consciousness. Otliers, in contrast, can approach it only 
by an indirect, inferential route. But how, for instance, can my authority for the claim that at die so- 
and-so manyeth place I intended you to write down thus-and-such be based on introspection, if, as has 
been stressed, no tiling which went on within me and which has any plausible claim to be regarded as a 
state o f  consciousness explicitiy anticipated the case o f  the so-and-so manyeth place at all?®^
81 Wright [2001 g, p. 126.
82 Wright [200ig, pp. 128-129.
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Wittgenstein aiguës, in a seiies o f lemaiks, that intention and meaning are not to be thought 
o f as mental states or processes.®^ An understanding of an intention or o f what we mean or 
meant is not an understanding o f a conscious mental state or process. Accordingly, a 
Cartesian account o f the asymmetry o f our knowledge of the intentional, which assumes 
otherwise, is not of service. We are in want o f a non-Cartesian account to explain the 
first/third person asymmetry in our Imowledge of intentions. And Wright offers one. 
According to Wright, it would seem we retain an authoritative and non-inferential 
understanding of our intentions because the expressions of our intentions are not so much 
descriptive but constitutive. He explains:
The authority wlùch our self-ascriptions o f  meaning, intention, and decision assume is not based on any 
kind o f  cognitive advantage, expertise or acliievement. Rather it is, as it were, a concession, unofficially 
granted to anyone whom one takes seriously as a rational subject It is, so to speak, such a subject’s 
right to declare what he intends, what he intended and what satisfies liis intentions; and his possession 
o f  this right consists in the conferral upon such declarations, other things being equal, o f  a constitutive 
rather than descriptive role. 84
Wright presents remarks from the Investigations in which Wittgenstein certainly seems to 
advance the view that our declaration o f our intentions may serve to constitute the intention. 
These remarks draw out that, at least in some cases, a declaration o f an intention need not be 
a consequent event to the having of the intention and Üiat stands to the intention as a report. 
In these cases, the declaration or recognition of the intention constitutes the intention. For 
instance, consider the following (the middle remark of three Wright offers in this 
connection): “I draw a head. You ask “W hom is that supposed to represent?” — I: “It’s 
supposed to be N .” — You: “But it doesn’t look like him; if anything, it’s rather like M.” — 
W hen I said it represented N. — was I establishing a connection or reporting one? And what
83 For instance, he points out tliat mental states and processes may be characterized as having beginnings, ends 
and durations that, while properly ascdbable to sensations, are not so ascribable to intentions or meanings.
84 Wright [200iq, p. 138.
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connexion did exist?” (PI 683) Wittgenstein here (as elsewhere in similar remarks) questions 
whether all declarations need report an intention; he advances the possibility that they may 
constitute the intention; that the recognition o f the intention, as attested in the declaration, 
stands to establish a connection to the object intended. Notice that it is in a reporting role 
that an intention is open to interpretation. If the declaration or recognition o f the intention 
serves to constitute the intention, then there is no divide between declaration and intention 
tliat is bridged by an inference or interpretation. Further, if  a declaration or recognition 
serves to constitute the intention, then this declaration should be authoritative about the 
content o f the intention. Thus, the constitutive proposal gives us grounds to  uphold the 
non-inferentiality and authority o f one’s declarations o f one’s intentions and thereby 
preserve the first/third person asymmetry in the knowledge of our intentions (in a non- 
Cartesian way). It does so, that is, for at least declarations of intentions that constitute and 
do not report.
I t  is not part o f  the case in the remark above (or in similar remarks) that all our 
declarations o f intentions serve to constitute those intentions. Wright does no t seem to 
require that it be read this way when he observes: “The question is difficult and probably 
admits o f no uniform answer.”®® It is not denied that declarations o f intentions may report; 
it is only denied that they need report. In the above remark, it seems clear that Wittgenstein 
may have been reporting his intention when he said that the drawing represented N.
Further, I do not believe that a reading o f Wittgenstein should require tliat our declarations ' 
or judgements o f our intentions are always constitutive for reason that a correct reading of 
Wittgenstein should not deny that we may stand in the role o f interpreter, even though we 
usually do not interpret (and this is to say that knowledge o f our intentions, as with most any
«5 Wright [2001 g, p. 136.
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case o f understanding, is approachable under both modes o f rationality). We may admit that 
any given declaration o f an intention may be constitutive o f that intention but this does not 
deny that declarations o f intentions can also report. Indeed, it seems to me to be a strength 
o f the constitutive account if  it is not an exclusive account.
Nonetheless, we should still say that the subject has authority in his declaration (be it 
descriptive or constitutive) for reason that it is only he who is in a position to constitute his 
intentions by a declaration. To explain, as just noted, in any given case tlie agent may be 
constituting his intention in his declaration. However, we cannot say (and the above remark 
seems to indicate that even the subject may not be able to say) whether a given declaration is 
constitutive or descriptive. Hence, we have no basis for denying authority to the subject (on 
grounds that his declaration is not constitutive but only descriptive). But we do have some 
basis for granting authority to the subject (for it may be that his declaration is constitutive, in 
which case, he certainly would be the authority about his intention). Thus, on the basis tliat 
in any given case a subject’s declaration o f his intention may be constitutive we should grant 
authority over the subject’s intentions to the subject. This is not an argument that the 
subject always is the best authority, but that he should be treated as authoritative on grounds 
that he is most lilrely to be the best autlioiity (note tliat since any declaration is defeasible, we 
do not need an account that affirms that the subject is necessarily the best authority).
Moreover, we see that we must treat a subject as authoritative over his own 
intentions if we are to view him as a rational adult agent. Wright makes this basic point 
when he describes the authority we grant to the subject as “a concession, unofficially granted to 
anyone whom one takes seriously as a rational subject.”®^ We may find ourselves treating a 
cliild as if  he did not know best what he intends but would be hard pressed to do tlie same
83W right[200iq,p. 138,
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in out régulât interaction with adults. I t would not be language or linguistic interaction as we 
Icnow it if  we made a regular practice o f no t conferring authority over intentions to the 
subject. Our treating others as sensible and rational and, importantly, independent requires 
that we treat them as authorities, able to mean and intend what they say they mean and 
intend. Further, tliis is not even to consider the difficulty o f establishing who should have 
authority over intentions if no t the subject. It would be an odd world if the content o f an 
intention was held to be mysterious to the subject until someone else had come along to 
decide (after the event). To use a turn o f phrase from Wittgenstein, it would be foreign to 
our form o f life to suppose that subjects are generally not authorities over their own 
intentions.
As stated, Wittgenstein in the above remark does not maintain that all our 
declarations or judgements o f intentions serve to constitute those intentions. The 
constitutive view does not have this scope. As shown, this does not prevent us from 
regarding the subject as authoritative in his declarations. However, the matter does not 
stand equally regarding the non-inferential character o f the subject’s knowledge o f his 
intentions: in cases where our declarations serve to report (and not to constitute) we do not 
have recourse to the constitutive view so as to maintain that the declaration is non- 
inferential. The constitutive role o f a declaration gives us reason to say that the agent’s 
declaration is arrived at non-inferentially but we lose this reason when the declaration is not 
constitutive of the intention. But now we seem without basis (i.e., at least that o f the 
constitutive account) to maintain a strict first/third-person asymmetry in the non-inferential 
knowledge o f intentions. O ne response is to say that the asymmetry breaks down in the case 
o f a non-constitutive declaration o f an intention; in this case, the subject’s declaration is 
inferential. Another response is to say that the asymmetry breaks down such tliat non-
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inferential Imowledge o f a subject’s intentions is not to be understood as the strict preserve 
o f the subject. Prima facie, we may be at pains to admit either; that is, either that the subject’s 
knowledge o f his intentions may be inferential or that others can have non-inferential 
knowledge o f the subject’s intentions, I wager on both responses as a reading o f 
Wittgenstein (and this without losing the asymmetric character o f our knowledge o f 
intentions). As noted, it should be possible for the subject to stand in the role o f interpreter 
in an understanding o f his intentions (and so Imowledge o f intentions is not special in regard 
to being beyond the scope of the interpretative mode) even though we generally do not do 
so. In  addition, I maintain that others can know of my intentions and meanings non- 
inferentiaUy or without interpretation just as I can. It is this latter claim that I wUl focus on.®^
VI. ii. An Asymmetry Reconsidered
There are three related considerations I wiU puU together, drawing on Wittgenstein, to make 
a case for the non-inferential knowledge o f the intentions o f otliers. One builds on the 
thought that, in the demise of the Cartesian view, there is no public/ private divide to apply 
to intentions. A second builds on the observation that intentions or meanings are not 
properly understood as conscious mental states or processes; this is related to the first but 
does not involve the same argument. A third draws on the sceptical considerations and 
observes that if our knowledge o f the intentions o f others is necessarUy under the 
interpretative mode then we do not have knowledge o f the intentions o f others (by pain of 
paradox). N one of these arguments, I expect, is conclusive that we can have non-inferential
87 They may be more prone to error but die possibility (and higher incidence) o f error does not deny that non- 
inferential knowledge is possible (for the subject may be mistaken also). Rather, tlie higher ratio o f  defeasibility 
by otilers only further indicates that the subject has a special autiiotity over his intentions.
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knowledge o f the intentions o f others. I do endeavour, though, to at least take steps towards 
this end, viz., to turn our intuitions to their contrary.
First, the attachment to the intuitive view (that only the subject can have non- 
inferential Imowledge of his intentions) is, I suspect, largely a residue of the Cartesian 
picture. Under the Cartesian picture, tlie first/third-person asymmetry in the knowledge of 
intentions divides along a public/private axis: Imowledge of intentions is knowledge that is 
private to the subject; this is to give the subject dkect or non-inferential access. Those that 
do not have access to this private domain can only infer and interpret. Wittgenstein aims to 
undermine this public/private divide as it applies to our knowledge o f intentions and 
meanings. The private language argument tells us that meanings are not private; that my 
knowledge o f my intentions is not a private knowledge. But this is just to admit that others 
know, or at least can know, o f my intentions; it is no t yet to admit that others know of my 
intentions without inference. But this is a worthy point: if  I am to have non-inferential 
knowledge o f my intentions, then since I cannot carry this knowledge privately, others must 
be able to come to this Imowledge (either inferentiaUy or non-inferentially). But if it is 
further argued, as it is in the third consideration below, that knowledge o f the intentions of 
others cannot be (strictly) interpretative (by pain of sceptical paradox), tlien since this 
knowledge must be possible (for not only I can have Imowledge o f my intentions, by the 
private language argument) others must be able to have Imowledge o f my intentions without 
interpretation (and so without an inference o f this sort). The thrust o f this point (privacy 
aside) is picked up in the third consideration below. Nevertheless, we may make the milder 
observation that the private language argument shows us that our intuition for tlie 
asymmetry in this re ^ rd  should not be on the basis o f a private (and thereby privileged) 
access to my intentions. But once this source o f the intuition (which has also been the prime
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historical source) is denied, we should have at least as much reason to suspect the intuition 
as to seek other means of upholding i t
Second, and a related point, Wittgenstein argues that intentions and meanings are not 
aptly characterised as mental states or processes. He even says tliat, “I f  G od had looked into 
our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.” (PI II, p. 
217) Briefly, we may defend this thought, as Wittgenstein does and as noted above, by 
pointing out that intentions and meanings are not suitably described as involving durations 
(and as always having beginnings and ends), and so in contrast to mental states and 
processes. And we may also defend the point, and perhaps more forcefully, by drawing on 
Kripke: even the ideal agent (with perfect recall and access to his mental states and 
processes) cannot determine whether plus or quus was meant and so there cannot be a fact 
of the matter (concerning mental states or processes) as to which function was meant.®®
Thus, if  intentions and meanings are not properly viewed as mental states or processes, 
Imowledge o f intentions should not involve an inference to a mental state or process. That 
is, gaining an understanding of the intentions o f others should not involve having to pierce 
through — by an act of inference or interpretation — to their conscious mental states or 
processes. This is not conclusive that knowledge o f the intentions o f others is not inferential 
or interpretative in some other way, but again a once putative source o f our intuition to the 
contrary is denied.®^
Third, sceptical considerations weigh in to show us that if we are to have Imowledge 
of the intentions o f others at all, then there must be a way to acquire this knowledge without
88 And o f  course we can extend tlie point, in similar fasliion, to say that tliere is no physical or behavioural fact 
as to which function was meant.
8^  The intuition being challenged assumes that intentions are mental states or processes. Hence, on tiiis 
assumption we camiot have knowledge o f  the intentions o f  others without inferring or Interpreting (i.e., some
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interpreting. As discussed (at length) for us to be able to grasp a rule requites that we be 
able to understand it without interpreting. But this requires that we be able to understand it 
as it was intended (for otherwise any set of instructions can be interpreted in an indefinite 
number o f ways; indeed, if  we have no knowledge of the intention “behind” them at all then 
we do not have knowledge that they are even instructions; they are just marks on a piece of 
paper or sounds in the ak). But if  we must interpret someone’s intentions (concerning how 
a rule or its instructions are to be followed), then the sceptical line o f tliought that takes us 
to the paradox just repeats itself (for, presumably, there are indefinitely many ways of 
interpreting someone’s intentions). Hence, to have rule-following it is requked that we be 
able to understand (and follow) someone’s intentions with regard to a rule without 
interpretation (and o f course, this is to be able understand someone’s intentions from under 
the reactive mode). In this thkd line, the sceptical argument is taken as a reductio against the 
assumption that an understanding o f the intentions of another must involve interpreting.^® 
We see that the Cartesian defense o f our Intuition that we can have non-inferential 
and non-interpretative knowledge o f our intentions but not that of others is not of service. 
We see that the constitutive account, read from Wittgenstein, cannot serve this end for cases 
where the declarations are not constitutive and, moreover as I claim, does not endeavour to 
serve this end at all; the constitutive account does allow us to maintain a claim to a special 
authority over our intentions and that this serves to maintain a first/thkd-person asymmetry 
in the Imowledge of intentions. In addition, we have three considerations in favour of 
turning on this intuition. Aside from tlie thkd  consideration above, the considerations do
mediated way o f  midei'standin^ for we lack immediate access to tliese; we are not the ones who have the 
mental states or processes in question. But as this assumption is challenged here, so is tlie intuition.
As noted in the first consideration above, the point here can also be combined with that involving the private 
language argument to the effect that if  we are to have non-inferential knowledge o f our intentions then others 
must be able to do so as well — see above.
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not contend to be conclusive of the point that we can have non-inferential and non- 
interpretative Imowledge o f tlie intentions o f others. The objective is more to show that our 
intuition that only we can have non-inferential and non-interpretative Imowledge of our 
intentions is not as well founded as we may suppose; and furtiier, as these points are drawn 
from Wittgenstein, it is thereby argued that he does not intend for us to maintain this 
intuition (and so non-inferential and non-interpretative Imowledge of the intentions of 
others is affirmed by Wittgenstein). I will finish this section with a discussion o f how the 
possibility o f non-inferential and non-interpretative knowledge of the intentions o f others 
secures agreement in judgement or application o f rules (and thereby enables rule-following 
under the reactive mode).
VI. iii. Non-inferential Knowledge of Intentions and Agreement in Judgement
Wittgenstein argues that we can follow a rule from an underdetermined understanding; that 
we can proceed without reasons that justify the course o f action we adopt. This involves 
following a rule “bHndly”. I f  we can have non-inferential and non-interpretative knowledge 
of intentions, o f our own and o f others’, then we can come to understand how it is that a 
rule or set o f instructions can be so followed. Let us take an example. We want it to be the 
case that a pupÜ can come to understand the instructions for the rule add-2 without 
interpreting those instructions. But this means that the pupil must be able to come to 
understand the instructions as intended without interpretation.®^ And so, an understanding of 
instructions requires an understanding of intentions (of others, presumably o f  those that
As noted, if  the pupil has no knowledge o f  the instructions as intended, he has no knowledge that they are 
even instructions — they are just empty marks or sounds. What makes them “mstructions” is an understandiug 
o f  their intended use.
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provide or author the instructions). But this should not be taken to mean that these 
intentions stand alongside the instructions as a separate item to be understood: instructions 
must be understood as something intended to even be instructions. To suppose that 
instructions and intentions (regarding those instructions) are separate items to be understood 
in our grasp o f a rule presumes tiiat an understanding o f these intentions adds to our 
understanding o f the instructions and, doubtless, serves to settle the correct interpretation of 
the instructions (and notice that tiiis is to fully accept a view o f grasping a rule as proceeding 
under the interpretative mode). This view violates AR** for it supposes that an 
understanding o f intentions is separate from an understanding that we gain from instructions 
and explanations (and it does not help that we may speak o f the intention as being “behind” 
the instructions). Further, to avoid rerunning the sceptical argument, there must be a way to 
grasp these intentions (“behind the instructions”) without interpreting. And o f course, this 
means that tiie pupil must be capable of understanding intentions that are not his own 
without interpreting.®^
We may approach this thought a littie differently. Wittgenstein affirms that when I 
give instructions for a rule I can tell the pupil all I Imow; hence, since I  do not need to 
interpret this set of instructions to foUow the rule — and since the pupü is given as much to 
work with as I have — he should not have to interpret. This point is a variant o f AR** and is 
expressed here: “ “But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself 
understand? D on’t you get him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples, - but 
he has to guess their drift, to guess your intention.” — Every explanation which I can give
2^ This may be expressed in saying the pupil must be able to understand our custom for following tlie rule; ie ., 
an understanding o f  the collective or communal intentions for how a rule is to be followed is an understanding 
o f  its custom. But again, a custom must be understood without interpretation to enable rule-following from an 
understanding o f  a custom — see Chapter 3 for details. The description o f  custom here as a “collective or
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myself I give to him too.” (PI 210) As expressed, I am not in a privileged position 
concerning what I know o f a rule: I have told him aU I know. Thus, if I can follow these 
same instructions without interpretation, so can the pupil. Wittgenstein is at pains to affirm 
that I do not keep something back — something Hkened to an understanding o f how the rule 
is intended — when I convey to someone how to follow a rule. He receives as much as I 
have myself and so should be able to follow the rule with the same ease. The thought here is 
that when I communicate a set o f instructions, I also communicate my intentions for how 
they are to be followed; my intentions are not a separate item to the instructions and are 
certainly not a separate item left behind to be interpreted.
It may be unclear how it is that we come to understand the intentions lying behind a 
set o f instructions. Indeed, it may stiU seem a mystery how we are to do this without 
inferring or interpreting. But this sentiment is largely driven, as I tried to disclose in the last 
sub-section, by the intuitions tliat intentions are hidden or private, that we must pierce 
tlirough to them (and the locution that an intention “lies behind” an utterance or instruction 
only reinforces this thought). We have it argued, by way of AR**, that an understanding of 
a rule does not transcend an understanding o f instructions, and so intentions cannot lie 
behiud instructions as something separate to be grasped. And we have it argued that we 
must be able to come to grasp the intentions o f others without interpreting on pain o f 
sceptical paradox. Much o f the puzzlement concerning how this feat is turned, I suspect, is 
due to the entrenchment o f these intuitions. But it is in an understanding o f the intentions 
of others that we have an answer to how agreement in judgement is achieved.
We can achieve agreement in application or judgement if we can follow instructions 
as they are intended. For in following a set o f instructions as tliey are intended we apply the
communal intention” serves to show tiie means by wliich I expect custom directs our rule-following behaviour:
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mie as those that author and provide the instructions would apply them (for presumably 
they do not apply the instmctions differendy than they intend for others to apply them). For 
instance, if the pupil applies the instructions as they are intended by his teacher he applies 
the rule as does the teacher. Hence, a conformity or agreement in application is achieved as 
a result o f a non-inferential and non-interpretative understanding o f the intentions of others. 
In a given language game, we apply rules in the same way because we commonly understand 
how those rules are intended to be followed. When someone brealrs a rule but gives, in liis 
defense, an interpretation which shows his action consistent with the rule, we may tell him 
he is not following the rule or instructions as intended (in a law court, we may say that he is 
nevertheless acting against the “spirit” o f the law or tliat his defense, consistent as it may be, 
is in “bad faith” and this is supposed to be binding on the defendant).
So, we see that agreement in judgement or application (and so following a rule under 
the reactive mode) involves being able to grasp the intentions o f others without inference 
and interpretation. It was earlier shown diat this need not run contrary to our intuitions 
concerning first/third-person asymmetry in the knowledge o f intentions. These intuitions 
are not denied but are argued to be modified. We have noted above that the subject still has 
a special autliority. We may also add that tliere is still a measure o f asymmetry with regard to 
access: I do not know o f my intentions through an interpretation or inference (although this 
is not without the possibility o f exception); others, in contrast, sometimes interpret and infer 
and sometimes not (they understand my intentions under both the reactive and interpretative 
modes with greater incidence). The considerations raised only attest that others must be 
able to understand my intentions non-inferentially and without interpreting, not that they 
always do or that they never stand as interpreters. Hence, there is also this asymmetric
in virtue o f  an understanding o f  the intentions o f others (but writ large),
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difference: I know of my intentions without interpreting and without inferring with less 
exception tiian do others. Someone may come to interpret my intentions concerning a rule 
for reason that he is not sure how I mean for a set o f instructions to be applied at some step. 
In  response, Wittgenstein says, “So in this case he could ask; and I could and should answer 
him.” {PI 210). But if it were not possible for him to understand my intentions for how a 
rule is to be followed without interpreting, he would no t be able to follow a rule from my 
instructions. A t any rate, the account here is not yet a complete answer to how it is that the 
intentions o f others are understood non-inferentially and non-interpretatively. Nonetheless, 
it is shown that this need not deny a first/third person asymmetry in  the Imowledge of 
intentions; that this is what is involved in following a rule blindly or from under the reactive 
mode; and that this serves to explain how it is that agreement in judgement is attained.^^
VII. Concluding Remarks
This chapter attempts to convey how rule-following is possible in light o f sceptical 
considerations raised in the rule-following remarks. It is thereby an attempt at a positive 
programme in answer to tiie negative agenda developed in Chapter 2 and further described
McDoweU seems to offer something in the way o f  a response to the question o f  how we follow a rule in a 
way tliat involves a non-inferential understanding o f  another’s intentions. He describes that linguistic 
behaviour must be understood, not as it is on tlie ''surface”, but as contentful (and we may here say in 
substitute that linguistic behaviour must be understood as it is intended). McDowell adds that a "command o f  
the language is needed in order to put one in direct cognitive contact with that in which someone’s meaning 
consists. (This might seem to represent command o f  die language as a mystetious sort o f  X-ray vision; but 
only in tlie context o f  the rejected conception o f  the surface.)” (McDowell [1984], p. 348) The notion of  
"direct cognitive command” is at once promising and opaque. McDowell, elsewhere, describes this notion, in 
virtue o f which we just "see” meanings, as somediing in the order o f  a perceptual capacity (McDowell [1981b], 
p. 239). However, McDowell does not do well to expand the notion. The perceptual metaphors, i f  they are 
metaphors, do not deepen our understanding o f  following a rule non-inferendally or without interpretation; 
they seem to say no more tlian what I find readüy agreeable: to understand a rule without interpretation we 
must understand how it is intended (and to do this witliout interpretation); i.e., we cannot understand 
instructions without interpretation if  we take them at their "surface” but must understand them as they are
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in Chaptef 3. This positive task, however, is more difficult to complete than the negative 
(and the account here is admittedly short o f a complete picture, although I see this as an 
opportunity for interesting future work). This is because Wittgenstein’s positive 
pronouncements are less systematically presented and their development less sustained than 
are the negative (even by his standards o f systematic presentation). However, very much can 
be said in favour o f a positive agenda and its disparate presentation just means that this 
chapter must unfold differently than the others. Different strands o f thought and lines of 
argument are joined together to provide argument for and explanation o f this positive 
agenda.
To this end, it is first argued that this positive agenda, and the moral o f the sceptical 
argument, takes the form of a mode o f rationality different fi:oni that which involves 
interpretation; that is, a way o f rationally responding to instructions in a rule that does not 
involve interpreting. This is a way o f responding to rule instruction that is unmoved by the 
underdetermination o f the instructions (unmoved for not finding them indeterminate); it 
involves understanding how to follow a rule from reasons that run short o f justifying a 
unique (let alone the correct) course o f action. This involves what has been called following 
a rule “blindly” (for there seems to be an epistemic leap involved in coming to follow a rule 
correctly from instructions that can be interpreted consistently in indefinitely many ways). 
And tliis is a mode o f rationality where agreement in application is the criterion with which 
we say tliat the rule has been understood correctly. This is the reactive mode of rationality 
and much space is given to explaming this mode, why there must be such a mode, and its 
interaction with the interpretative mode (e.g., an account is given explaining how changes in
intended ot as content-beating. I f  they are more than metaphors, though, then they become truly puzzling. At 
any rate, a clear solution, let alone a clear 'Wittgensteinian one, does not seem to be on offer here.
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common rule-following practice, a point o f criticism of Kripke’s sceptical solution, is 
enabled by the play o f both modes).
An account o f following a rule under the reactive mode is m et with considerations 
that approach directly and others that proceed architecturally: these speak to the form of, 
and offer constraints on, a possible account. With regard to the latter, it is noted that an 
account o f tlie epistemology of grasping and following a rule under the reactive mode — of 
what it is to follow a rule blindly — should not aim to be a determinative account; i.e., we 
should not aim to justify blind rule-following. This would be to provide an account of 
following a rule under the reactive niode to the standards o f the interpretative mode of 
rationality and this is a hopeless task: we cannot account for what it is to understand under 
one mode to the standards o f the other (this is what it means to have two modes or 
standards o f rationali^. W hat we should aim for is an explanation o f the reactive mode and 
o f the operation o f normative constraints that do no t determine but nevertheless serve to 
guide rule-following behaviour and lead to conformity of application. Furthermore, it is 
noted that agreement in judgement or application is necessary for rule-following (we see this 
with the case o f the deviant pupil and tiiis point is elaborated in Section IV). However, as 
argued (in Section V  on Sameness), agreement in application is not achieved through a 
separate act of understanding. Agreement in application, in other words, is a correctness 
criterion (under the reactive mode o f rationality) but not an epistemic criterion for following 
a rule. Thus, an account of how we achieve agreement in application from an 
underdetermined understanding of a rule should not argue that we do so through a separate 
act o f understanding.
In addition, it is stated (in Section II. vii., on Bedrock and Sub-bedrock) that non- 
normative considerations about ourselves or our form of life (i.e., considerations about
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ourselves available to investigation by the physical and social sciences) offer explanations o f 
why we commonly apply rules. These explanations are not determinative, but as noted, tiiis 
is not required anyway. This is one (fairly obvious) line o f answer after our conformity in 
application.
Another line of answer is to look to actual cases (as Wittgenstein advises in P I 201). 
In  actual cases, we observe that we proceed blindly (in the epistemic sense described) and 
without consideration o f alternatives, and attain conformity of application even though, at 
any step, alternatives may be available tliat are consistent with our understanding of the rule 
(i.e., in actual cases we observe that we do not interpret even though we could). This line o f 
answer is therapeutic: it aims to dispel our philosophical dissatisfaction by showing us that 
we are not dissatisfied in actual cases. The chess illustration draws this out: in scenarios 2 
and 3 the players proceed one way and the other, respectively between the scenarios, without 
noticing the ambiguity in the rule (and so without noticing that they could stop to interpret). 
Scenario 1 shows that they could, but this just draws out that we always could doubt but not 
tliat we do doubt (PI 213).
Furthermore, (in Section III) it is argued that our understanding o f a rule under tlie 
reactive mode, where we follow rules blindly, is characterised by a lack o f a c/ear conception 
o f an alternative practice (at least for bedrock or necessary rules). We could have some 
conception o f an alternative practice, and so have some conception o f proceeding 
differently, but the lack o f a clear conception explains, to an extent, why it is that we do not 
doubt our application o f a rule even though we could. And lastly, (in Section VI) it is argued 
that our intuitive view o f the first/third-person asymmetry in the knowledge o f intentions is 
not damaged if we admit that we can have non-inferential and non-interpretative Imowledge 
o f the intentions o f others. This Imowledge enables conformity in application for we
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understand how to follow a rule as others intend for us, and presumably, also for themselves 
(for by AR**, they do not understand more o f the rule than what they can convey to us; and 
so if an understanding o f intentions is relevant to an understanding o f how to follow a rule 
from a set o f instructions, this understanding o f intentions should no t be lost in the giving 
and understanding o f instructions).
In  closing, Wittgenstein does not deny that we may, at any point for most any rule, 
come to doubt or interpret. His plain response is to say that there is nevertheless a way to 
follow a rule without an interpretation (PI 201) and without coming to doubt (PI 213).
There is an important distinction here: there is a way o f grasping a rule that does not involve 
an interpretation and fliere is way that does, which I have described as grasping a rule under 
the “reactive” and “interpretative” modes respectively. Wittgenstein, o f course, does not 
talk explicitly in these terms (for it is likely too much theorising) but, as I have tried to show, 
there is a distinction in the way we come to grasp rules that is captured in the account o f 
these two modes. This separation o f modes, Kripke, constitutes an accommodation of 
the sceptical conclusion: in what effectively stands as a warning, (for almost any rule, i.e., at 
least sameness excepted) we may come to interpret or doubt our way o f following a rule, but 
the possibility of following a rule reactively shows us that we need not.
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CONCLUSION
A view has emerged in this thesis o f different castes o f rules. We have, beginning in Chapter 
2, a distinction made between basic and non-basic rules. In one sense, the notion o f a basic 
rule is purely relative: a rule that must be understood for another rule to be understood (e.g., 
counting for addition), but not vice-versa, is a comparatively basic rule. But since we cannot 
continue forever, to ever more foundational rules presupposed in our understanding o f any 
given rule, we must, it seems, arrive at rules that are truly basic (rules that do not presuppose 
an understanding o f a further level o f basic rules, although we may want to say that any of 
these basic rules cannot be understood mdependently; and so we may admit, or at least it is 
not inconsistent to admit, a holism at the base level). Another approach to the notion of 
basic rules lies in the discussion o f bedroclc. Bedrock is described as the point where our 
reasons run out, where our attempts at justification end, and this gives rise to a notion of 
rules at bedrock which must be understood to understand other rules but themselves cannot 
be further justified by bringing in other rules. Bedrock gives us another way o f talking about 
basic rules. These are rules which must be followed blindly, i.e., under the reactive mode, 
because they are followed wifliout justifying or vindicating reasons (we cannot foUow tliese 
rules from under die interpretative mode because, from under this mode the course of 
action we pursue in following the rule will seem arbitrary precisely because we have run out 
o f reasons that would serve to justify this course of action over others).
But among basic rules — among those grasped and followed blindly — we see a special 
and fundamental status given to the rule pertaining to sameness or accordance. An 
understanding o f any odier particular rule presupposes an understanding o f sameness and 
this in turn does not presuppose an understanding of any other particular rule. As explained, 
a correct grasp o f sameness, i.e., a grasp that is the “same” as that o f others, is a necessary 
condition for enjoining in linguistic communication with others. And so, although this
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understanding, as with that o f other rules, is gained through means that are 
underdeterrnining, it is not the case that this understanding can be seen as open to 
interpretation, or that someone can even latch on to a deviant interpretation. A nd this to say 
that sameness must be grasped blindly and must be grasped correctly. And it does not seem 
that the same can be said of any other particular rule (although we should want to say the 
same is true o f basic rules taken generally, as described in Chapter 4),
The upshot o f the negative programme, presented in Chapter 2, was that we cannot 
but obtain an underdetermined understanding o f a rule. While admitting that grasping a rule 
need not involve interpreting (on pain o f  paradox), and thus that we are not led to a sceptical 
conclusion as a result, we are nonetheless left with an understanding o f a rule in which the 
full and correct application is not determined. This is a sceptical consideration to be 
reckoned with even though we escape a sceptical conclusion. And so an account is needed 
explaining how it is that we can come to follow a rule from an underdetermined 
understanding without coming to see it as indeterminate in what it proscribes. It is certainly 
not denied that tliis is a common occurrence: we can readily find that instructions can be 
interpreted in indefinitely many ways, were we to try, but this poses no epistemic difficulty in 
our commonplace grasping o f rules from sets of instructions. But that this is commonplace, 
to respond in this way, shows the same of our ability to follow a rule blindly and this 
involves grasping rules in a way that does not involve viewing them or their instructions as 
open to interpretation. It is this account tliat is pieced together in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 is 
long (apologies to the reader) and, for all tliat, not a complete account. But its success lies in 
laying tlie framework for what a proper account should be — viz., that this be an account of 
an alternative mode o f rational response to instruction in a rule — and also in taldng certain 
steps in fleshing out this account o f what it is to follow a rule “blindly” and how it is that
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agreement in judgement is achieved in spite o f the noted sceptical consideration. This is the 
positive programme given in response to the negative programme described in Chapter 2. 
Commentary on Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks, especially since Kripke, has focussed 
on the negative considerations without much discussion of the positive (indeed, Wright even 
finds for Wittgenstein being a “quietist” about a positive agenda). Chapter 4, thus, offers 
some needed balance and shows that Wittgenstein, although perhaps less obviously so, is 
also a constructive philosopher.
Some final words on where we stand on the issue of radical conventionalism, the 
issue with which the thesis begins and that ties the first chapter to the rest, are due. In the 
first chapter, I dealt with the charge of radical conventionalism as it applies to the concept 
modification thesis and strong verificationism. I take that issue to be closed and that the 
chapter, as a result, is fairly self-contained. Concerning the charge o f radical 
conventionalism as it arises out o f rule-following considerations, the point was made that 
this charge is well incorporated into a sceptical reading of the rule-following remarks. A 
response to how we are able to follow a rule (truly follow, which requires that we be guided 
and do not decide at any given step) despite these sceptical considerations is a response to 
the charge o f radical conventionalism. Thus, the charge of radical conventionalism was 
swallowed, as it were, into the larger discussion o f scepticism and rule-following. But since 
the discussion o f scepticism, and its response, is the dominant theme carrying through the 
chapters on rule-following, the issue o f radical conventionalism was always close to the fore.
Given this incorporation into the sceptical readiug, tine response to the charge of 
radical conventionalism, to be treated fully, involves the account we can give o f following a 
rule from an underdetermined understanding without interpreting (after all, it is the 
indefinitely many, and arbitrary, interpretations that are available of most any rule or set of
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instructions — as seen under die appropriate rational mode — that serves to leads us to the 
view that decision or choice has a role in our rule-following practice, even for rules we deem 
necessary). Alternatively stated, an account o f how and why it is that we do not decide is an 
account o f how and why it is that we are led or guided in following a rule (or, as it is put in 
PI 242 and treated in Chapter 4, Section IV, how and why it is that logic is not abolished for 
“logic”, in the looser sense employed by Wittgenstein, speaks to our being guided in 
following a rule). This is an account o f following a rule blindly. Thus a full account 
explaining why decision does not play a role in rule-following, as with the similar story 
concerning interpretation, is ultimately had in die account o f grasping and following a rule 
under die reactive mode.
But notice, a full account is more than we need to reject the charge o f radical 
conventionalism. Most simply, we may reject the point that, at any given step, the correct 
way to follow a rule is a matter decided, as we reject the point diat grasping a rule requires 
interpreting, on die basis of treating the argument to the contrary as a reductio. This is not a 
facde solution. A reductio-reading of radical conventionalism tells us that there must be a 
way to grasp the requirements o f a rule without deciding, and without being pressed to 
decide, and this, again, points to a way o f following a rule blindly or under the reactive mode 
(for decision makes sense as a decision over consistent interpretations; i.e., if  we do not see a 
rule or set of instructions as variously interpretable, and we are guided in following a rule 
despite having an understanding o f the requirements o f the rule that is underdetermined, 
tlien decision has no place in our determining the requirements o f the rule; when a rule is 
followed blindly it is not followed arbitrarily). Alternatively, and still quite simply, we may 
bring the discussion o f sameness into context. As explained, an understanding o f sameness 
is necessary for an understanding o f any rule (and a common understanding o f sameness is
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necessary for a common understanding o f any rule, and so for linguistic communication 
between individuals). But we cannot collectively decide to understand and apply the rule for 
sameness commonly (i.e., in the same way) for this would aheady presuppose an 
understanding o f sameness. As explained, we must be able to agree in judgement without 
this requiring a further epistemic move or decision and this is just what it is to follow a rule 
under the reactive mode. Lilcewise, and differently again, we may say that deciding, like 
interpreting, involves a linguistic sldll that is not without some sophistication; hence, 
deciding, like interpreting, cannot be a part o f an account o f our acquiting that basic 
linguistic sldU (this is a point made, in a different setting, first in Section II. vi., where it was 
argued that basic or bedrock rules must be grasped under the reactive mode, i.e., blindly, if 
they are to be grasped at ah). A t any rate, a fuh account o f tlie reactive mode is not required 
for a rejection o f this role for decision, as with that for interpretation, along these fines.
In tlie end, what I hope to have achieved, for myself and for the reader, is a 
deepened understanding o f Wittgenstein’s thoughts, in particular, those on rule-fbhowing; 
that core o f thought that sustains — fike a root — Ms views on meaning, understanding, and 
rationality. Wittgenstein is difficult to understand, in tMs area as in others. That is fairly 
obvious, and tMs much seems to remain constant fitom early to middle to later periods. As a 
response to tliis difficulty, one approach to the material, among the many commenting on 
Wittgenstein, sees theit task as a scholarly endeavour. Exegesis is important, and there 
certainly are points in tMs thesis where I give tMs special attention, but it is of limited value 
in gaining an understanding. And tMs is because the real difficulty in understanding 
Wittgenstein is the difficulty of philosophy, of engaging the issues that engaged Mm. The 
struggle o f understanding him is a measure o f Ms struggle to understand, less taxing (we 
should hope) for having Ms help, in the form of Ms writings, but still a struggle. The best
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tradition among philosophers that work on Wittgenstein, in my view, sees the material in this 
light: as something to be engaged; as a struggle, less o f  deciphering seemingly obscure 
passages, and more o f understanding and grappling with difficult issues. It is these 
philosophers that I have focussed on — borrowing from some and challenging others, 
gaining insight from aU — and it is to this engagement with Wittgenstein that I hope to have 
made a contribution.
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A Handy Reference Sheet Of Key Points And Arguments
From the Chapter.
RC: The logical necessity o f any statement is decided.
CM: A proof serves to modify the sense o f a mathematical proposition.
CM*: A proof serves to modify the sense o f a mathematical proposition and it is not
possible to give an account o f how this sense has been modified.
SV: The sense o f a mathematical proposition is its proof.
SV*: The sense o f a mathematical proposition is the method of checking it.
From the 2"  ^Chapter and on.
RFl: There is a correct way to follow a rule.
RF2: Indefinitely many courses o f action can be interpreted to be in accord with the
instructions for a rule.
RF3: Any or every course o f action can be interpreted to be in accord with tlie
instructions for a rule.
AR** The understanding o f a rule does not transcend an understanding o f an 
explanation o f or instructions in the rule.
CP. I f  AR** is not true o f the understanding of a rule, then the understanding o f the
rule is necessarily private.
The Sceptical-Inductive Argument
SI. Instructions cannot but underdetermine a rule, [from the case for RF2 above]
82. The understanding of a rule does not transcend an understanding o f an 
explanation o f or instructions in the rule, [firom AR** above]
53. Therefore, the understanding o f a rule is underdetermined.
54. An underdetermined understanding o f a rule requites that the rule be 
interpreted to be understood (and followed).
55. But if a rule must be interpreted to be understood (and followed), then we fall 
prey to a sceptical paradox.
56. Therefore, we fall prey to a sceptical paradox (alternatively, there is no rule- 
foUowin^.
The Sceptical-Conceptual Argument
C l. Indefinitely many courses o f action can be interpreted to be in accord witli the 
instructions for a rule. [RF2]
C2. I f  indefinitely many courses o f action can be interpreted to be in accord with the 
instructions for a rule, then any (or every) course o f action can be interpreted to 
be in accord with the instructions for a rule. [RF2 RF3]
C3. I f  any (or every) course o f action can be interpreted to be in accord with the 
instructions for a rule, then no course o f action is determined by the instructions 
for a rule. [From P I 201]
C4. I f  no course o f action is determined by tlie instructions for a rule, then there is 
no rule-following. [Also from P I 201]
C5. Therefore, there is no rule-fbHowing.
